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This paper has updated the assessment of the Commission’s forecasts’ track record from 
1999 by extending the observation period from 1969-1997 to also take into account the 
forecasts and outcome for the years 1998-2005. This update has also included some further 
tests on e.g. informational efficiency and undertaken a comparison with the forecasts of 
other international institutions and those of market participants. Variables have been chosen 
and data processed in a broadly similar manner compared to the study of 1999 to ensure 
comparability to the greatest degree possible. 
Overall, the Commission's forecasts continue to dispose a reasonable track record. Forecasts 
for the EU generally seem to be unbiased, efficient and display a high success rate for 
directional accuracy. The same holds true for the outlook for most Member States, although 
there are individual examples to the contrary. Moreover, in view of the importance of the 
international environment in explaining past forecast errors, it is reassuring to note that the 
forecasts for the largest non-EU countries generally seem to perform well. Finally, the 
Commission's forecasts' track record for GDP is broadly comparable with the ones of 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The track record of the Commission was first examined in the economic paper no. 137 of 
1999 by F. Keereman. Based on both a set of traditional tests for examining the quality of 
predictions, he argued that the Commission forecasts disposed a reasonable track record, see 
Box 1. In particular, it was stressed that there was no strong evidence of the Commission 
presenting an overly optimistic short-term outlook of the EU economy.  
Box 1: Main conclusion from the original study of the Commission's track record from 1999 
The paper argues that the Commission forecasts dispose of a reasonable track record.  Most of the traditional 
tests for examining the quality of predictions are passed in a satisfactory way.  The comparisons with forecasts 
made by the IMF, OECD and national forecast institutes are not unfavourable for the European Commission.  
In particular it is found that there is no strong evidence of presenting an overly optimistic picture of the 
economy in the Commission short-term forecasts.  The rosy gloss which, according to some, sometimes hangs 
over the Commission forecasts is related to some form of cycle denial.  This could maybe lead to an optimistic 
bias further ahead in the future, but applying this to the short-term forecasts of the European Commission is 
unjustified. 
The purpose of this update is to examine whether the ex-post accuracy of the Commission's 
fully-fledged projections has changed in recent years. This is done by extending the 
observation period from 1969-1997 to take into account the forecasts and outcome for the 
years 1998-2005.  
To ensure comparability with the initial testing, variables have been chosen and data 
processed in a broadly similar manner as done in 1999. The focus has been on those tests 
where the results are likely to change with a longer sample period. Some further tests have 
also been carried out on e.g. informational efficiency to exploit the methodological progress 
made lately and further deepen the analysis on how well the forecasts perform (see, for 
instance, Timmermann (2006)). A comparison with the forecasts of other international 
institutions and those of market participants have also been carried out. In addition, 
bootstrapping has been used in this update for the tests for unbiasedness and absence of 
serial correlation to reduce the risks of misleading results, especially in view of the small 
sample sizes for some of the Member States and for the euro area. 
It should be noted from the outset that there may be many reasons behind forecast errors 
going beyond the ability of the forecaster. They can inter alia be influenced by problems 
stemming from data availability, stability and volatility or from the realism of the external 
assumptions on which the forecast is based. The latter has proved to explain up to about 
60% of the forecast error in EU year-ahead forecasts for GDP and inflation in an earlier 
study (Keereman (2003)). In particular, the assessment of world GDP and trade is important, 
while erroneous assumptions on oil prices affect the inflation outlook. The assumptions on 
budgetary policy are also crucial in this respect, where the practise is to incorporate only 
those policy measures adopted by the authorities or, at least, known in sufficient detail. 
Moreover, it cannot be excluded that the Commission's forecasts for e.g. general 
government net lending for some Member States have, at times, provoked a (desirable) 
policy reaction, which thereby makes the forecast out-of-date. Conclusions on how well the 
forecasts perform for individual countries and variables must therefore be drawn with due 
care.  
This note is structured in the following way: the next section recalls how forecasting has 
evolved in the Commission and its current set-up. The third section presents the variables,   
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the dual focus on the EU aggregate and it's Member States and, finally, the distinction 
between forecasts for the "current year" and the "year ahead" as the forecast error may differ 
over the forecast horizon. The fourth section presents the methods used to test the accuracy 
of the Commission's forecasts. The main results are presented in the fifth section, before 
conclusions are drawn in the last section. The detailed outcome by Member State and the 
full comparison with the results of 1999 are presented in the subsequent annexes.   
2.  FORECASTING AT THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
An important impetus to forecasting stems from the early 1960's, when the Conjunctural 
Policy Committee offered a forum for discussion of the national budgets of the Member 
States together with the directorate general responsible for economic and financial affairs at 
the European Commission2 (DG II at the time). These discussions were based on the 
different national budgets and their underlying forecasts, while DG II presented the overall 
view and gave comments on the national submissions. However, since the Commission did 
not do forecasts on its own and as each country followed national practices, had different 
external assumptions etc., comparability was low and the aggregated overview probably 
inconsistent. Subsequently, a working group was created with a view to enhancing 
comparability with representatives of both DG II and the Member States.  
Following different steps, degree of consultation and coverage, DG II started to produce a 
full set of forecasts in parallel to the Member States from 1973 onwards. In order to limit the 
normative element of the projections, it started to only take into account those policy 
measures decided upon or known in sufficient detail in 1974 (in contrast to many Member 
States at the time). Such forecasts based on an unchanged policy assumption became the 
rule thereafter and are known as "probabilistic" or "positive" forecasts. As an exception, DG 
II made both "normative" and "positive" forecasts in 1976 and 1977, although clearly 
distinguishing between the two. Soon thereafter, the forecasts of DG II also became the 
basis for the discussion in the Working Group on Economic Budgets and the national 
experts were invited to comment upon them.  
The aim of the forecasts was initially to provide support to the preparation of the national 
budgets. It has gradually shifted to become the basis for the discussions on policy co-
ordination in general at the Community level.3 These discussions take place in both the 
Economic Policy Committee (replacing the Conjunctural Policy Committee) and in the 
Monetary Committee, which later transformed into today's Economic Financial Committee. 
The forecasts have been made public since the spring of 1982. 
At present the Commission produces two fully-fledged short-term macroeconomic forecasts 
every year, which are widely used as a basis for economic policy analysis. For instance, 
following the recent reform of the Stability and Growth Pact and related regulations, the 
forecasts play an important role in the Commission's budgetary surveillance.4 See also Box 2 
                                                 
2   The European Union (EU) and European Commission were only introduced with the Maastricht Treaty 
(1993), but are used throughout this study for reasons of simplicity, even if it would be more appropriate 
to refer to the European Economic Community (EEC) and its Commission for the period before 1993.  
3   C.f. the Council decision of 18 February 1974 on the attainment of a high degree of convergence of the 
economic policies of the Member States of the European Community (74/120/EEC). 
4     For example: Council regulation (EC) 1467/97 of July 1997 on speeding up the implementation of the 
excessive deficit procedure as amended by Council regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005   
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for a brief overview of the different types of forecasts currently produced by the 
Commission. 
Box 2: A brief overview of the Commission's different types of short-term forecasts and projections 
The Commission produces short-term macroeconomic forecasts twice a year. In 2007, these are published in 
early May and early November. These fully-fledged forecasts concentrate on the Member States, the euro area 
and the EU, but also include the outlook for the candidate countries as well as some non-EU countries. The 
forecast covers the current year and next of a total of 180 variables and is the result of several iterative rounds. 
The forecasts are not based on a centralised econometric model. Instead, they result from the analysis made by 
country desks, each of which uses statistical methods to varying degrees. The forecasts are checked for mutual 
consistency, in particular as regards trade flows. The EU and euro-area variables are not directly forecast, but 
obtained by aggregation. 
Starting in 2006 and in between the fully-fledged forecasts interim forecasts are produced, in which an update 
of real GDP growth and inflation is estimated for the seven largest Member States and for the current year 
only. The interim forecasts are largely prepared using indicator-based models.  
In addition, DG ECFIN runs a dynamic factor model on a monthly basis to make a projection of euro-area 
GDP growth for the coming quarters. This is done by distilling the relevant "factors" driving the euro-area 
business cycle from some 2.000 time series for the euro-area countries and is published as a model outcome on 
DG ECFIN’s web site.5 
Although the coverage in terms of countries and variables has increased over the years, the 
structure of the fully-fledged forecast rounds remains largely stable since the early 1980's 
(see Colasanti et al. (1982)).  
¾  A forecasting exercise lasts about two months and involves more than 60 members 
of staff.  
¾  The forecasts are prepared and discussed in three iterations elaborating the 
preliminary, provisional and final sets of forecasts.  
¾  The main forecasting work is carried out by the country desks using a judgmental 
approach.  
¾  The forecasts are prepared on a set of external assumptions that reflect the market 
expectations at the time of the forecast. To shield the assumptions from possible 
volatility during one specific trading day, averages from a 10-day reference period is 
used for exchange and interest rates as well as for oil prices.  
¾  It is a bottom-up process where the EU and euro-area variables are not directly 
forecast, but obtained by aggregation. However, plausibility tests of the (sum of the) 
forecasts are undertaken vis-à-vis area-wide statistics and the results of econometric 
                                                                                                                                                      
specifies that “[…] the excess of the reference value shall be considered temporary if budgetary forecasts 
as provided by the Commission indicate that the deficit will fall below the reference value following the 
end of the unusual event or the severe economic downturn.” (Art. 2) and that “[…] The Council shall 
assess the existence of unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for 
government finances against the economic forecast in its recommendation” (Art. 3 (5)) or “[…] in its 
notice” (Art. 5 (2)). Traditionally the forecast in the notice is the fully-fledged forecast by the 
Commission. 
5    The original bridge equation (c.f. P. Grasmann and F. Keereman 2001) was recently replaced by a 
dynamic factor model (c.f. D. Grenouilleau 2006).   
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model simulations using e.g. DG ECFIN’s QUEST model (Roeger and in’t Veld 
(1997)).  
¾  The QUEST model can also be used to calibrate alternative scenarios, quantifying 
e.g. the impact if one of the identified risks was to materialise. This was last done in 
the autumn 2006 forecast presenting the economic implications for the EU of a more 
marked correction of the US housing market.6  
¾  Other econometric models are also used in a systematic way, e.g. when introducing a 
fan-chart in the spring 2007 economic forecast. It provided a quantification of the 
risks identified to the outlook in terms of possible deviations from the central 
scenario. 
¾  Special attention is devoted to ensure consistency in trade flows for goods and 
services at the level of the Member State, the euro-area, the EU and the world (Jones 
(1983), Kieler (1995)).  
The forecasts continue to be prepared in close co-operation with the Member States, both in 
bilateral meetings during e.g. fact-finding missions and in the multilateral meeting between 
national experts and DG ECFIN in EPC's Working Group on Economic Forecasts. This is 
done on the basis of the provisional forecast. Following these discussions and other new 
information, the final version of the forecasts is prepared. Furthermore, the methodology for 
calculating potential output and the output gap has been agreed with Member States in the 
EPC and endorsed by the Ecofin Council. These estimates allows for an assessment of the 
cyclical stance of the economy and of the structural stance of fiscal policies in accordance 
with the Stability and Growth Pact. 
The forecasts are usually made public in a press conference by the Commissioner in charge 
of economic and financial affairs. He/she also informs the European Commission, i.e. the 
College of Commissioners, of the forecast, often together with a further information note on 
the forecasts' implication for budgetary surveillance. However, the forecasts are not adopted 
by the College and must be seen as technical work by one of the Commission's services. The 
forecasts are also presented to the European Parliament.  
3.  VARIABLES, AGGREGATES AND DATA 
3.1.  Variables 
To ensure comparability with the initial testing of the track record of the Commission's 
forecasts, variables have been chosen and data processed in a broadly similar manner as 
done in 1999.  
Of the 180 variables forecast by the Commission, six variables were tested that, taken 
together, should give a reasonable verdict of the accuracy of the forecasts: 
Real GDP growth and inflation were chosen for the key role they play in economic 
analysis in general. An important further test on the Commission's ability to correctly 
assess the economic development was done by including the most volatile of the demand 
                                                 
6    Economic forecasts-Autumn 2006, Box 2.3 in European Economy no. 5 (European Commission, 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs).   
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components: total investment. The testing has been done on annual changes (not levels) 
for these variables. 
Three other variables were selected in view of their importance for the policy debate: the 
unemployment rate as a share of the labour force, the general government balance as a 
percentage of GDP and the current account / GDP ratio.  
The definition of the variables may have altered over time, which could lead to a difference 
between the forecast and the outcome that should not necessarily be described as a forecast 
error. However, no attempt has been made to correct for this.  
3.2.  Aggregates 
The focus is on both the Member States and the EU aggregate. Following the successive 
enlargement, the EU has grown from six to 27 Member States at present. Keereman's 1999 
study reflects the variable composition of the EU. This implies that the weight of the 
founding Member States gradually decreased when the number of Member States increased. 
The 1999 study did include all 15 Member States following the 1995 enlargement, although 
Austria, Finland and Sweden were not examined individually due to a shortage of data to 
allow for any meaningful testing.  
The three countries that joined in 1995 as well as the euro area have now been added to the 
testing. Due to the small sample size the ten recently-acceded Member States (RAMSs) that 
joined in 2004 have not been examined, nor included in the EU aggregate. This also follows 
from a greater concern about their data availability, stability and quality. The EU thus 
continues to refer to the EU15 for 2004 and 2005. Nor have the two most recently-acceded 
Member States, Bulgaria and Romania that joined this year, been included in this study 
since the observation period is only extended to 2005.  
3.3.  Data 
Keereman selected two types of forecasts (and their respective outturn data) to capture how 
the forecast error may differ over the forecast horizon. The current-year forecast is 
concerned with the quality of the outlook carried out in the beginning of the year for that 
year, while the year-ahead forecast deals with the following year. The current-year forecasts 
are taken from the spring forecasts, whereas the year-ahead forecasts come from the autumn 
forecasts.7  
Similarly, a choice was made for the selection of the outturn data, where the realisation for 
the current-year forecasts are so-called "first available estimates" presented in the spring 
forecast in the following year (i.e. the outcome for year t is taken from the spring forecast in 
t+1), while the outturn data for the year-ahead forecast refer to the so-called "first settled 
estimates" presented in the autumn forecast following the year to be forecast (the outturn for 
year t+1 is taken from the autumn forecast in year t+2).  
It should be noted that selection of forecast and outturn data is not without importance since 
it could influence both the size of the forecast error and its interpretation. Although there is 
no single universally accepted definition, a certain common practise has developed over the 
                                                 
7    From 1971 to 1989, the Commission prepared three forecasts a year, when the spring and autumn 
forecasts were complemented with either a summer or a winter outlook.    
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years.8 It takes e.g. note of the fact that a swift confirmation of the forecast may be more 
important for the shorter-term forecast (that of the current year), while a more precise 
measure can be used for the year-ahead outlook. 
It could of course be argued that it would be more appropriate to compare the forecast with 
the final data. However, in view of the sizeable revisions that occur over the years as a result 
of new information and of methodological changes, final data are based on a different 
information set than that available to the forecaster. The interpretation of the forecast error 
would therefore be far from clear-cut. However, it is important for policy makers to be 
aware that preliminary information, which is needed to allow for a timely policy reaction 
under e.g. the Stability and Growth Pact, may still be subject to large revisions, often several 
quarters after the publication of the first estimate, and that these revisions differ across 
countries.9 
4.  METHODS USED FOR ASSESSING THE ACCURACY OF THE COMMISSION'S FORECASTS 
There are many different ways of assessing the quality of a forecast going beyond the desire 
that its forecast errors are minimised. Indeed, the size of a forecast error may not appear 
overly problematic, within reasonable limits, as long as it is not systematic. For instance, the 
forecasts should be unbiased (thus no systematic over- or under prediction of a variable) and 
the errors uncorrelated. 
It must be recalled that shorter data samples for some of the Member States are a concern 
that may aggravating cross-country comparisons. Small samples may also cause violations 
of the standard distributional assumptions, which may produce misleading conclusions from 
asymptotic tests. To deal with this issue we designed a bootstrap experiment that is 
described below.  
In line with the 1999 study we define the forecast errors as follows: 
et,t = yt,t – yt for the current year, and  
et+1,t = yt+1,t – yt+1 for the year ahead;  
where yt,t and yt+1,t are the forecasts made at t for period t and t+1 respectively. yt is the 
realisation for year t, and yt+1 is the one for year t+1. 
The following sub-sections describe the statistics calculated, and the econometric tests 
performed in order to assess the accuracy of the Commission’s forecasts. 
4.1.  Summary statistics for data sample and forecast errors 
Before turning to the statistical techniques for testing non-model based forecasts, some 
elementary statistics will be provided to give a first indication of the data sample and how 
the forecasts perform: 
                                                 
 8   See, for instance, the evaluations carried out on IMF's World Economic Outlook by Kenen and Schwarz 
in 1986, Artis in 1996 or Timmermann in 2006.  
9   Godo Mora L. and J. Nogueira Martins (2007)   
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The standard deviation (STD) of the realisations is a measure of the variables volatility, 
recalling that the more volatile a variable is, the more difficult it usually is to predict.   
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A percentage of positive forecast errors close to 50 per cent would be an indication of 
weakly efficient forecasts.   
4.2.  A comparison with naïve forecast techniques  
It is also important to assess the performance of the forecasts compared to other prediction 
techniques. The study of 1999 compared the value of the Commission’s forecasts to naïve or 
easily available alternatives, namely a “no change forecast,” i.e. a random walk, and an 
“average forecast,” i.e. an average over the whole series of the realisations. The statistics 
presented, called THEIL110 and THEIL2, show the ratio of the RMSE of the Commission’s 
forecasts to the RMSE of the “no change” and “average” forecasts, respectively. In this 
update a further comparison was added, called THEIL2*, where the Commission’s outlook 
was compared to a so-called recursive-mean forecast. This was done since the overall mean 
is a theoretical concept that can only be calculated ex-post at the end of the sample period, 
whilst the recursive mean can be calculated at the time of each forecast. The results of the 
three THEIL statistics suggest in the case of a ratio below one that the Commission’s 
forecasts outperform the naïve ones.    
                                                 
10   It should be noted that for the current year, the “no change forecast” uses the latest available realisation, 
while for the year-ahead outlook it is based on the latest available forecast (i.e. the spring forecast for the 
current year). Thus, the forecast error for the “no change forecast” is defined as et,t = yt-1 - yt for the current 
year, and as et+1,t = yt,t – yt+1 for the year ahead.   
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4.3.  Persistence of forecast errors 
It is important to ensure that once a forecast error is made, it does not feed into the next 
forecasts. As a first check for correlation in the forecast errors, and thus for rejection of the 
weak efficiency hypothesis we present autocorrelation coefficients up to three lags.  Their 
significance is tested using the Ljung-Box test. A p-value below 0.05 indicates that the null 
hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation in the forecast errors is rejected at the 5% level of 
significance.        
4.4.  Absence of bias 
The report tested for the absence of bias since some forecasters, particularly public national 
or international forecasters, are frequently accused of presenting overly optimistic 
predictions. One important finding of the original study was thus the absence of a bias in the 
Commission’s short-term forecasts. Unbiasedness is tested by running the following simple 
regression: 
et,t = α + εt                                                                                                                (1) 
for the current year, and 
et+1,t = α + εt+1                                                                                                            (2) 
for the year ahead; where ε is assumed to be a zero-mean normally distributed error term. 
The null hypothesis H0 : α=0 is then tested with a simple t-test. As in the original report, the 
test was additionally carried out for two sub-periods, the first until 1982 and the second 
starting in 1983 (which is when the current forecast procedures were established), in order to 
test for a possible change in bias in the two sub-periods. A p-value below 0.05 would imply 
the occurrence of a bias or (in the case of the additional test) a change in bias between the 
two periods statistically significant at the 5% level. 
4.5.  Efficiency tests 
Forecasts are deemed efficient if all information available at the time of the forecast is used. 
4.5.1.  Weak efficiency 
As a first step and as in the 1999 paper we initially test for weak efficiency by assuming that 
the information available is equal to the forecast itself. The test is carried out with the 
traditional realisation-forecast equation (Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969)): 
yt = α + βyt,t + εt                                                                                                       (3)  
for the current year, and  
yt+1 = α + βyt+1,t + εt+1                                                                                                       (4) 
for the year ahead. We then employ an F-test for the joint null hypothesis, Ho: α = 0 and β = 
1. If the null is not rejected, the forecasts are said to be weakly efficient. It should be 
recalled, however, that serial correlation may be present in the residuals, which would affect 
inference. The Durbin-Watson statistic is therefore presented to give an indication of this 
problem (if DW is low). Alternatively, it could be checked by looking at the persistence of 
forecast errors (see section 4.3).    
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Secondly, as a complement to the tests for unbiasedness and weak efficiency with Mincer-
Zarnowitz regressions, this update introduced a further test for weak efficiency, where the 
forecast error is regressed on a constant and on the lagged error, i.e. 
et,t = α + βet-1,t-1 + εt                                                                                                   (5) 
for the current year, and 
et+1,t = α + βet,t-1 + εt+1                                                                                               (6) 
for the year ahead. Tests are made on the coefficients both separately (t-tests) and jointly (F-
test). Numbers below 0.05 would imply the occurrence of bias and/or serial correlation in 
the former case, and a rejection of the weak efficiency hypothesis in the latter case. 
A bootstrap experiment 
In order to obtain more robust conclusions from inference we designed a bootstrap 
experiment that was applied on regressions 5 and 6, specifically on the individual tests for 
unbiasedness and for absence of serial correlation. The advantage of bootstrapping is that we 
can avoid the normality as well as any other distributional assumption as inference will be 
based on the constructed empirical distribution functions of the statistics of interest. The 
technique that was used is the residual bootstrap11, where the residuals of the original 
regression are resampled instead of the original data themselves (see MacKinnon (2006)).  
In order to simplify the presentation we focus on the year-ahead forecast errors (equation 6). 
The description is virtually the same for the current year. Also, we describe the procedure 
only for the serial correlation coefficient, but again nothing changes for the bias coefficient.    
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rerun regression (6) using the bootstrap sample, and we obtain a bootstrap estimate  
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se . Finally, we calculate the bootstrap t-statistic centred at 
the original estimate, that is: t* = (
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se . This procedure is repeated 10,000 times, 
producing 10,000 bootstrap t-statistics 
*
j t , where j = 1,…, 10,000. We have thus obtained an 
empirical distribution function for t. Thereafter, the original statistic t is compared with the 
bootstrap statistics 
*
j t  in order to calculate a bootstrap p-value for the test that β = 0. The 


















* ( > t)], where I is the indicator function, and B is the number 
of bootstrap replications, that is 10,000. This is a two-sided nonsymmetrical test.   
                                                 
11   For supportive evidence on the choice of the bootstrap technique, see annex C.    
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4.5.2.  Informational efficiency 
This update also introduced several further efficiency tests, albeit for the outlook for GDP 
and inflation only. These stronger efficiency tests focus on whether information available at 
the time of the forecast was fully exploited, thus they could be described as tests for 
informational efficiency.12 We start with a test where we examine whether the forecast error 
can be predicted by the forecasts of some key variables. First, the forecast error is regressed 
on the prediction of EU GDP growth. The estimated equation is as follows: 
et,t = α + βzt,t + εt                                                                                                              (7) 
for the current year, and 
et+1,t = α + βzt+1,t + εt+1                                                                                                     (8)   
for the year ahead; where z denotes the forecast of EU real GDP growth. The null 
hypothesis is H0 :  β = 0. 
Thereafter, we regress the forecast error of the different Member States on the prediction of 
German GDP growth, French GDP growth, Italian GDP growth and UK’s GDP growth. The 
regression therefore is the following:  
et,t = α + β
1z
1
,t t  + β
2 2
,t t z  + β
3 3
,t t z  + β
4 4
,t t z  + εt                                                             (9) 
for year t, and 
et+1,t = α + β
1 1
, 1 t t z +  + β
2 2
, 1 t t z +  + β
3 3
, 1 t t z +  + β
4 4
, 1 t t z +  + εt+1                                            (10) 




4 are the four GDP forecasts for Germany, France, Italy 
and the United Kingdom. In the case of GDP growth, we exclude from the regressors the 
country whose forecast error is to be explained. We test both the individual significance of 
the β’s (t-tests) and their joint significance with an F-test.  
A second informational efficiency test checks whether forecast errors can be predicted by 
past realisations. Therefore, for the current year we have: 
et,t = α + βyt-1 + εt                                                                                                     (11) 
However, for the year-ahead outlook the second lag of the realisations has to be used as the 
first estimate of the fourth quarter National Accounts of the previous year will only be 
available in the first quarter of the following year. This is thus the information that the 
forecaster has available at the time of the forecast. Hence, 
et+1,t = α + βyt-1 + εt+1                                                                                               (12) 
The null is again: H0: β = 0.                                                                                                       
                                                 
12   Timmermann performed similar tests in his 2006 study.  
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4.6.  Directional accuracy 
Besides these quantitative tests, qualitative tests on the directional accuracy are also useful 
to assess how well a forecaster performs, i.e. by testing if the direction of a change is 
predicted correctly. Indeed, this may be more important than the forecast value of e.g. GDP 
growth. We obtain the standard contingency table of failures and successes (see, for 
instance, Diebold and Lopez (1996), p.257), and we report the total success rate, which 
should exceed 50% as a minimum. A test of independence between the direction of change 
of the outturns and of the forecasts is also performed. A number below 0.05 would imply 
that directional changes in the outturn are not independent from that of the forecast at the 
5% level. 
4.7.  A comparison with other forecasters 
A comparison was also made with other fully elaborated forecasts from the IMF, the OECD 
and those published by Consensus (which present the mean outlook of a number of private-
sector forecasters on a monthly basis), although only for GDP due to data availability. 
Forecasts and realisations of the other institutions were selected in the same manner as for 
the Commission.13 
First of all, the statistics presented in sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.6 are now calculated for the 
alternative forecasts as well as for the Commission’s forecasts at the sample size that 
corresponds to that of the rival forecasts. Furthermore, we present the proportion of positive 
differentials between the Commission’s forecasts and the competing forecasts as an 
indication of whether there is a systematic difference between the different sets of forecasts. 
This will be the case if the proportion deviates significantly from 0.50.  
The tests for unbiasedness (equations 1 and 2) and weak efficiency (equations 5 and 6) are 
again carried out, always at the same sample size as that of the rival forecasts.        
Moreover, we are now able to perform another informational efficiency test in order to see 
whether the forecast of the other institution was fully taken into account. For every country 
we thus regress the Commission’s forecast error on the alternative forecast, say y*. 
Therefore, 
et,t = α + β
∗
t t y ,  + εt                                                                                                          (13) 
for the current year, and 
et+1,t = α + β
*
, 1 t t y +  + εt+1                                                                                           (14) 
for the year ahead. The null hypothesis is as usual H0 : β = 0.  
We then move to tests for equal forecast accuracy, forecast encompassing and forecast 
combinations. First, we apply the test proposed by Diebold and Mariano (1995) for equal 
forecast accuracy. The statistic of interest is the mean of the differential between the square 
of the Commission’s forecast errors and the square of the competing institution’s forecast 
errors (e*). For the current year we estimate the equation: 
                                                 
13   We gratefully thank T. Harjes at the IMF and L. Vogel at the OECD for their kind help in providing the 
Commission with their respective forecast and realisation data.    
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dt,t = α + εt                                                                                                                (15) 
where  dt,t = (et,t)
2 – (
*
,t t e )
2.   Respectively, for the year ahead: 
dt+1,t = α + εt+1                                                                                                          (16) 
where dt+1,t = (et+1,t)
2 – (
*
, 1 t t e + )
2. The null hypothesis (H0 : α=0) is tested with use of the small 
sample correction proposed by Harvey et al. (1997). P-values lower than 0.05 indicate that 
the hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy is rejected at the 5% level of significance.
     
If we modify d as dt,t = (et,t - 
*
,t t e ) et,t for the current year, and as dt+1,t = (et+1,t - 
*
, 1 t t e + ) et+1,t for 
the year ahead, the Diebold and Mariano test becomes then a test for forecast encompassing, 
i.e. to test whether the information contained in the other forecast is effectively included in 
that of the Commission. The null hypothesis of α=0 is tested against the alternative of α>0. 
Under the null hypothesis the forecasts of the Commission are said to encompass the ones of 
the alternative forecaster. We again apply a small sample correction as suggested in Harvey 
et al. (1998).  
Following Timmermann (2006), we also run regressions of the realisations on the two 
competing forecasts. For the current year we have: 
yt = α + β1yt,t + β2
∗
t t y , + εt.                                                                                         (17)  
Similarly for the year ahead: 
yt+1 = α + β1yt+1,t + β2
*
, 1 t t y +  + εt+1.                                                                                            (18) 
We then test the individual significance of β1 and β2 to see how much weight one should put 
on each of the two rival forecasts in order to obtain a combination that increases the 
optimality of the forecast. The test can also be seen as a test for forecast encompassing: if β1 
=1 and β2 =0 the Commission’s forecasts encompass the alternative ones, while the opposite 
is true if  β1 =0 and β2 =1. 
Finally, we present RMSEs from the following forecast combination: yt,t + a(yt,t - 
∗
t t y , ) for 
the current year, and yt+1,t + a(yt+1,t -
*
, 1 t t y + ) for the year ahead. These are then compared to the 
original RMSEs of the Commission. As in Timmermann (2006), we assign different values 
to a (from -0.5 to -0.25, 0.1, 0.25 and 0.5) in order to examine whether the Commission’s 
forecasts could be improved by moving closer to or further away from the alternative 
forecasts.    
5.  RESULTS OF THE ACCURACY TESTS 
This section will present the key results obtained when updating the accuracy tests for the 
Commission’s forecasts from 1999.  
5.1.  Summary statistics for forecast error  
Summary statistics of the forecast errors for GDP, inflation and general government deficit 
are presented in Tables 1-3 below, while the complete set of results alongside the original 
ones is included in the table annexes.   
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5.1.1.  GDP 
The forecast error for GDP for the EU as a whole and as measured by the ME has increased 
somewhat, from 0.08 percentage point (pp.) for the current year to 0.11 pp, see table A1 in 
annex A. For the year-ahead outlook, the ME has also increased marginally (up to 0.34 from 
0.32 pp.), see table A2. The ME could suggest the occurrence of a bias in the forecasts for 
several countries, positive in some cases and negative in others, that broadly offset each 
other, at least for the current-year forecast. The only marked change in the ME when adding 
the period 1998-2005 to the observation period is the increase in the ME for Portugal, where 
e.g. the ME for the year-ahead outlook increased from 0.10 to 0.41 pp. However, it should 
be noted that the ME continues to be larger for some other Member States, notably for 
Ireland (-0.76 pp.) and Italy (+0.70 pp.).  
Sample current year year ahead current year year ahead current year year ahead
Belgium 69/05 -0.05 0.25 0.70 1.14 0.87 1.53
Denmark 73/05 0.14 0.20 0.68 0.94 0.88 1.23
Germany 69/05 0.09 0.41 0.84 1.21 1.13 1.63
Ireland 73/05 -0.57 -0.76 1.65 2.24 1.98 2.63
Greece 81/05 -0.12 -0.11 0.68 0.87 0.87 1.23
Spain 86/05 -0.20 -0.13 0.55 0.79 0.77 1.06
France 69/05 0.03 0.30 0.57 0.88 0.74 1.20
Italy 69/05 0.43 0.70 0.88 1.29 1.22 1.75
Luxembourg 69/05 -0.63 -0.08 1.44 2.03 1.95 2.71
Netherlands 69/05 -0.02 0.02 0.72 1.08 0.92 1.36
Austria 95/05 0.15 0.36 0.50 0.71 0.71 0.95
Portugal 86/05 0.24 0.41 0.70 0.95 0.87 1.19
Finland 95/05 0.16 -0.07 0.96 1.27 1.31 1.59
Sweden 95/05 -0.09 0.22 0.58 0.80 0.82 1.06
United Kingdom 73/05 0.01 0.25 0.69 1.07 0.89 1.38
European Union 69/05 0.11 0.34 0.50 0.86 0.72 1.23
euro area 98/05 0.28 0.46 0.38 0.69 0.53 0.86
ME MAE RMSE
Table 1: Forecast errors for GDP
 
Turning to a more telling estimate of the forecast error, the MAE, the error declined from 
0.53 pp. to 0.50 pp. for the current year for the EU when extending the observation period. 
The forecast error for the year-ahead projection has also improved, from 0.94 pp. to 0.86 pp. 
for the EU when extending the coverage, see table A4.  
The forecast error for real GDP 
growth continues to be clearly 
smaller for the aggregate than for 
the individual countries. From 
tables A3-A4 and Graph 1 it can 
be seen that the forecast error has 
improved for most countries in 
this update, but also that 
differences remain sizeable 
across Member States. Especially 
some of the smaller Member 
States have markedly higher 
forecast errors and have not 
always improved when the outcome of eight further years was added.  























Graph 2: Development of MAE over time
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Judging from Graph 2, the overall impression is that accuracy has improved over time. 
However, this is partly an effect from the sizeable forecast errors in the 1970's around the oil 
price crises. One may therefore expect that the forecast error on average should decline over 
time, although this may not necessarily represent an improved performance per se when the 
years 1998-2005 was added to the analysis. There is also a tendency that the ME increases 
and becomes significant, while the MAE declines for some Member States, suggesting that 
in these cases one gets it "more precisely wrong".  
With a view to better understanding whether the forecast error has gradually declined, table 
A5-A6 presents the MAE by country and sub-periods. Adding this dimension, it becomes 
clear that the forecast error for GDP on average has clearly declined for Germany, Greece, 
Spain and the United Kingdom in the most recent years and for both the "current-year" and 
the "year-ahead" projections. In other cases, the MAE has increased in the period 1998-
2005, although still below the levels of the 1970's. Nevertheless, in the cases of Ireland and 
the Netherlands, the MAE for the last period exceeds that of the 1970s for the current-year 
outlook. Similarly, for Luxembourg in its year-ahead forecast, the MAE is at its highest 
ever. For the EU as a whole, the MAE has decreased somewhat to 0.38 pp in 1998-2005 
(down from 0.44 pp. in the previous period from 1990 to 1997) for the current-year outlook. 
The MAE decreased more 
strongly for the year-ahead 
forecast (down to 0.60 pp. from 
0.85 pp.).  
Measured by the RMSE, the 
forecast error for the current-year 
GDP prediction has declined 
from 0.77 pp. to 0.72 pp. for the 
Union as a whole. The 
improvement is marginally 
stronger for the year-ahead 
outlook, where the RMSE 
decreases from 1.33 pps. to 1.23 pps. for the EU. Again, differences are sizeable across 
countries and the forecast error for the aggregate is smaller than for most individual Member 
States, see tables A3-A4 in annex A.  
It should be recalled that conclusions must be drawn with due care when looking at cross-
country comparisons. Data availability and stability continues to differ, even if the situation 
has improved over time. The underlying distribution of the data series also varies. An 
attempt to control for volatility across countries and periods has been made within DG 
ECFIN suggesting that, once volatility is controlled for, the MAE of the current-year GDP 
forecast only improved significantly for Greece and Ireland in the most recent period14.  
5.1.2.  Inflation 
The forecast error for inflation measured by the ME at the EU level remained unchanged at 
0.02 pp. for the current-year forecasts when adding 1998-2005 to the observation period. For 
the year-ahead projection, the ME declined from -0.31 to -0.23 pp. for the EU. This may still 
suggest a certain tendency to underestimate inflation for t+1 forecasts for several Member 
States, albeit less so than in the past.   
                                                 
14   Acknowledging results from internal work by P. Cardoso at DG ECFIN.   
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Sample current year year ahead current year year ahead current year year ahead
Belgium 69/05 -0.02 0.01 0.57 1.02 0.71 1.56
Denmark 73/05 -0.18 -0.39 0.58 1.14 0.73 1.90
Germany 69/05 0.10 0.01 0.32 0.69 0.42 0.88
Ireland 73/05 0.01 -0.33 0.95 1.83 1.32 2.73
Greece 81/05 -0.11 -0.69 0.95 1.22 1.36 1.96
Spain 86/05 -0.28 -0.41 0.44 0.56 0.57 0.76
France 69/05 0.04 -0.37 0.47 0.94 0.72 1.47
Italy 69/05 -0.14 -1.11 0.65 1.42 0.93 2.49
Luxembourg 69/05 0.02 -0.18 0.52 1.27 0.67 1.63
Netherlands 69/05 -0.04 0.15 0.40 0.68 0.54 0.90
Austria 95/05 0.13 0.21 0.44 0.37 0.48 0.54
Portugal 86/05 -0.41 -0.83 0.56 1.04 0.74 1.71
Finland 95/05 -0.11 0.32 0.47 0.92 0.52 1.11
Sweden 95/05 -0.01 0.45 0.35 0.64 0.40 0.77
United Kingdom 73/05 0.17 -0.23 0.77 1.47 1.22 2.27
European Union 69/05 0.02 -0.23 0.31 0.81 0.44 1.33
euro area 98/05 -0.08 -0.17 0.15 0.29 0.21 0.35
ME MAE RMSE
Table 2: Forecast errors for inflation
 
Measured by the MAE, the forecast error for inflation in the EU decreased somewhat from 
0.37 pp. to 0.31 pp. when updating the tests. For the year-ahead outlook, the MAE declined 
from 0.99 pp. to 0.81 pp.  
Again, the forecast errors clearly 
differ in absolute levels across 
Member States and it is easier to 
predict the aggregate than 
individual Member States. 
However, these differences 
between countries appear 
somewhat smaller than those for 
GDP (at least for the "current-
year" forecasts), c.f. Table 2 and 
Graph 3.  
Similar to the evolution of the 
forecast error for GDP measured by MAE and individual Member State, forecast errors were 
markedly larger in general in the 1970's than in more recent years. The average forecast 
error should therefore decline over time, although this may not necessarily represent an 
improved performance in the period now added to the analysis.  
Following the comparison in tables A5-A6, which presents the MAE by country and 
different sub-periods, it becomes clear that the forecast error for inflation has indeed 
declined for Greece, Italy and Portugal in the most recent years for both the "current-year" 
and the "year-ahead" projections. For several other countries, the MAE decreased for only 
part of the forecast horizon and in some cases it increased in the period 1998-2005, although 
still clearly lower than e.g. in the 1970's. For the EU as a whole, the MAE has fallen to 0.11 
pp. (down from 0.16 pp. in the 1990-1997) for the current year and has remained largely 
unchanged for the year-ahead projection (from 0.26 pp. to 0.23 pp.).  
The RMSE for the EU also declined somewhat, from 0.49 pp. to 0.44 pp. for the current 
year. For the year-ahead projection, the RMSE for the EU fell from 1.51 pps. to 1.33 pps. 
























This improvement is broad-based, reflecting decreasing RMSEs across all Member States 
when extending the observation period. 
5.1.3.  Total investment 
The forecast error for total investment measured by ME increased somewhat for the current-
year projections, from 0.58 pp. to 0.65 pp. for the EU. This seems to be explained by, in 
particular, a sizeable increase of the ME in the case of Germany (from 0.60 pp. to 1.08 pp.), 
whilst noting that the ME is still larger for several other Member States. For the year-ahead 
outlook the ME for the EU remained stable (up by 0.01 to 0.79 pp.). Although sizeable 
differences can be noted at the Member State level extending beyond Germany, they largely 
off-set each other at the aggregated level. Given the volatility of investment growth, it 
comes as no surprise that the forecast errors are generally larger than those for GDP growth.   
A similar development of the forecast error holds looking at the aggregated MAE. While the 
forecast error rose for the current-year prediction when extending the observation period 
(from 1.14 pps. to 1.24 pps.), it remained largely stable for the year-ahead forecast (up by 
0.03 to 1.77 pps.). At the Member State level, the MAE ranges from around 1.5 pps. for the 
forecast for France to more than 3 pps in the cases of Denmark, Ireland, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden for the current-year outlook. A substantial fall was noted 
as regards Spain where the MAE declined from 3.24 pps. to 2.43 pps. The differences were 
even larger for the year-ahead forecast, where a French MAE of less than 2 pps. is markedly 
smaller than e.g. those of Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg that all exceed 5 pps.  
The forecast error also rose somewhat when measured by the RMSE for the current-year 
prediction (up from 1.63 pps. to 1.72 pps.), while it improved slightly for the year-ahead 
projection (down from 2.51 pps. to 2.45 pps.). A cross-country comparison would again 
reveal the impressive track record as regards the French outlook in comparison to those of 
most other Member States, even if the error clearly improved for Greece, Spain and 
Luxembourg (current year) and for Denmark, Ireland and Spain (year ahead).  
5.1.4.  Unemployment rate 
Turning to the outlook for the unemployment rate, the ME remains small (from -0.5 pp. to 
0.03 pp. for the current-year and 0.2 to 0.10 for the year-ahead outlook) when extending the 
sample period. This would also be true for around half of the Member States. For the other 
half of the countries, the errors are larger and appear more persistent, with the exception of 
Portugal where the forecast error was almost halved for the year-ahead projection.  
Measured by the MAE, the forecast error declined slightly for the current-year outlook for 
the EU (down from 0.28 pp. to 0.23 pp.), while it remained unchanged further out (down by 
0.01 to 0.51 pp.). At the country level, the error range is markedly more compressed (from 
0.38 pp. for Luxembourg to 1.34 pps. for Spain in the year-ahead projection) and remains 
relatively stable in this update. 
A certain improvement can be noted for both forecast years when measuring the error by the 
RMSE, with the error declining by 0.09 pp. to 0.32 (current-year) and by 0.05 to 0.75 pp. 
(year-ahead). This would suggest that although the absolute error remained largely constant 
for the year-ahead projection, unusually large errors were avoided in the more recent years. 
The improvement noted over the forecast period appears broad-based across countries.    
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5.1.5.  General government balance 
The  ME for the general government balance increased somewhat for the current-year 
projection (from -0.02 to -0.08 pp.), while it declined for the year-ahead forecast (down 
from 0.16 to 0.12 pp.). With the exception of Spain and Portugal, where the MEs were 
markedly reduced, the errors remained largely unchanged, see tables A3-A4.  
Sample current year year ahead current year year ahead current year year ahead
Belgium 69/05 0.12 0.35 0.43 1.09 0.61 1.50
Denmark 73/05 -0.10 0.01 0.84 1.59 1.22 1.97
Germany 69/05 -0.16 -0.09 0.79 1.03 0.97 1.29
Ireland 73/05 -0.33 -0.08 1.45 2.15 1.84 2.54
Greece 81/05 0.54 0.97 1.66 2.25 2.14 2.77
Spain 86/05 0.05 0.16 0.80 0.89 1.07 1.28
France 69/05 -0.06 0.07 0.62 0.71 0.86 1.01
Italy 69/05 0.15 0.46 0.95 1.36 1.39 1.73
Luxembourg 69/05 -0.65 -1.27 1.49 2.18 1.86 2.52
Netherlands 69/05 -0.30 -0.19 0.94 1.24 1.18 1.50
Austria 95/05 -0.09 -0.44 0.51 0.69 0.67 0.83
Portugal 86/05 -0.29 -0.04 0.77 1.21 1.02 1.60
Finland 95/05 -0.47 -0.53 0.87 1.00 1.09 1.25
Sweden 95/05 -1.16 -1.16 1.25 1.38 1.38 1.56
United Kingdom 73/05 0.03 0.37 0.82 1.38 1.08 1.64
European Union 69/05 -0.08 0.12 0.50 0.71 0.63 0.89
euro area 98/05 -0.11 0.03 0.51 0.66 0.65 0.81
ME MAE RMSE
Table 3: Forecast errors for general government balance
 
Looking at the absolute error, the MAE rose marginally for both the current-year and the 
year-ahead projections at the aggregated level (by 0.04 to 0.5 pp. and by 0.02 to 0.71 pp., 
respectively). At the country 
level, the MAE improved 
somewhat for most countries and 
more clearly in the cases of 
Greece, Spain, Luxembourg and 
Portugal for the current-year 
outlook, see also Graph 4. 
A similar pattern can be found 
when looking at the error 
measured by the RMSE, which 
rose slightly for both years. The 
RMSE increased from 0.56 to 
0.63 pp. for the current-year and from 0.87 to 0.89 pp. for the year-ahead outlook for the 
EU, despite a clear improvement noted in some cases (notably for Greece, Spain, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Portugal).   
5.1.6.  Current account balance 
Lastly, the forecast error for the current account balance measured by the ME remains minor 
at the aggregated level. It declined slightly for the current year (from -0.08 to -0.03 pp.), 
while it rose marginally for the year-ahead outlook (from -0.01 to 0.04 pp.). The error is 
larger for several of the Member States and has not always improved (c.f. Greece, Spain, 
Luxembourg and Portugal). 
Graph 4: MAE improved somewhat for most countries





















The MAE remained broadly unchanged for the EU (up by 0.02 for both years to 0.33 pp. and 
0.51 pp., respectively). Also at the Member State level differences were in most cases 
relatively small, disregarding a sizeable increase for Luxembourg. 
Also measured by the RMSE changes to the forecast error were minor (up by 0.01 to 0.42 
pp. for the current-year outlook and unchanged at 0.68 pp. further out). Again, besides the 
outlook for Luxembourg and also Portugal, differences at the country level were relatively 
small.  
5.2.  A comparison with naive forecast techniques 
It goes without saying that predicting the future is by definition difficult and all 
macroeconomic forecasts contain errors. One alternative way of measuring the value of the 
Commission's forecasts is to compare them with other, easily available alternative forecasts.  
The RMSE of the Commission's forecast was therefore compared to the RMSE of either the 
"no change" (THEIL1), the "average" (THEIL2) or the "recursive-mean forecast" (so-called 
THEIL2*), see tables A3-A4 in annex A. Although deteriorating for the year-ahead outlook, 
the ratio always remained below one at the aggregate level. This would imply that the 
Commission's forecasts outperform the naïve ones for all the variables and over both 
forecast years.  
For the current-year projections, the forecast errors are about half or less the size than those 
from the naïve forecasts for all variables except the current account balance (where the ratio 
is around ⅔). For the year ahead, the errors are generally between ½ and ¾ of the naïve 
ones, besides the current-account projection with a ratio of around 0.9. This would suggest 
that using naïve forecasts for the current account would not generate forecast errors 
markedly larger than those calculated from the Commission's forecasts, although it could be 
recalled that errors are generally small in size.  
At the Member-State level, some ratios very close to or above 1 have been recorded. These 
typically refer to the smaller Member States and particularly the year-ahead outlook for the 
current-account balance.  
5.3.  Persistence of forecast errors 
Te test for persistence of forecast errors or serial correlation are reported upon in Tables A7-
A8 in annex A. The aim is to avoid any systematic correlation between prediction errors, 
thus ensuring that once an error is made it is not fed into the next forecast.  
The tests for serial correction have been carried out for up to three lags. At the aggregated 
level, there are no cases of persistence in forecast errors for the current-year outlook. The 
results with the year-ahead forecast are somewhat less satisfactory where serial correlation 
was noted for inflation, investment, unemployment and the current account balance. The 
outlook for real GDP growth and government balance did not display such persistence in its 
errors. These results largely confirm the original set of tests. However, when extending the 
observation period, persistence in the forecast errors of the current account balance now also 
proved statistically significant.  
At the Member-State level, serial correlation among the current-year forecast errors is 
largely absent, with the exception of the GDP-forecast for Portugal and the unemployment 
outlook for Luxembourg. For the year-ahead prediction, on the other hand, several countries 
display serial correlation, in particular for smaller Member States and as regards   
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unemployment and inflation, but also for investment, government balances and the current 
account.   
5.4.  Unbiasedness 
In order to test whether the Commission's forecasts are systematically over or under 
estimating a variable, tables A9 and A10 in Annex A display the presence or absence of 
bias. For real GDP growth, inflation and general government balances some of the key 
results are summarised in tables 4-6 below.  
Taking into account the results for all variables, forecasts about the EU do not appear to be 
too rosy (with the exception of investment growth), while the outlook for some Member 
States seem somewhat too optimistic (such as Italy and Portugal) or too pessimistic (e.g. 
Ireland and Luxembourg). 
As regards GDP, there appears to be no bias for the EU as a whole. Although the p-value is 
clearly lower for the year-ahead forecast; it is still above the threshold where a bias would 
be statistically significant at the 5% level. It is noteworthy, though that the GDP outlook for 
Italy and Luxembourg appear to have a systematic bias that is significant once the 
observation period has been extended with the years 1998-2005. In the case of Italy, GDP is 
overestimated by 0.43 pp. for the current year and 0.70 pp. for the year t+1, while the GDP 
forecast for Luxembourg is underestimated by 0.63 pp. for the current year.  
With a view to better understanding the biases documented above some further tests were 
undertaken. Looking at results from a test for weak efficiency, which can be decomposed 
into bias and serial correlation, the presence of a bias was confirmed for Italy, both with and 
without bootstrapping (see tables A13-A14). This was not the case for Luxembourg, where 
the apparent bias appears to originate from a problem of serial correlation, see also table 4. 
This suggests that rather than being systematically pessimistic about real GDP growth for 
Luxembourg, errors (once made) seem likely to persist. The complementary test also 
confirmed the results noted in 5.3 on persistence of forecast error for Portugal in the current-
year outlook. The test of a possible persistence of forecast error also turned significant for 
the projections for Ireland and Spain in the alternative test. Similarly, in the case of France, 
the weak efficiency test indicates a certain positive bias for the French outlook (+0.38 pp. 
for the year-ahead forecast).  
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α (ME) Signif. α=0 α Signif. α=0 β Signif. β=0 
Belgium -0.05 0.72 -0.01 0.94 0.21 0.13
Denmark 0.14 0.36 0.09 0.57 0.06 0.58
Germany 0.09 0.62 0.17 0.33 0.01 0.80
Ireland -0.57 0.10 -0.54 0.17 0.02 0.75
Greece -0.12 0.50 -0.19 0.26 0.06 0.59
Spain -0.20 0.26 -0.14 0.47 0.32 0.053
France 0.03 0.83 0.06 0.61 0.21 0.12
Italy 0.43 0.03 0.46 0.04 -0.14 0.47
Luxembourg -0.63 0.048 -0.41 0.26 0.27 0.047
Netherlands -0.02 0.92 0.00 0.99 0.18 0.18
Austria 0.15 0.50 0.06 0.78 0.12 0.40
Portugal 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.45 0.44 0.02
Finland 0.16 0.70 0.08 0.80 -0.20 0.66
Sweden -0.09 0.73 -0.08 0.82 -0.01 0.73
United Kingdom 0.01 0.95 0.00 1.00 -0.22 0.27
European Union 0.11 0.37 0.14 0.19 -0.06 0.84
euro area 0.28 0.15 0.31 0.24 0.02 0.59
Year-ahead forecast
Belgium 0.25 0.34 0.25 0.33 0.17 0.21
Denmark 0.20 0.36 0.13 0.60 0.09 0.48
Germany 0.41 0.13 0.47 0.07 -0.06 0.81
Ireland -0.76 0.10 -0.72 0.11 0.30 0.03
Greece -0.11 0.66 -0.21 0.45 -0.01 0.86
Spain -0.13 0.62 0.02 0.90 0.35 0.03
France 0.30 0.13 0.38 0.04 0.01 0.79
Italy 0.70 0.01 0.58 0.054 0.10 0.40
Luxembourg -0.08 0.86 -0.06 0.92 0.07 0.52
Netherlands 0.02 0.94 0.06 0.78 0.04 0.70
Austria 0.36 0.22 0.37 0.19 -0.28 0.42
Portugal 0.41 0.14 0.41 0.18 0.25 0.15
Finland -0.07 0.89 -0.17 0.79 -0.14 0.85
Sweden 0.22 0.52 0.32 0.36 -0.27 0.48
United Kingdom 0.25 0.31 0.11 0.66 0.25 0.07
European Union 0.34 0.09 0.38 0.054 -0.02 0.95
euro area 0.46 0.18 0.71 0.14 -0.44 0.35
Note: α (unbiasedness test): coefficient in regressions (1) and (2).
α, β (weak efficiency test): coefficients in regressions (5) and (6).
Bootstrap p-values are reported for the weak efficiency test
Numbers below 0.05 indicate the presence of bias / serial correlation at the 5% significance level.
See also tables A9-A10 and A13-A14.
Table 4: Forecast error for GDP - Tests for Unbiasedness and Weak Efficiency
Current-year forecast
Bias (unbiasedness test) Bias (weak eff. test) Serial corr. (weak eff. test) 
 
At the aggregated level, the inflation outlook appears unbiased. At the Member-State level, 
however, the situation deteriorated somewhat in so far that two more countries now display 
a tendency to systematically underestimate inflation for the current and/or the year ahead 
(which was not the case in the 1999 report). Spain and Portugal underestimated inflation by 
0.28 pp. and 0.41 pp., respectively, for the current year, while the corresponding forecast 
error for the year ahead was roughly twice as large (-0.41 pp. and -0.83 pp.). Sweden, on the 
other hand, seems to overestimate inflation for the year-ahead outlook (0.45 pp.), while Italy 
continues to display a significant bias in underestimating the year-ahead inflation outlook 
with 1.11 pps.  
Complementary information from the test for weak efficiency confirms the biases noted for 
the Spanish and Italian inflation outlook (also when using bootstrapping). However, it is not 
proven at the 5% significance level that this would be the case for Portugal or Sweden,   
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where at least the Portuguese problem appears to originate from serial correlation. In fact, 
the alternative test suggest that most countries as well as the EU aggregate display serial 
correlation for their year-ahead inflation outlook. 
α (ME) Signif. α=0 α Signif. α=0 β Signif. β=0 
Belgium -0.02 0.89 -0.01 0.93 0.10 0.42
Denmark -0.18 0.16 -0.14 0.27 -0.01 0.88
Germany 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.23 0.06 0.57
Ireland 0.01 0.96 0.09 0.69 -0.28 0.09
Greece -0.11 0.70 -0.09 0.74 0.10 0.44
Spain -0.28 0.02 -0.31 0.01 -0.28 0.21
France 0.04 0.74 0.08 0.46 -0.13 0.49
Italy -0.14 0.38 -0.10 0.56 0.17 0.19
Luxembourg 0.02 0.83 0.01 0.91 0.13 0.29
Netherlands -0.04 0.70 -0.03 0.78 -0.12 0.55
Austria 0.13 0.41 0.07 0.75 0.13 0.39
Portugal -0.41 0.01 -0.34 0.06 0.24 0.14
Finland -0.11 0.52 -0.19 0.32 -0.04 0.91
Sweden -0.01 0.94 -0.06 0.70 -0.11 0.91
United Kingdom 0.17 0.44 0.25 0.18 -0.01 0.92
European Union 0.02 0.74 0.04 0.62 0.11 0.36
euro area -0.08 0.35 -0.14 0.054 -0.15 0.62
Year-ahead forecast
Belgium 0.01 0.96 -0.05 0.81 0.31 0.03
Denmark -0.39 0.25 -0.29 0.23 -0.31 0.02
Germany 0.01 0.93 0.04 0.79 0.48 0.00
Ireland -0.33 0.50 0.09 0.85 0.37 0.01
Greece -0.69 0.09 -0.52 0.19 0.35 0.02
Spain -0.41 0.01 -0.38 0.04 0.12 0.39
France -0.37 0.13 -0.34 0.16 0.14 0.25
Italy -1.11 0.01 -0.96 0.01 0.18 0.17
Luxembourg -0.18 0.51 -0.15 0.55 0.53 0.00
Netherlands 0.15 0.33 0.08 0.63 0.29 0.04
Austria 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.02 0.61
Portugal -0.83 0.03 -0.34 0.47 0.54 0.00
Finland 0.32 0.37 0.09 0.83 0.28 0.16
Sweden 0.45 0.045 0.30 0.37 0.28 0.15
United Kingdom -0.23 0.58 0.11 0.68 0.39 0.00
European Union -0.23 0.31 -0.16 0.47 0.37 0.01
euro area -0.17 0.21 -0.28 0.13 -0.19 0.76
Note: α (unbiasedness test): coefficient in regressions (1) and (2).
α, β (weak efficiency test): coefficients in regressions (5) and (6).
Bootstrap p-values are reported for the weak efficiency test.
Numbers below 0.05 indicate the presence of bias / serial correlation at the 5% significance level.
See also tables A9-A10 and A13-A14.
Table 5: Forecast error for inflation - Tests for Unbiasedness and Weak Efficiency
Current-year forecast
Bias (unbiasedness test) Bias (weak eff. test) Serial corr. (weak eff. test) 
  
Turning to the most volatile of demand components: investment, there is a tendency to 
overestimate investment growth by 0.65 pp. in the EU for the current-year outlook, while a 
possible bias for the year-ahead prediction proved not statistically significant (albeit only 
just). Moreover, for the current year, the mean error has increased slightly once the 
observation period was extended and the results are more robust, i.e. it is statically 
significant at a lower level. A bias in investment growth is also noted for a few Member 
States individually, which are significant at the 5% level. Investment growth is 
overestimated by more than 1 pp. in Germany and Italy for the current year and by more   
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than 1½ pps. in Greece and Italy for the year ahead. These results were broadly confirmed in 
the complementary test for weak efficiency. 
As regards unemployment, the aggregated forecast is unbiased and only in the case of 
Ireland is the bias significant (of an overestimation of 0.34 pp. for the current-year forecast 
and 0.58 pp. for the year ahead), which was not the case in the original report. Similarly, the 
outlook for Spain and Portugal also deteriorated, although they still pass the statistical test at 
the 5% level. Judging from the test for weak efficiency, only the bias in the Irish current-
year forecast was confirmed.  
For government balances, the EU outlook displays no bias, while Luxembourg and Sweden 
both have a tendency for a relatively sizeable underestimation (-0.65 pp. and -1.27 pps. for 
Luxembourg and -1.16 pps. for both years as regard Sweden). This result is only confirmed 
as regards Luxembourg in the supplementary test carried out for weak efficiency. On the 
other hand, this alternative test suggests a tendency to underestimate the general government 
balances also in the Netherlands, Austria and Finland (see table 6). 
It must be recalled, however, that the use of the non-policy-change assumptions (especially 
for the year-ahead outlook) where only those policy measures are taken into account that are 
known in sufficiently detail when forecasting the general government balance, may have an 
impact on the forecast error and bias. 
The current account outlook is generally without any presence of a bias except for Greece, 
where the balance is overestimated by 0.68 pp. for the current year and by 0.86 pp. for the 
year ahead (with an overestimation for the year-ahead outlook for Portugal just passing the 
5% significance test). The complementary test for weak efficiency also pointed to a problem 
of a bias in the case of Greece, although not significant at the 5% level.   
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α (ME) Signif. α=0 α Signif. α=0 β Signif. β=0 
Belgium 0.12 0.27 0.08 0.43 0.21 0.14
Denmark -0.10 0.67 -0.08 0.79 0.27 0.08
Germany -0.16 0.32 -0.13 0.40 -0.01 0.92
Ireland -0.33 0.32 -0.43 0.22 -0.06 0.83
Greece 0.54 0.23 0.66 0.19 0.04 0.65
Spain 0.05 0.85 0.01 0.95 -0.06 0.98
France -0.06 0.68 -0.01 0.99 0.05 0.61
Italy 0.15 0.51 0.19 0.43 -0.21 0.24
Luxembourg -0.65 0.045 -0.90 0.01 -0.25 0.16
Netherlands -0.30 0.12 -0.38 0.053 0.01 0.81
Austria -0.09 0.67 -0.27 0.10 -0.18 0.46
Portugal -0.29 0.22 -0.07 0.80 0.25 0.12
Finland -0.47 0.16 -0.79 0.02 -0.50 0.08
Sweden -1.16 0.00 -0.55 0.45 0.59 0.01
United Kingdom 0.03 0.86 0.00 0.98 0.26 0.07
European Union -0.08 0.44 -0.04 0.69 0.09 0.44
euro area -0.11 0.66 -0.06 0.92 0.28 0.12
Year-ahead forecast
Belgium 0.35 0.17 0.37 0.13 0.16 0.23
Denmark 0.01 0.98 -0.03 0.95 0.54 0.00
Germany -0.09 0.67 -0.08 0.72 -0.04 0.93
Ireland -0.08 0.87 -0.16 0.75 0.30 0.04
Greece 0.97 0.09 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.01
Spain 0.16 0.60 0.13 0.66 0.33 0.06
France 0.07 0.69 0.09 0.57 0.28 0.047
Italy 0.46 0.11 0.42 0.20 0.11 0.38
Luxembourg -1.27 0.00 -1.15 0.02 0.16 0.24
Netherlands -0.19 0.46 -0.11 0.69 0.40 0.01
Austria -0.44 0.08 -0.64 0.02 -0.14 0.72
Portugal -0.04 0.91 -0.06 0.89 0.18 0.28
Finland -0.53 0.17 -0.65 0.18 -0.10 0.98
Sweden -1.16 0.01 -0.88 0.21 0.24 0.22
United Kingdom 0.37 0.21 0.21 0.54 0.26 0.07
European Union 0.12 0.44 0.13 0.39 0.10 0.43
euro area 0.03 0.93 0.13 0.85 0.14 0.38
Note: α (unbiasedness test): coefficient in regressions (1) and (2).
α, β (weak efficiency test): coefficients in regressions (5) and (6).
Bootstrap p-values are reported for the weak efficiency test
Numbers below 0.05 indicate the presence of bias / serial correlation at the 5% significance level.
See also tables A9-A10 and A13-A14.
Table 6: Forecast error for general government balance - Tests for Unbiasedness and Weak Efficiency
Current-year forecast
Bias (unbiasedness test) Bias (weak eff. test) Serial corr. (weak eff. test) 
 
 
5.5.  Efficiency tests 
5.5.1.  Weak efficiency 
A forecast is deemed efficient if it has exploited the data set used in the forecast fully. The 
results from the updated weak efficiency test are presented in tables A11-A12. A low 
probability value for the joint F-test (i.e. < 0.05) would suggest that the forecast is correlated 
with its error and that the forecast could thus be improved by exploiting this information. 
However, serial correlation in the error term could aggravate hypothesis testing and the 
results should therefore be interpreted with due caution. The Durbin Watson statistic and the   
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results in the two preceding sections indicate that this could indeed be the case for inflation 
and, in particular, unemployment. 
Overall, the GDP forecasts appear to be weakly efficient. However, weak efficiency for the 
outlook for Portugal and Italy appears to have deteriorated and the null hypothesis could no 
longer be accepted (thereby reinforcing the original set of results where they just passed the 
5% significance test). Broadly similar results are obtained in the complementary test for 
weak efficiency presented in tables A13-A14, but where also Luxembourg (current year) 
and Ireland (year ahead) seem inefficient. 
Turning to inflation, the forecasts appear to be efficient at the aggregated level and for most 
individual countries. However, this appears not to be the case for Spain, Italy and Portugal 
where the probability values have fallen below the 0.05 threshold when extending the 
observation period. As regards the current-year outlook, these results were only confirmed 
in the alternative test for weak efficiency for Spain and Portugal. The interpretation for the 
tests on the year-ahead projections appears more doubtful. Most countries as well as the EU 
appear not to be weakly efficient, reflecting inter alia frequent problems of serial 
correlation.  
Regarding the remaining variables, efficiency generally seems to have deteriorated with the 
exception of the general government balance. Efficiency seems particularly doubtful as 
regards investment and unemployment for the EU as a whole. The same holds true for 
several, mostly smaller Member States and also as regards the government and current 
account balances, although not to the same degree. Similar results were obtained in the 
complementary testing for weak efficiency.  
5.5.2.  Informational efficiency 
This update also introduces further efficiency tests to control if all publicly available 
information at the time of the forecast was fully exploited (which could thus go beyond the 
data set actually used in the forecast).  
In view of the increased inter-linkages between the European economies and more 
synchronised business cycles, the forecast error of each Member State is regressed on the 
GDP outlook for the EU as a whole as well as for the four largest Member States. 
The results suggest that the forecast for EU GDP growth could have been better exploited 
for, at least, the Greek and Portuguese GDP outlook, see tables A15-A16. The forecast 
errors for GDP as regards Italy, Austria and Portugal could also have been reduced by taking 
into account to a greater extent the GDP outlook for Germany, France, Italy and/or the 
United Kingdom. 
The impact of economic activity on inflation is well known. It appears as if the forecast 
error for inflation could also have been reduced by better exploiting the forecasts for GDP at 
the EU level or those for the largest economies. For the current-year prediction this seems 
particularly important for Ireland and Italy, while for the year-ahead outlook this would be 
true for both more than half of the Member States and the EU aggregate.  
An additional test for informational efficiency controls for the importance of the past 
outcome (i.e. the forecast error is regressed on the lagged realisation). As regards real GDP 
growth, the past outcome generally seems to have been reflected (with Italy being the sole 
exception), see tables A17-A18. On the other hand, the past outcome for inflation could   
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have been better incorporated as regards Denmark, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and for the 
euro area and the EU as a whole. 
5.6.  Directional accuracy 
Besides assessing the forecast in a quantitative manner as regards the size of the error, the 
occurrence of biases etc. it may be as important to ensure that the direction of change is 
correct. For a good understanding of the economic situation and outlook it is key for a 
forecaster to correctly predict whether growth is accelerating, remaining constant or 
decelerating.  
When testing if the direction of change is correct, the success rates are clearly better for the 
current-year forecasts made in the beginning of each year. At the aggregated level, these 
range from 81 to 92%, see tables A19-A20. Also at the Member-State level, success rates 
are generally high for GDP and inflation (between 80-90% in most cases), while the range is 
larger for the other variables. In particular, the low (and declining) directional accuracy as 
regards the unemployment rate for Greece and the general government balance for Ireland 
must be seen as disappointing.  
Turning to the year-ahead predictions, the success rate amounts to some 70-80% for GDP, 
inflation, investment and unemployment for the EU. However, it has declined to less than ⅔ 
for the general government and current account balances. The picture at the Member-State 
level is also mixed. Significant improvements are noted for some variables for e.g. Spain, 
France, Luxembourg and Portugal, while it has deteriorated in other cases, such as Ireland or 
for the other variables, for Spain and Portugal. Although a success rate at around 50 or 
below for general government balances for Ireland, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom 
could clearly be a source of concern, it could also follow from the usual unchanged policy 
assumption, i.e. by only taking those measures into account that have been adopted by the 
authorities or are known in sufficient detail (which is not always the case as regards the end 
of the year budgets). 
5.7.  The international context 
The outlook for the EU and its Member State cannot be assessed in isolation. In view of the 
increased specialisation in a globalised world, developments in Europe are clearly affected 
by the forecast for other developed and developing economies. Indeed, an earlier evaluation 
suggests that up to 60% of the forecast error for GDP and inflation in the EU can be 
explained by the external assumptions together with the international economic 
environment, where especially the assessment of world GDP and trade appears important.15  
The forecast for the EU is based on an outlook for GDP in and trade with the rest of the 
world. Although these predictions are generally prepared in a more succinct way, close to 
fully-fledged forecasts are elaborated for the three Candidate Countries, the US, Japan and, 
more recently, also for China. The forecasts for these economies are also presented 
alongside the country-sections for the Member States in the forecast document.  
The international outlook and the implications of the technical assumptions for oil prices, 
exchange and interest rates are, above all, discussed in an internal scene-setter meeting 
ahead of the first forecast iteration. Possible revisions to the global outlook and the technical 
assumptions are communicated to all forecast participants ahead of subsequent iterations.  
                                                 
15   Keereman (2003).   
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The forecast error measured by MAE is somewhat larger for the US’ and Japanese GDP 
forecasts than that of the EU as a whole (of around ¾ and 1 pp., respectively, compared to ½ 
pp. for the current-year predictions), see table A22. The outlook for at least the US thereby 
compares relatively well to those of the larger Member States, being e.g. worse than the 
current-year MAE for France and the United Kingdom, but better than those for Germany 
and Italy. Moreover, the relative difference between the RMSE and the MAE is smaller 
suggesting that fewer sizeable forecast errors have been made for the GDP forecasts for the 
US and Japan. 
Judging from a similar set of tests on how well the forecasts for these larger non-EU 
economies perform, there appears to be a certain persistence in the forecast error for Japan 
for the current year, see table A23, while the forecasts generally seem unbiased, efficient 
and display a high success rate of directional accuracy, see tables A24-A27. 
Particular attention is paid to the trade variables and, especially, to export market 
developments. Although the forecast error for export and import volumes into the EU is 
clearly higher (with a current-year MAE at around 2 and 2¼ pps., respectively) than those 
for the EU or the largest non-EU economies, the forecast for the trade variables generally 
perform well in terms of absence of statistically significant serial correlation and bias; the 
forecasts appear efficient and have a high success rate of directional accuracy. However, the 
efficiency tests for export and, in particular, import prices were not fully satisfactory.  
6.  A COMPARISON WITH OTHER FORECASTERS 
6.1.  Consensus 
The forecast errors generally seem larger for the forecasts prepared by Consensus, whether 
measured by ME, MAE or RMSE, see table B1. This could possibly be explained by the 
timing advantage the Commission may have from a later presentation date, since the 
Consensus presents forecasts prepared by different market participants up to a certain date 
every month. The comparison with naïve forecasts also reflects favourably for the 
Commission's forecast, for which the THEIL statistics generally are lower.  
When testing for directional accuracy, the Commission seems to outperform Consensus in 
most cases, with Germany and Italy (current year only) as noteworthy exceptions.  
Looking at the share of positive forecast differentials in table B2, a first indication of 
systematic difference between the two sets of forecasts can be seen in two cases: Italy and 
Finland. 
Table B3 displays the country-specific bias and its significance for the respective GDP 
forecasts, where both forecasters perform equally well (bad). Both had the same four 
instances of biases, namely for Ireland, Greece, Italy and Portugal and as regards both 
forecast years. 
As regards the weak efficiency test, see table B4, the two sets of forecasts perform in almost 
similar manner, with weak efficiency rejected for the outlook of Ireland, Greece, Italy and 
Portugal for both years. However, some differences can be noted when looking at the 
individual coefficients. In particular, in the efficiency test for Portugal, the Commission's 
projection seems to have a bias, while the forecast of Consensus suffers from serial 
correlation.   
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Turning to the results from regressions (13) and (14), only in the case of the year-ahead 
outlook for Austrian GDP could the Commission forecast be improved by better taking into 
account the information contained in the Consensus outlook, see table B5.  
In the tests for equal forecast accuracy as expressed in regressions (15) and (16), the null is 
rejected for Ireland (current-year outlook) and Portugal (year ahead). In view of the negative 
sign of the mean differential, this would suggest that the Commission's squared errors are 
lower and hence its forecast better performing, see table B6.  
Using the same regressions (i.e. 15 and 16), but modifying d as follows: dt,t = (et,t - 
*
,t t e ) et,t 
for the current year, and as dt+1,t = (et+1,t - 
*
, 1 t t e + ) et+1,t for the year ahead, the test now becomes 
one on forecast encompassing. From table B7 it can be seen that in the case of the current-
year forecast for the Netherlands, the null is rejected and the Commission has thus not 
encompassed the Consensus outlook.  
Based on the regressions (17) and (18), the Commission seems to encompass the 
information included in the Consensus forecast in the outlook for a number of smaller 
Member States, e.g. as regards the Greek and Irish outlook, see table B8. However, it can be 
seen that for a number of countries, both sets of forecasts can be useful. Indeed, in the case 
of some of the year-ahead forecasts, both sets of forecasts contain relevant information.   
Finally, table B9 presents the RMSE from the forecast combinations. An improvement could 
be obtained for Ireland (current year) and Portugal (year ahead) by giving a negative weight 
to the forecast by Consensus. 
Overall, it appears as if the Commission outlook scores as well as the forecast made by 
Consensus, although noting that there are some differences at the country-specific level.  
6.2.  IMF 
The forecast errors generally seem larger for the forecasts prepared by the IMF, whether 
measured by ME, MAE or RMSE, see table B1, especially for the year-ahead outlook. 
However, the Irish forecast seems to be an exception over both forecast years. Again, this 
difference in performance could partly be explained by the timing advantage. The 
comparison with naïve forecasts results in generally lower THEIL statistics for the 
Commission.  
The Commission also seems to outperform the IMF in most cases when testing for 
directional accuracy, particularly for the year-ahead forecasts, but with the exception of the 
outlook for Greece and Ireland (both for the year ahead only).  
Turning to the test for unbiasedness, see table B11, the performance appears largely similar 
with a bias noted for the same countries, with the year-ahead outlook for Germany being the 
sole exception. There the IMF's forecast is significantly biased (by 0.85 pp.), whereas the 
Commission's outlook appears unbiased.  
The weak efficiency test presented in table B12 reveals a similar performance for the 
Commission and the IMF when looking at the joint test (F-statistics). Again, the year-ahead 
outlook for Germany is an exception, where the IMF outlook is not weakly efficient, 
originating from both a bias and a serial-correlation problem. 
Testing for informational efficiency, see regressions (13) and (14) with results presented in 
table B13, the year-ahead Commission outlook for Austrian, Belgian, Greek and French   
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GDP growth could be improved by better taking into account the information contained in 
the IMF's outlook. 
Following the test for equal forecast accuracy (c.f. regressions (15) and (16)), the null is 
never rejected and thus the competing forecasts appear equal. Once modified, the results of 
regression (15) and (16) indicate that the Commission does not encompass the IMF's 
forecast for Ireland for both the current year and the year ahead.  
The Commission seems to encompass the information included in the competing forecast in 
the outlook for a number of Member States, see table B16. As with Consensus, it can be 
seen that for a number of countries, such as the year-ahead projections for Belgium and 
France, both sets of forecasts can be useful. 
The RMSE from the forecast combinations, presented in table B17, suggest that a certain 
improvement could be obtained for the outlook for France and Portugal (both year ahead) by 
giving a negative weight to the IMF's forecast. 
Overall, the size of the forecast errors and the results from the different accuracy tests 
suggest that the Commission's forecast perform at least as well as those of the IMF. This 
conclusion follows, in particular, from the IMF's weaker performance as regards the year-
ahead outlook for Germany. 
6.3.  OECD 
In contrast to the comparisons with Consensus and the IMF, the forecast errors generally 
seem larger for the outlook prepared by the Commission when compared with the OECD for 
the current year, see table B18. However, this is likely to be explained to a certain extend by 
the timing factor with the OECD's forecasts being released around one month after those of 
the Commission. Results are more mixed for the year ahead, where the two sets of forecasts 
seem to perform equally. The same appears true for the success rates of directional accuracy. 
The share of positive forecast differentials, see table B19, gives a first indication of 
systematic difference between the two set of forecasts for Italy, Austria and Finland for the 
current year. 
Table B20 presents the results for the test for unbiasedness, where the OECD outperforms 
the Commission. A bias occurs in the Commission's current-year forecast for Ireland and 
Luxembourg as well as in the year-ahead outlook for Ireland, France and Italy, while a bias 
is only present in the OECD's year-ahead prediction for Ireland.  
Similarly, the Commission's current-year outlook also reveals problems with the test for 
weak efficiency for Ireland and Luxembourg, presented in the joint test (F-statistics) in table 
B21. For the year ahead, both institutions appear not weakly efficient as regards the Irish 
outlook, while for the OECD, the weak efficiency hypothesis was also rejected for the 
Portuguese forecast. Judging from the individual coefficients, the Commission's current-year 
predictions suffer from both bias (Ireland and Italy) and serial correlation (Italy, 
Luxembourg and Portugal), whereas the OECD's forecast errors are serially correlated for 
Spain and Portugal only. The Commission's forecasts perform better for the year ahead, 
where the occurrence of a bias is limited to France and Italy (only marginally), with serial 
correlation noted for Spain. The OECD, on the other hand, appears to have more of a 
problem with serial correlation for the year-ahead predictions (i.e. for Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom).   
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As regards informational efficiency, the Commission's forecasts could be improved by better 
taking into account the information in the OECD's forecasts for Ireland (current year) and 
Portugal (both years), see table B22.  
Based on the test for equal forecast accuracy, the null is only rejected for the current-year 
outlook for Finland, see table B23.  
The Commission does not encompass the information in the OECD's forecast in the outlook 
for the current-year predictions for most Member States, see table B24. The score for the 
year-ahead outlook is better, but the Commission does not encompass the OECD's forecasts 
for Germany and Greece. 
The OECD encompasses the information included in the outlook for Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands, see table B25. For the year-ahead prediction, the 
Commission encompasses the information in the Belgian and French forecasts, while the 
opposite is true for Greece.  
An improvement could be obtained for the current-year outlook for Germany, and to a lesser 
degree also for some other countries, by increasing the weight of the OECD's forecast. 
Taken together, the Commission's forecast does not appear to perform as well as those of the 
OECD, especially for the current year (whilst recalling that the impact of the timing 
advantage is likely to be most important for the ongoing year). However, results are mixed 
for the year ahead with the relative performance appearing almost equal.  
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has updated the assessment of the Commission’s forecasts’ track record from 
1999 by extending the observation period from 1969-1997 to also take into account the 
forecasts and outcome for the years 1998-2005. This update has also included some further 
tests on e.g. informational efficiency and undertaken a comparison with the forecasts of 
other international institutions and those of market participants. To ensure comparability to 
the greatest degree possible, variables have been chosen and data processed in a broadly 
similar manner compared to the study of 1999. 
Before turning to results of the statistical tests for non-model based forecasts, some error 
statistics are presented to give a first picture of how the forecast performs. The forecast 
error, whether measured by the mean absolute error (MAE) or the root mean squared error 
(RMSE), has generally improved somewhat for the EU as a whole when extending the 
observation period. Measured by the MAE for real GDP growth, it decreased by 0.03 pp. to 
0.5 pp. for the current-year forecast and by 0.08 pp. to 0.86 for the year ahead. This implies 
that the Commission’s forecasts for GDP growth has, on average, proven to be 0.5 pp. too 
high/low for the current year. Measured by the RMSE, the forecast error declined from 0.77 
pp. on average to 0.72 pp. for the current-year predictions and from 1.33 pps. to 1.23 pps. 
for the year-ahead outlook. 
The forecast error continues to be smaller for the aggregate than for the individual country. 
This reflects e.g. the fact that, at the aggregated level, overly optimistic forecasts for some 
countries may be offset by more pessimistic projections for others. The MAE improved for 
almost all countries when extending the observation period, although sizeable differences 
remain across Member States. Especially some of the smaller Member States have higher 
forecast errors. Several reasons could explain this, such as difficulties with data availability, 
stability and volatility. However, it could also reflect a higher degree of openness of the   
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country. Smaller countries are often more exposed to the international economic 
environment, which has proven to be an important source of forecast error in the past. 
In view of the sizeable forecast errors that occurred during the 1970’s reflecting e.g. the oil 
price crises, a certain improvement of the forecast error should perhaps be expected when 
the observation period is extended. Changes to the macroeconomic regime have generally 
also contributed to greater stability. Moreover, GDP growth rates have declined over time.  
Indeed, when comparing the MAE for the years added in this update with those of the earlier 
decades, the MAE declined to 0.38 pp. for the current-year and to 0.60 pp. for the year-
ahead projections for the EU as a whole. A similar development can be observed for most, 
but not all, Member States. A marked improvement can be noted for the outlook for 
Germany, Greece, Spain and the United Kingdom for both the current-year and the year-
ahead forecasts, although to a degree reflecting their initial starting position. The recent 
deteriorating for the current-year outlook for France may therefore be less noteworthy than 
the exceptionally good performance (in comparison with the outlook for the other countries) 
over the whole period.  
The Commission’s fully-fledged forecasts cover a great number of variables where, besides 
real GDP growth, the track record is also assessed as regards the forecasts for inflation, 
investment, the unemployment rate, the general government balance and the current account 
balance. Looking at these other variables, the MAE clearly improved for the inflation 
forecast for the EU, it remained largely unchanged for unemployment, general government 
and the current account balances, while it increased somewhat for investment (being the 
most volatile of demand components).  
Based on a set of traditional tests for examining the quality of the Commission’s forecast, 
the original paper of 1999 argued that “the Commission’s forecasts dispose a reasonable 
track record” with most tests passed in a satisfactory way. Although some of the updated 
test results are mixed, this overall assessment still appears valid. 
When extending the observation period, there seem to be no evidence for a bias in the 
forecast for the EU as a whole, thus no systematic over- or underestimation could be 
detected in the Commission’s forecast with the exception of investment growth. However, 
the outlook for some of the Member States appears to be too optimistic (such as Italy and 
Portugal) or too pessimistic (e.g. Ireland and Luxembourg).  
The GDP outlook for Italy and Luxembourg appear to have a systematic bias that is 
significant once the observation period has been extended with the years 1998-2005. In the 
case of Italy, GDP is overestimated by 0.43 pp. for the current year and 0.70 pp. for the year 
t+1, while the GDP forecast for Luxembourg is underestimated by 0.63 pp. for the current 
year. However, judging from the results from a test for weak efficiency, the presence of a 
bias was only confirmed for the Italian GDP forecast, while the bias for Luxembourg 
appears to originate from a problem of serial correlation. This suggests that rather than being 
systematically too pessimistic about real GDP growth for Luxembourg, errors (once made) 
seem likely to persist. It cannot be excluded that the upward bias of the Italian GDP forecast 
could partly be explained by an overestimation of potential growth, in view of the 
assumption often used in year-ahead forecasts that growth approaches potential. Similarly, 
sizeable down (up) ward correction in potential growth for Germany (Ireland) may have 
contributed to a certain tendency of a bias, albeit they are not significant at the 5%-level.  
A test is carried out as regards the persistence of forecast errors with a view to avoiding 
systematic correlation between prediction errors, i.e. to ensure that once an error is made it   
  37
is not fed into the next forecast automatically. The outlook for real GDP growth and 
government balance does not display persistence in its error for the EU outlook, while serial 
correlation was noted for the year-ahead EU forecast for inflation, investment, 
unemployment and the current account balance. These results thereby largely confirm the 
original set of results (with the exception of the current account outlook, where the serial 
correlation now also proved statically significant).  
At the Member-State level, serial correlation among the current-year forecast errors is 
largely absent, with the exception of the GDP-forecast for Portugal and the unemployment 
outlook for Luxembourg. For the year-ahead prediction, on the other hand, several countries 
display serial correlation, in particular for smaller Member States and as regards 
unemployment and inflation. 
Forecasts are deemed efficient if all information available is used. The updated test for weak 
efficiency (i.e. on ensuring that the information in the data set used in the forecast was fully 
exploited) suggest that the forecasts remain efficient at the aggregated level for real GDP 
growth, inflation and general government balances. However, efficiency is more doubtful as 
regards investment (current year), unemployment (both forecast years) and the current 
account balance (year ahead). 
For the individual Member States, efficiency for the GDP outlook for Portugal and Italy has 
deteriorated and the hypothesis of inefficiency could no longer be rejected. Complementary 
efficiency tests also prove the forecasts for Luxembourg (current year) and Ireland (year 
ahead) to be inefficient. Similarly, the inflation outlook appears efficient for most Member 
States, besides Spain, Italy and Portugal. These results were confirmed in the 
complementary efficiency tests carried out as regards the current-year forecasts for Spain 
and Portugal, while the interpretation of the tests on the year-ahead predictions is less clear-
cut. For most countries as well as the EU the hypothesis of weak efficiency was rejected as 
regards the inflation outlook. This is more easily detected when bootstrapping is used in 
view of the test's greater power.  
This update introduced further tests on informational efficiency to control if all publicly 
available information at the time of the forecast was fully exploited, which could thus go 
beyond the data set actually used in the forecast. The question could for instance be if the 
forecast error for the individual country could be reduced by e.g. better taking into account 
the GDP outlook for the EU as a whole or for the four largest Member States. Most 
countries score well also as regards this stronger efficiency test, although the forecast error 
for the Greek and the Portuguese GDP outlook could have reduced by better incorporating 
the EU GDP outlook. Similarly, errors may be reduced for the GDP outlook for Italy, 
Austria and Portugal by taking into account the forecast for the largest Member States to a 
greater extent.  
A further efficiency test revealed that the past outcome of real GDP growth has generally 
been well reflected (with Italy as an exception), while the outcome for inflation could have 
been better incorporated as regards the outlook for Denmark, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands 
and for the EU as a whole. 
Besides these quantitative tests, qualitative tests on the directional accuracy are also useful 
to assess how well a forecaster performs, i.e. by testing if the direction of a change is 
predicted correctly. Indeed, this may be more important than the forecast value of e.g. GDP 
growth. The success rates are clearly better for the current-year forecasts made in the 
beginning of each year. For the outlook of the EU as a whole, these range from 81-92%. 
Also for the country-specific forecasts, success rates ranges from 80-90% in most cases for   
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real GDP growth and inflation, while the range is larger for other variables. However, the 
success rates of the directional accuracy as regards the unemployment rate for Greece and 
the general government balance for Ireland remains low and are even declining further, 
partly explained by (a lack of) data availability and stability. 
The success rate for the year-ahead predictions amounts to some 70-80% for the forecasts 
for GDP, inflation, investment and unemployment for the EU. However, it has declined to 
less than ⅔ for the general government and current account balances. The test results for the 
country-specific forecasts are also mixed, where significant improvements were noted in 
some cases, such as in the outlook for Spain, France Luxembourg and Portugal. In other 
cases it deteriorated. Although a success rate at around 50 or below for general government 
balances for Ireland, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom could clearly be a source of 
concern, it could also follow from the usual unchanged policy assumption, i.e. by only 
taking those measures into account that have been adopted by the authorities or are known 
in sufficient detail (which is not always the case as regards the end of the year budgets). 
The so-called external assumptions (on commodity prices, interest and exchange rates) 
together with the international economic environment have proved to explain a substantial 
part of the forecast error for GDP and inflation in the EU in an earlier study. Especially the 
assessment of world GDP and trade appeared important. Particular attention has therefore 
been paid to how well the international context is forecasted.  
The MAE is somewhat larger for the US and Japanese GDP forecasts than that of the EU as 
a whole, but appears broadly in line with those of the larger Member States. The difference 
to the RMSE seems lower, which would suggest that fewer sizeable forecast errors have 
been made for the GDP outlook for the US and Japan. Moreover, the forecasts for the largest 
non-EU countries generally seem unbiased, efficient and display a high success rate of 
directional accuracy, while there seem to be certain persistence in the forecast error for the 
current-year GDP outlook for Japan. 
The forecasts for the trade variables also seem to perform well in terms of absence of 
statistically significant serial correlation and bias; the forecasts appear efficient and have a 
high success rate of directional accuracy. However, the forecast errors are generally larger 
and the efficiency tests for export and, in particular, import prices were not fully 
satisfactory. 
The Commission's forecasts' track record is relatively reasonable when comparing them with 
those of the other international institutions and with market participants. Overall, it appears 
as if the Commission outlook scores as well as the forecast made by Consensus and slightly 
better than those of the IMF. This may partly reflect the timing of the forecast, with the 
Commission having an informational advantage. The main difference with the IMF is its 
weaker performance as regards the year-ahead outlook for Germany. On the other hand, the 
Commission's forecast does not appear to perform as well as those of the OECD, especially 
for the current year. However this could partly be explained by the fact that the OECD 
releases its forecast one month later and has therefore a certain data and timing advantage. 
However, results are mixed for the year ahead with the relative performance appearing 
almost equal between the Commission and the OECD. 
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ANNEX A  
  42 
GDP
Sample 69/05 69/97 73/05 73/97 69/05 69/97 73/05 73/97 81/05 81/97 86/05 86/97 69/05 69/97 69/05 69/97
No of obs. 37 29 33 25 37 29 33 25 25 17 20 12 37 29 37 29
MV(F) 2.22 2.22 2.00 1.99 2.35 2.56 3.99 3.34 2.10 1.35 2.79 2.68 2.61 2.70 2.48 2.55
MV(R) 2.27 2.35 1.85 1.86 2.26 2.52 4.56 3.82 2.22 1.42 2.99 2.90 2.58 2.73 2.37 2.47
ME -0.05 -0.13 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.04 -0.57 -0.48 -0.12 -0.08 -0.20 -0.22 0.03 -0.03 0.11 0.08
STD(R) 1.85 2.01 1.65 1.81 2.09 2.23 3.35 3.03 1.64 1.37 1.43 1.78 1.96 2.13 1.71 1.88
Inflation
Sample 69/05 69/97 73/05 73/97 69/05 69/97 73/05 73/97 81/05 81/97 86/05 86/97 69/05 69/97 69/05 69/97
No of obs. 37 29 33 25 37 29 33 25 25 17 20 12 37 29 37 29
MV(F) 4.25 4.99 5.05 5.96 3.19 3.66 7.38 8.68 11.73 15.86 4.27 5.32 5.19 6.22 5.34 6.31
MV(R) 4.26 4.89 5.23 6.25 3.08 3.58 7.37 8.57 11.84 15.83 4.55 5.51 5.15 6.25 5.32 6.29
ME -0.02 0.10 -0.18 -0.29 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.11 -0.11 0.03 -0.28 -0.18 0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.02
STD(R) 3.04 3.14 3.83 3.87 1.92 1.89 6.34 6.85 7.34 5.27 1.78 1.67 4.06 3.92 3.30 3.09
Investment
Sample 69/05 69/97 73/05 73/97 69/05 69/97 73/05 73/97 81/05 81/97 86/05 86/97 69/05 69/97 69/05 69/97
No of obs. 37 29 33 25 37 29 33 25 25 17 20 12 37 29 37 29
MV(F) 2.65 2.58 1.80 1.50 2.85 3.21 4.49 3.89 4.84 3.25 5.16 5.31 2.58 2.46 2.76 2.68
MV(R) 2.60 2.49 1.47 0.66 1.78 2.61 3.95 3.22 3.42 1.63 5.26 5.27 2.26 1.99 2.11 2.10
ME 0.05 0.09 0.33 0.83 1.08 0.60 0.53 0.67 1.42 1.62 -0.10 0.04 0.32 0.47 0.65 0.58
STD(R) 5.01 5.40 8.73 9.60 4.78 4.83 7.38 7.54 6.20 6.30 6.05 7.62 3.71 3.90 3.50 3.70
Unemployment rate
Sample 69/05 69/97 73/05 73/97 69/05 69/97 73/05 73/97 81/05 81/97 86/05 86/97 70/05 70/97 69/05 69/97
No of obs. 37 29 33 25 37 29 33 25 25 17 20 12 36 28 37 29
MV(F) 8.29 8.42 6.65 7.22 6.11 5.35 11.41 13.32 8.52 7.97 17.60 20.24 8.26 7.81 7.75 7.51
MV(R) 8.27 8.38 6.66 7.24 6.08 5.31 11.07 13.01 8.52 7.79 17.24 20.03 8.24 7.80 7.72 7.56
ME 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.34 0.30 0.00 0.18 0.36 0.22 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.05
STD(R) 3.44 3.87 2.40 2.48 3.04 2.99 5.22 4.43 1.66 1.51 4.49 2.74 3.35 3.65 3.27 3.67
Government bal.
Sample 71/05 71/97 77/05 77/97 69/05 69/97 74/05 74/97 82/05 82/97 86/05 86/97 69/05 69/97 69/05 69/97
No of obs. 35 27 29 21 37 29 32 24 24 16 20 12 37 29 37 29
MV(F) -4.98 -6.32 -1.10 -2.31 -2.32 -2.26 -5.72 -7.95 -8.23 -11.46 -2.79 -4.27 -2.17 -2.09 -3.34 -3.80
MV(R) -5.09 -6.55 -1.00 -2.37 -2.16 -2.10 -5.39 -7.72 -8.76 -11.92 -2.84 -4.55 -2.11 -1.96 -3.25 -3.78
ME 0.12 0.23 -0.10 0.05 -0.16 -0.15 -0.33 -0.23 0.54 0.46 0.05 0.28 -0.06 -0.13 -0.08 -0.02
STD(R) 3.81 3.04 3.57 3.19 1.81 1.83 6.08 5.14 5.82 4.26 2.54 1.65 1.74 1.88 1.88 1.68
Current account
Sample 71/05 71/97 73/05 73/97 71/05 71/97 73/05 73/97 82/05 82/97 86/05 86/97 71/05 71/97 71/05 71/97
No of obs. 35 27 33 25 35 27 33 25 24 16 20 12 35 27 35 27
MV(F) 1.64 0.77 -0.83 -1.59 0.89 0.84 -1.15 -1.53 -3.69 -3.51 -1.72 -1.20 0.16 -0.25 0.18 0.09
MV(R) 1.61 0.87 -0.83 -1.69 1.10 1.01 -0.85 -1.07 -4.38 -4.05 -2.08 -1.24 0.11 -0.17 0.22 0.17
ME 0.03 -0.09 0.01 0.10 -0.20 -0.17 -0.30 -0.46 0.68 0.54 0.37 0.04 0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.08
STD(R) 3.00 2.98 2.72 2.48 1.86 1.84 4.84 5.50 2.03 1.73 2.24 1.95 1.39 1.31 0.68 0.73
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
Ireland
F=forecast data; R=realisation data; MV=average mean value; ME= mean error (MV(F) – MV(R)): thus the mean error is equal to the mean forecast minus the mean realised average;  
Table A1: Basic characteristics of the sample data – current year
STD(R): standard deviation of realisation data
Greece Spain France European Union Belgium Denmark Germany
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Austria Finland Sweden euro area
GDP
Sample 69/05 69/97 69/05 69/97 69/05 69/97 95/05 86/05 86/97 95/05 95/05 73/05 73/97 98/05 69/05 69/97
No of obs. 37 29 37 29 37 29 11 20 12 11 11 33 25 8 37 29
MV(F) 2.52 2.73 2.41 2.07 2.26 2.28 2.04 2.58 2.86 3.61 2.37 1.84 1.66 2.14 2.48 2.55
MV(R) 2.08 2.33 3.04 2.67 2.28 2.42 1.88 2.34 2.86 3.45 2.46 1.83 1.68 1.86 2.37 2.47
ME 0.43 0.39 -0.63 -0.60 -0.02 -0.14 0.15 0.24 0.00 0.16 -0.09 0.01 -0.01 0.28 0.11 0.08
STD(R) 1.98 2.13 2.74 2.74 1.69 1.67 0.90 1.90 1.88 1.74 0.98 1.79 2.03 1.02 1.71 1.88
Inflation
Sample 69/05 69/97 69/05 69/97 69/05 69/97 95/05 86/05 86/97 95/05 95/05 73/05 73/97 98/05 69/05 69/97
No of obs. 37 29 37 29 37 29 11 20 12 11 11 33 25 8 37 29
MV(F) 8.09 9.70 4.19 4.85 3.96 4.41 1.87 5.85 8.02 1.56 1.55 6.48 7.96 1.84 5.34 6.31
MV(R) 8.22 9.79 4.16 4.73 4.00 4.42 1.75 6.26 8.40 1.67 1.55 6.31 7.85 1.91 5.32 6.29
ME -0.14 -0.09 0.02 0.12 -0.04 -0.01 0.13 -0.41 -0.38 -0.11 -0.01 0.17 0.12 -0.08 0.02 0.02
STD(R) 6.00 5.87 2.87 2.98 2.91 3.12 0.52 4.08 3.99 0.70 0.69 5.26 5.16 0.33 3.30 3.09
Investment
Sample 69/05 69/97 69/05 69/97 69/05 69/97 95/05 86/05 86/97 95/05 95/05 73/05 73/97 98/05 69/05 69/97
No of obs. 37 29 37 29 37 29 11 20 12 11 11 33 25 8 37 29
MV(F) 2.62 2.43 2.55 2.49 1.62 1.56 3.02 5.24 6.83 6.63 5.14 1.86 1.13 2.94 2.76 2.68
MV(R) 1.46 1.30 3.38 3.25 1.58 1.66 2.03 4.69 7.57 4.49 3.92 1.20 0.60 1.83 2.11 2.10
ME 1.16 1.13 -0.84 -0.76 0.04 -0.10 0.99 0.55 -0.73 2.14 1.22 0.66 0.53 1.11 0.65 0.58
STD(R) 4.88 5.35 5.50 5.71 4.60 4.89 2.99 7.05 6.22 4.23 5.23 4.52 4.70 2.75 3.50 3.70
Unemployment rate
Sample 69/05 69/97 75/05 75/97 69/05 69/97 95/05 86/05 86/97 95/05 95/05 73/05 73/97 98/05 69/05 69/97
No of obs. 37 29 31 23 37 29 11 20 12 11 11 33 25 8 37 29
MV(F) 8.94 8.64 2.08 1.66 6.37 7.07 4.15 6.17 6.54 11.18 7.00 7.55 8.20 9.28 7.75 7.51
MV(R) 8.93 8.74 2.08 1.68 6.13 6.85 4.27 5.86 6.14 11.15 7.29 7.48 8.16 9.08 7.72 7.56
ME 0.01 -0.10 0.01 -0.02 0.24 0.23 -0.12 0.31 0.40 0.03 -0.29 0.08 0.04 0.20 0.03 -0.05
STD(R) 3.51 3.88 1.16 0.90 3.81 4.00 0.43 1.37 1.39 3.07 1.92 2.92 3.04 0.91 3.27 3.67
Government bal.
Sample 69/05 69/97 74/05 74/97 69/05 69/97 95/05 86/05 86/97 95/05 95/05 73/05 73/97 98/05 69/05 69/97
No of obs. 37 29 32 24 37 29 11 20 12 11 11 33 25 8 37 29
MV(F) -7.26 -8.64 0.75 0.70 -2.90 -3.40 -2.11 -4.96 -6.47 1.12 -0.57 -2.61 -3.16 -1.89 -3.34 -3.80
MV(R) -7.41 -8.83 1.41 1.28 -2.60 -3.13 -2.02 -4.68 -5.89 1.59 0.59 -2.64 -3.32 -1.78 -3.25 -3.78
ME 0.15 0.19 -0.65 -0.58 -0.30 -0.27 -0.09 -0.29 -0.58 -0.47 -1.16 0.03 0.16 -0.11 -0.08 -0.02
STD(R) 3.90 3.09 2.23 2.12 2.38 2.28 1.74 2.14 1.65 3.53 3.67 2.61 2.21 1.05 1.88 1.68
Current account
Sample 71/05 71/97 71/05 71/97 71/05 71/97 95/05 86/05 86/97 95/05 95/05 73/05 73/97 98/05 71/05 71/97
No of obs. 35 27 33 27 35 27 11 20 12 11 11 33 25 8 35 27
MV(F) 0.07 -0.08 18.72 20.34 3.05 2.52 -1.22 -3.14 -0.96 5.13 3.13 -1.03 -0.79 0.89 0.18 0.09
MV(R) -0.09 -0.14 18.30 20.27 3.09 2.62 -0.99 -3.39 -0.58 5.17 3.49 -0.84 -0.63 0.65 0.22 0.17
ME 0.15 0.06 0.43 0.06 -0.05 -0.10 -0.23 0.26 -0.37 -0.05 -0.36 -0.18 -0.16 0.24 -0.03 -0.08
STD(R) 1.70 1.86 14.56 14.95 2.11 1.93 1.94 4.13 1.85 1.63 2.15 1.60 1.75 0.51 0.68 0.73
F=forecast data; R=realisation data; MV=average mean value; ME= mean error (MV(F) – MV(R)): thus the mean error is equal to the mean forecast minus the mean realised average;  
STD(R): standard deviation of realisation data
United Kingdom European Union
Table A1: Basic characteristics of the sample data – current year (continued)
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)  
  44 
GDP
Sample 70/05 70/97 74/05 74/97 70/05 70/97 74/05 74/97 82/05 82/97 87/05 87/97 70/05 70/97 70/05 70/97
No of obs. 36 28 32 24 36 28 32 24 24 16 19 11 36 28 36 28
MV(F) 2.37 2.37 2.19 2.15 2.52 2.67 3.93 3.27 2.23 1.46 2.89 2.79 2.73 2.82 2.60 2.66
MV(R) 2.12 2.15 1.99 1.97 2.11 2.35 4.70 3.91 2.35 1.51 3.02 2.86 2.42 2.54 2.25 2.34
ME 0.25 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.41 0.36 -0.76 -0.64 -0.11 -0.04 -0.13 -0.07 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.32
STD(R) 1.83 1.99 1.53 1.70 1.92 2.06 3.33 3.17 1.66 1.37 1.52 1.91 1.72 1.88 1.58 1.74
Inflation
Sample 70/05 70/97 74/05 74/97 70/05 70/97 74/05 74/97 82/05 82/97 87/05 87/97 70/05 70/97 70/05 70/97
No of obs. 36 28 32 24 36 28 32 24 24 16 19 11 36 28 36 28
MV(F) 4.23 4.98 4.70 5.55 3.07 3.51 6.72 7.88 10.60 14.34 3.89 4.86 4.82 5.76 5.13 6.06
MV(R) 4.21 4.88 5.10 6.07 3.05 3.59 7.05 8.20 11.29 15.25 4.31 5.22 5.19 6.24 5.36 6.37
ME 0.01 0.10 -0.39 -0.52 0.01 -0.08 -0.33 -0.32 -0.69 -0.91 -0.41 -0.35 -0.37 -0.48 -0.23 -0.31
STD(R) 3.01 3.09 3.79 3.91 1.99 1.93 6.37 6.95 6.93 4.82 1.50 1.30 4.02 4.03 3.38 3.18
Investment
Sample 70/05 70/97 74/05 74/97 70/05 70/97 74/05 74/97 82/05 82/97 87/05 87/97 70/05 70/97 70/05 70/97
No of obs. 36 28 32 24 36 28 32 24 24 16 19 11 36 28 36 28
MV(F) 2.96 2.87 2.39 2.20 2.96 3.18 4.66 3.77 5.42 3.76 5.24 5.44 2.97 2.91 3.02 2.96
MV(R) 2.06 2.06 1.54 0.80 1.81 2.56 4.09 2.93 3.75 2.32 5.45 5.47 2.24 1.97 2.23 2.19
ME 0.90 0.80 0.85 1.41 1.15 0.61 0.57 0.85 1.67 1.44 -0.21 -0.04 0.73 0.94 0.79 0.78
STD(R) 5.24 5.81 8.71 9.71 4.48 4.47 7.81 8.14 5.19 5.18 5.05 6.33 3.20 3.24 3.06 3.18
Unemployment rate
Sample 71/05 71/97 74/05 74/97 71/05 71/97 74/05 74/97 82/05 82/97 87/05 87/97 71/05 71/97 71/05 71/97
No of obs. 35 27 32 24 35 27 32 24 24 16 19 11 35 27 35 27
MV(F) 8.65 8.87 6.79 7.47 6.35 5.58 11.73 13.77 8.53 8.06 17.15 19.67 8.37 7.87 8.05 7.86
MV(R) 8.41 8.57 6.80 7.42 6.30 5.53 11.15 13.23 8.91 8.19 16.85 19.82 8.35 7.91 7.95 7.84
ME 0.23 0.31 -0.01 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.58 0.54 -0.38 -0.14 0.30 -0.15 0.02 -0.04 0.10 0.02
STD(R) 3.20 3.62 2.04 1.99 2.77 2.69 5.18 4.19 1.37 0.98 4.63 2.90 3.13 3.41 2.90 3.28
Government bal.
Sample 71/05 71/97 77/05 77/97 70/05 70/97 74/05 74/97 82/05 82/97 87/05 87/97 70/05 70/97 70/05 70/97
No of obs. 35 27 29 21 36 28 32 24 24 16 19 11 36 28 36 28
MV(F) -4.60 -5.80 -1.12 -2.34 -2.33 -2.26 -5.49 -7.78 -7.82 -10.87 -2.65 -4.10 -2.11 -2.03 -3.18 -3.67
MV(R) -4.95 -6.31 -1.13 -2.48 -2.24 -2.20 -5.41 -7.73 -8.79 -11.67 -2.81 -4.64 -2.18 -2.05 -3.30 -3.83
ME 0.35 0.51 0.01 0.14 -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 0.97 0.80 0.16 0.54 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.16
STD(R) 3.80 3.21 3.56 3.18 1.63 1.63 6.12 5.24 5.52 4.25 2.61 1.66 1.70 1.84 1.80 1.57
Current account
Sample 71/05 71/97 74/05 74/97 71/05 71/97 74/05 74/97 82/05 82/97 87/05 87/97 71/05 71/97 71/05 71/97
No of obs. 35 27 32 24 35 27 32 24 24 16 19 11 35 27 35 27
MV(F) 1.53 0.63 -0.46 -1.13 0.96 0.93 -1.11 -1.39 -3.78 -3.65 -1.95 -1.60 0.08 -0.30 0.22 0.12
MV(R) 1.57 0.89 -0.65 -1.51 1.14 1.05 -1.19 -1.36 -4.64 -4.09 -2.36 -1.52 0.11 -0.08 0.18 0.12
ME -0.05 -0.25 0.19 0.37 -0.19 -0.13 0.08 -0.04 0.86 0.44 0.42 -0.08 -0.04 -0.21 0.04 -0.01
STD(R) 2.83 2.85 3.00 2.90 1.92 1.89 4.78 5.50 2.14 1.68 2.16 1.74 1.45 1.39 0.74 0.80
European Union
F=forecast data; R=realisation data; MV=average mean value; ME= mean error (MV(F) – MV(R)): thus the mean error is equal to the mean forecast minus the mean realised average;  
STD(R): standard deviation of realisation data
Table A2: Basic characteristics of the sample data – year ahead
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
   
  45 
Austria Finland Sweden euro area
GDP
Sample 70/05 70/97 70/05 70/97 70/05 70/97 95/05 87/05 87/97 95/05 95/05 74/05 74/97 99/05 70/05 70/97
No of obs. 36 28 36 28 36 28 11 19 11 11 11 32 24 7 36 28
MV(F) 2.66 2.85 2.60 2.27 2.19 2.16 2.35 2.64 2.84 3.57 2.66 2.05 1.92 2.23 2.60 2.66
MV(R) 1.96 2.19 2.68 2.17 2.17 2.26 1.99 2.24 2.74 3.65 2.45 1.80 1.64 1.77 2.25 2.34
ME 0.70 0.66 -0.08 0.11 0.02 -0.10 0.36 0.41 0.10 -0.07 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.46 0.34 0.32
STD(R) 1.99 2.16 3.05 2.94 1.74 1.76 0.81 1.87 1.91 1.69 0.98 1.73 1.96 0.97 1.58 1.74
Inflation
Sample 70/05 70/97 70/05 70/97 70/05 70/97 95/05 87/05 87/97 95/05 95/05 74/05 74/97 99/05 70/05 70/97
No of obs. 36 28 36 28 36 28 11 19 11 11 11 32 24 7 36 28
MV(F) 7.27 8.73 4.12 4.76 4.08 4.58 1.85 5.27 7.23 1.85 1.99 6.11 7.53 1.86 5.13 6.06
MV(R) 8.38 10.05 4.30 4.87 3.93 4.37 1.64 6.09 8.29 1.54 1.54 6.34 7.95 2.03 5.36 6.37
ME -1.11 -1.32 -0.18 -0.11 0.15 0.21 0.21 -0.83 -1.06 0.32 0.45 -0.23 -0.42 -0.17 -0.23 -0.31
STD(R) 6.01 5.81 2.88 3.02 2.95 3.18 0.61 3.95 3.90 1.19 0.70 5.48 5.43 0.36 3.38 3.18
Investment
Sample 70/05 70/97 70/05 70/97 70/05 70/97 95/05 87/05 87/97 95/05 95/05 74/05 74/97 99/05 70/05 70/97
No of obs. 36 28 36 28 36 28 11 19 11 11 11 32 24 7 36 28
MV(F) 3.17 2.95 1.53 1.09 1.50 1.31 3.52 5.47 6.77 7.02 5.78 2.40 1.88 3.43 3.02 2.96
MV(R) 1.60 1.48 2.78 2.52 2.00 2.08 2.58 4.48 7.41 4.85 3.98 1.73 1.01 1.63 2.23 2.19
ME 1.57 1.48 -1.25 -1.44 -0.50 -0.77 0.94 0.99 -0.64 2.17 1.80 0.67 0.87 1.80 0.79 0.78
STD(R) 4.31 4.70 7.23 6.43 4.68 4.92 3.32 7.00 6.15 4.74 5.23 4.76 5.13 2.90 3.06 3.18
Unemployment rate
Sample 71/05 71/97 76/05 76/97 71/05 71/97 95/05 87/05 87/97 95/05 95/05 74/05 74/97 99/05 71/05 71/97
No of obs. 35 27 30 22 35 27 11 19 11 11 11 32 24 7 35 27
MV(F) 9.10 8.82 2.00 1.63 6.65 7.48 4.27 5.98 6.42 11.40 7.04 7.69 8.46 9.03 8.05 7.86
MV(R) 9.04 8.89 2.08 1.69 6.42 7.26 4.27 5.66 5.83 11.05 7.27 7.57 8.32 8.80 7.95 7.84
ME 0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 0.24 0.21 0.00 0.32 0.59 0.35 -0.24 0.12 0.14 0.23 0.10 0.02
STD(R) 3.04 3.37 1.12 0.87 3.76 3.88 0.51 1.28 1.30 2.95 1.90 2.75 2.77 0.59 2.90 3.28
Government bal.
Sample 70/05 70/97 75/05 75/97 70/05 70/97 95/05 87/05 87/97 95/05 95/05 74/05 74/97 99/05 70/05 70/97
No of obs. 36 28 31 23 36 28 11 19 11 11 11 32 24 7 36 28
MV(F) -7.14 -8.54 0.43 0.29 -2.66 -3.12 -2.33 -4.44 -5.98 1.02 -0.55 -2.35 -2.99 -1.76 -3.18 -3.67
MV(R) -7.60 -9.09 1.69 1.41 -2.48 -3.01 -1.89 -4.39 -5.45 1.55 0.61 -2.72 -3.42 -1.79 -3.30 -3.83
ME 0.46 0.55 -1.27 -1.12 -0.19 -0.11 -0.44 -0.04 -0.54 -0.53 -1.16 0.37 0.43 0.03 0.12 0.16
STD(R) 3.83 2.88 2.37 2.16 2.55 2.50 1.72 2.05 1.75 3.51 3.71 2.58 2.15 1.07 1.80 1.57
Current account
Sample 71/05 71/97 73/05 73/97 71/05 71/97 95/05 87/05 87/97 95/05 95/05 74/05 74/97 99/05 71/05 71/97
No of obs. 35 27 26 25 35 27 11 19 11 11 11 32 24 7 35 27
MV(F) 0.26 0.06 19.65 20.22 3.09 2.53 -1.32 -3.28 -1.10 5.29 2.87 -1.02 -0.85 0.83 0.22 0.12
MV(R) -0.17 -0.23 20.51 20.94 3.15 2.68 -0.94 -4.38 -1.53 5.49 3.51 -1.01 -0.80 0.46 0.18 0.12
ME 0.43 0.30 -0.86 -0.72 -0.07 -0.15 -0.38 1.10 0.43 -0.20 -0.64 -0.01 -0.05 0.37 0.04 -0.01
STD(R) 1.81 2.00 13.73 13.83 2.07 1.92 1.91 3.75 1.61 1.26 2.20 1.64 1.81 0.46 0.74 0.80
European Union
F=forecast data; R=realisation data; MV=average mean value; ME= mean error (MV(F) – MV(R)): thus the mean error is equal to the mean forecast minus the mean realised average;  
STD(R): standard deviation of realisation data
Table A2: Basic characteristics of the sample data – year ahead (continued)
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal United Kingdom
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
   
  46 
GDP
MAV 2.51 2.65 2.10 2.18 2.55 2.88 4.77 4.09 2.33 1.58 3.09 3.07 2.73 2.91 2.53 2.68
MAE 0.70 0.72 0.68 0.70 0.84 0.96 1.65 1.60 0.68 0.85 0.55 0.70 0.57 0.56 0.50 0.53
RMSE 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.91 1.13 1.23 1.98 1.93 0.87 1.03 0.77 0.94 0.74 0.77 0.72 0.77
THEIL1 0.45 0.42 0.39 0.37 0.46 0.45 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.37
THEIL2 0.47 0.44 0.55 0.51 0.55 0.56 0.60 0.65 0.54 0.77 0.55 0.55 0.38 0.37 0.43 0.42
T H E I L 2 * 0 . 4 40 . 4 80 . 5 00 . 5 50 . 5 10 . 4 90 . 3 60.39
% of positive errors 43 64 51 39 36 40 54 57
Inflation
MAV 4.26 4.89 5.23 6.25 3.11 3.61 7.37 8.57 11.84 15.80 4.55 5.51 5.15 6.25 5.32 6.29
MAE 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.66 0.32 0.33 0.95 1.05 0.95 1.15 0.44 0.40 0.47 0.49 0.31 0.37
RMSE 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.80 0.42 0.44 1.32 1.44 1.36 1.53 0.57 0.52 0.72 0.73 0.44 0.49
THEIL1 0.43 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.38 0.46 0.45 0.51 0.48 0.51 0.37 0.48 0.44 0.32 0.31
THEIL2 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.16
T H E I L 2 * 0 . 2 30 . 1 80 . 2 10 . 2 00 . 1 80 . 2 90 . 1 70.13
% of positive errors 49 48 62 61 52 40 57 59
Investment
MAV 4.37 4.56 7.04 7.79 4.02 4.39 6.79 6.57 5.88 5.11 6.59 7.48 3.52 3.51 3.40 3.53
MAE 2.28 2.31 3.84 3.94 2.40 2.26 3.49 3.48 3.22 3.59 2.43 3.24 1.51 1.60 1.24 1.14
RMSE 2.95 3.05 4.79 4.86 3.03 2.87 4.42 4.36 4.26 4.77 2.87 3.58 1.95 2.01 1.72 1.63
THEIL1 0.63 0.61 0.47 0.44 0.71 0.63 0.55 0.50 0.79 0.80 0.58 0.58 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.45
THEIL2 0.60 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.64 0.60 0.61 0.59 0.70 0.75 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.45
T H E I L 2 * 0 . 5 60 . 5 00 . 5 90 . 5 60 . 6 40 . 4 40 . 5 00.46
% of positive errors 54 52 59 45 64 50 57 73
Unemployment rate
MAV 8.27 8.38 6.66 7.24 6.08 5.31 11.07 13.00 8.52 7.79 17.24 20.00 8.24 7.80 7.72 7.56
MAE 0.49 0.46 0.54 0.62 0.30 0.30 0.65 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.68 0.63 0.32 0.35 0.23 0.28
RMSE 0.63 0.61 0.85 0.95 0.45 0.48 0.88 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.85 0.80 0.43 0.47 0.32 0.41
THEIL1 0.64 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.38 0.37 0.55 0.54 0.99 0.90 0.48 0.44 0.54 0.59 0.38 0.46
THEIL2 0.19 0.16 0.36 0.39 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.58 0.66 0.19 0.31 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.11
T H E I L 2 * 0 . 1 80 . 3 30 . 1 40 . 1 60 . 5 20 . 1 80 . 1 20.10
% of positive errors 51 58 51 70 68 75 61 57
Government bal.
MAV 5.13 6.55 2.88 3.00 2.50 2.43 6.26 7.80 8.77 11.90 2.98 4.55 2.28 2.18 3.32 3.78
MAE 0.43 0.45 0.84 0.89 0.79 0.80 1.45 1.44 1.66 2.03 0.80 0.99 0.62 0.68 0.50 0.46
RMSE 0.61 0.66 1.22 1.23 0.97 0.94 1.84 1.89 2.14 2.43 1.07 1.29 0.86 0.92 0.63 0.56
THEIL1 0.53 0.51 0.62 0.56 0.61 0.62 0.95 0.93 0.83 0.82 0.86 0.85 0.80 0.83 0.59 0.54
THEIL2 0.16 0.22 0.35 0.40 0.55 0.52 0.31 0.38 0.37 0.59 0.43 0.82 0.50 0.50 0.34 0.34
T H E I L 2 * 0 . 1 60 . 3 20 . 5 10 . 2 90 . 3 50 . 4 00 . 4 80.32
% of positive errors 51 55 46 34 63 40 51 43
Current account
MAV 2.85 2.47 2.50 2.61 1.73 1.67 3.86 4.73 4.38 4.05 2.44 1.84 1.13 1.05 0.56 0.59
MAE 0.90 0.90 0.75 0.75 0.59 0.57 1.35 1.55 1.22 1.21 0.84 0.79 0.53 0.48 0.33 0.31
RMSE 1.16 1.15 0.97 0.96 0.78 0.74 1.92 2.14 1.70 1.68 1.06 1.06 0.64 0.60 0.42 0.41
THEIL1 0.84 0.80 0.72 0.67 0.75 0.72 0.68 0.68 0.91 0.85 0.81 0.84 0.63 0.55 0.66 0.62
THEIL2 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.85 1.00 0.49 0.57 0.46 0.46 0.63 0.57
T H E I L 2 * 0 . 3 70 . 3 50 . 4 10 . 3 80 . 7 90 . 4 40 . 4 40.58
% of positive errors 51 58 51 45 71 75 51 60
Table A3: Basic characteristics of the forecast errors - current year
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
THEIL2* is defined as the ratio between the root mean sqaured errors of the Commission forecast and "recursive mean forecast"
European Union
MAV: mean absolute value of the realisation data; MAE: mean absolute forecast error; RMSE: root mean squared forecast error; 
THEIL1 is defined as the ratio between the root mean squared errors of the Commission forecast and "no change forecast" 
THEIL2 is defined as the ratio between the root mean squared errors of the Commission forecast and "average forecast" 
   
  47 
Austria Finland Sweden euro area
GDP
MAV 2.36 2.69 3.51 3.27 2.47 2.61 1.88 2.59 3.06 3.45 2.46 2.25 2.24 1.86 2.53 2.68
MAE 0.88 0.94 1.44 1.43 0.72 0.69 0.50 0.70 0.73 0.96 0.58 0.69 0.77 0.38 0.50 0.53
RMSE 1.22 1.32 1.95 2.01 0.92 0.86 0.71 0.87 0.89 1.31 0.82 0.89 0.98 0.53 0.72 0.77
THEIL1 0.47 0.45 0.56 0.54 0.63 0.57 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.63 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.38 0.37
THEIL2 0.62 0.63 0.72 0.74 0.56 0.52 0.83 0.47 0.50 0.79 0.87 0.50 0.49 0.55 0.43 0.42
THEIL2* 0.58 0.66 0.52 0.71 0.43 0.69 0.72 0.44 0.46 0.39
% of positive errors 70 38 38 64 65 55 45 61 75 57
Inflation
MAV 8.22 9.79 4.16 4.73 4.01 4.44 1.75 6.26 8.40 1.67 1.55 6.31 7.85 1.91 5.32 6.29
MAE 0.65 0.75 0.52 0.54 0.40 0.43 0.44 0.56 0.63 0.47 0.35 0.77 0.84 0.15 0.31 0.37
RMSE 0.93 1.03 0.67 0.71 0.54 0.58 0.48 0.74 0.86 0.52 0.40 1.22 1.35 0.21 0.44 0.49
THEIL1 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.37 0.89 0.50 0.48 0.81 0.47 0.43 0.42 0.72 0.32 0.31
THEIL2 0.16 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.97 0.19 0.22 0.79 0.61 0.24 0.27 0.69 0.14 0.16
THEIL2* 0.15 0.23 0.18 0.82 0.17 0.69 0.49 0.22 0.55 0.13
% of positive errors 32 54 54 73 30 45 45 61 50 59
Investment
MAV 3.87 4.19 5.10 5.16 4.00 4.19 3.17 6.92 8.22 5.09 5.61 3.68 3.60 2.70 3.40 3.53
MAE 2.60 2.85 3.34 3.07 2.55 2.58 2.23 3.55 3.67 2.90 3.45 2.15 2.05 1.44 1.24 1.14
RMSE 3.54 3.85 4.26 3.90 3.20 3.27 2.63 4.25 4.40 3.97 3.82 2.65 2.58 1.94 1.72 1.63
THEIL1 0.56 0.55 0.82 0.80 0.59 0.56 0.71 0.77 0.78 1.05 0.58 0.52 0.47 0.80 0.50 0.45
THEIL2 0.74 0.73 0.79 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.92 0.62 0.74 0.99 0.76 0.60 0.56 0.75 0.50 0.45
THEIL2* 0.68 0.73 0.65 0.81 0.56 0.86 0.63 0.56 0.63 0.46
% of positive errors 68 41 46 64 55 73 64 64 88 73
Unemployment rate
MAV 8.93 8.74 2.08 1.68 6.13 6.85 4.27 5.86 6.14 11.15 7.29 7.48 8.16 9.08 7.72 7.56
MAE 0.72 0.79 0.31 0.26 0.67 0.74 0.28 0.59 0.68 0.37 0.78 0.28 0.31 0.20 0.23 0.28
RMSE 1.13 1.25 0.40 0.33 1.13 1.26 0.40 0.74 0.83 0.52 1.01 0.33 0.35 0.24 0.32 0.41
THEIL1 0.88 0.88 0.79 0.83 0.74 0.75 1.01 0.81 0.89 0.44 0.95 0.25 0.24 0.39 0.38 0.46
THEIL2 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.30 0.32 0.98 0.56 0.62 0.18 0.55 0.11 0.12 0.28 0.10 0.11
THEIL2* 0.31 0.34 0.29 0.87 0.49 0.15 0.48 0.11 0.22 0.10
% of positive errors 51 58 65 36 75 73 45 70 100 57
Government bal.
MAV 7.41 8.83 2.18 2.05 2.96 3.41 2.04 4.68 5.89 3.25 2.86 3.21 3.51 1.88 3.32 3.78
MAE 0.95 1.09 1.49 1.67 0.94 0.86 0.51 0.77 0.96 0.87 1.25 0.82 0.72 0.51 0.50 0.46
RMSE 1.39 1.54 1.86 2.03 1.18 1.13 0.67 1.02 1.20 1.09 1.38 1.08 0.93 0.65 0.63 0.56
THEIL1 0.76 0.76 0.98 1.04 0.89 0.91 0.65 0.84 1.00 0.51 0.58 0.63 0.60 0.63 0.59 0.54
THEIL2 0.36 0.51 0.85 0.98 0.50 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.76 0.32 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.66 0.34 0.34
THEIL2* 0.35 0.80 0.47 0.33 0.45 0.28 0.33 0.40 0.53 0.32
% of positive errors 59 22 41 45 40 36 18 58 50 43
Current account
MAV 1.40 1.56 19.48 21.40 3.32 2.91 1.90 3.96 1.53 5.17 3.49 1.39 1.34 0.65 0.56 0.59
MAE 0.76 0.75 3.10 2.33 0.98 0.81 0.81 1.45 1.14 1.19 0.91 0.78 0.85 0.46 0.33 0.31
RMSE 0.94 0.95 5.51 3.59 1.27 1.04 1.07 2.03 1.41 1.32 1.07 0.98 1.04 0.56 0.42 0.41
THEIL1 0.61 0.56 0.65 0.47 0.85 0.80 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.84 0.60 0.56 0.93 0.66 0.62
THEIL2 0.56 0.52 0.38 0.25 0.61 0.55 0.58 0.50 0.80 0.85 0.52 0.62 0.61 1.16 0.63 0.57
THEIL2* 0.52 0.36 0.58 0.52 0.47 0.74 0.47 0.54 0.86 0.58
% of positive errors 69 58 46 55 50 55 36 45 88 60
THEIL2* is defined as the ratio between the root mean sqaured errors of the Commission forecast and "recursive mean forecast"
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal United Kingdom European Union
MAV: mean absolute value of the realisation data; MAE: mean absolute forecast error; RMSE: root mean squared forecast error; 
THEIL1 is defined as the ratio between the root mean squared errors of the Commission forecast and "no change forecast" 
Table A3: Basic characteristics of the forecast errors - current year (continued)
THEIL2 is defined as the ratio between the root mean squared errors of the Commission forecast and "average forecast" 
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
   
  48 
GDP
MAV 2.42 2.54 2.16 2.20 2.42 2.75 4.75 3.97 2.45 1.66 3.14 3.06 2.55 2.70 2.43 2.56
MAE 1.14 1.19 0.94 1.03 1.21 1.31 2.24 2.36 0.87 1.14 0.79 1.06 0.88 0.94 0.86 0.94
RMSE 1.53 1.62 1.23 1.33 1.63 1.75 2.63 2.71 1.23 1.47 1.06 1.32 1.20 1.28 1.23 1.33
THEIL1 0.77 0.77 0.60 0.58 0.69 0.68 0.90 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.65 0.66 0.62 0.61 0.67 0.67
THEIL2 0.85 0.83 0.81 0.80 0.86 0.87 0.80 0.87 0.76 1.11 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.79 0.78
T H E I L 2 * 0 . 7 50 . 7 70 . 7 70 . 7 10 . 6 60 . 5 50 . 6 20.70
% of positive errors 56 50 64 34 29 47 61 58
Inflation
MAV 4.21 4.88 5.10 6.07 3.08 3.62 7.05 8.20 11.29 15.25 4.31 5.22 5.19 6.24 5.36 6.37
MAE 1.02 1.13 1.14 1.38 0.69 0.76 1.83 2.08 1.22 1.57 0.56 0.57 0.94 1.15 0.81 0.99
RMSE 1.56 1.72 1.90 2.17 0.88 0.95 2.73 3.04 1.96 2.36 0.76 0.84 1.47 1.78 1.33 1.51
THEIL1 0.81 0.81 0.99 0.99 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.66 0.87 0.88 0.75 0.76
THEIL2 0.53 0.57 0.51 0.57 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.45 0.29 0.51 0.52 0.68 0.37 0.45 0.40 0.48
T H E I L 2 * 0 . 4 50 . 4 50 . 4 00 . 3 80 . 2 50 . 4 30 . 3 30.35
% of positive errors 64 44 64 66 38 26 42 50
Investment
MAV 4.06 4.39 6.90 7.95 3.86 4.17 7.31 7.18 5.28 4.45 5.94 6.33 3.19 3.06 3.16 3.24
MAE 3.33 3.71 5.15 5.65 3.19 3.18 5.69 6.28 3.42 3.39 3.03 3.71 1.93 1.97 1.77 1.74
RMSE 4.75 5.22 6.59 7.17 3.89 3.78 6.82 7.35 3.87 3.88 3.66 4.35 2.52 2.63 2.45 2.51
THEIL1 0.94 0.96 0.69 0.67 0.79 0.76 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.77 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.74 0.68 0.66
THEIL2 0.92 0.92 0.77 0.75 0.88 0.86 0.89 0.92 0.76 0.77 0.74 0.75 0.80 0.83 0.81 0.80
T H E I L 2 * 0 . 8 50 . 6 60 . 7 30 . 7 70 . 6 70 . 5 70 . 7 10.71
% of positive errors 58 63 61 53 71 37 56 61
Unemployment rate
MAV 8.41 8.57 6.80 7.42 6.30 5.53 11.15 13.23 8.91 8.19 16.85 19.82 8.35 7.91 7.95 7.84
MAE 0.84 0.86 1.02 1.18 0.75 0.83 1.05 1.15 1.17 1.27 1.34 1.53 0.59 0.64 0.51 0.52
RMSE 1.13 1.18 1.29 1.43 1.04 1.14 1.46 1.58 1.48 1.56 1.61 1.80 0.76 0.82 0.75 0.80
THEIL1 0.81 0.79 0.86 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.67 0.71 1.02 1.03 0.64 0.70 0.87 0.98 0.74 0.73
THEIL2 0.36 0.33 0.64 0.74 0.38 0.43 0.29 0.38 1.10 1.64 0.36 0.65 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.25
T H E I L 2 * 0 . 3 10 . 5 50 . 3 40 . 2 50 . 9 60 . 3 00 . 2 20.23
% of positive errors 54 47 54 69 42 53 49 57
Government bal.
MAV 5.01 6.31 2.88 3.06 2.45 2.39 6.25 7.80 8.79 11.67 2.97 4.64 2.32 2.23 3.36 3.83
MAE 1.09 1.19 1.59 1.79 1.03 1.07 2.15 2.28 2.25 2.56 0.89 1.21 0.71 0.75 0.71 0.69
RMSE 1.50 1.63 1.97 2.12 1.29 1.34 2.54 2.72 2.77 3.05 1.28 1.61 1.01 1.07 0.89 0.87
THEIL1 0.95 0.96 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.93 0.94 0.75 0.75 0.81 0.82 0.77 0.82 0.73 0.76
THEIL2 0.40 0.52 0.56 0.68 0.81 0.83 0.42 0.53 0.51 0.74 0.50 1.02 0.60 0.59 0.50 0.56
T H E I L 2 * 0 . 3 60 . 4 80 . 6 90 . 3 80 . 4 40 . 4 30 . 5 40.44
% of positive errors 54 52 47 44 58 42 42 58
Current account
MAV 2.76 2.42 2.72 2.86 1.78 1.72 3.89 4.83 4.64 4.09 2.54 1.83 1.19 1.11 0.61 0.65
MAE 1.35 1.41 1.60 1.79 0.91 0.90 2.12 2.46 1.53 1.30 1.32 1.25 0.75 0.77 0.51 0.49
RMSE 1.68 1.78 2.20 2.45 1.23 1.18 2.82 3.16 1.88 1.63 1.61 1.57 0.93 0.96 0.68 0.68
THEIL1 0.83 0.81 0.99 1.03 0.79 0.82 0.95 0.98 0.83 0.82 0.75 0.81 0.80 0.93 0.90 0.88
THEIL2 0.60 0.63 0.75 0.86 0.65 0.64 0.60 0.59 0.90 1.00 0.77 0.95 0.66 0.70 0.94 0.86
T H E I L 2 * 0 . 5 30 . 6 70 . 5 90 . 5 20 . 7 90 . 6 30 . 5 90.83
% of positive errors 57 50 43 53 71 58 57 46
MAV: mean absolute value of the realisation data; MAE: mean absolute forecast error; RMSE: root mean squared forecast error; 
THEIL1 is defined as the ratio between the root mean squared errors of the Commission forecast and "no change forecast" 
THEIL2 is defined as the ratio between the root mean squared errors of the Commission forecast and "average forecast" 
THEIL2* is defined as the ratio between the root mean sqaured errors of the Commission forecast and "recursive mean forecast"
European Union
Table A4: Basic characteristics of the forecast errors - year ahead
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
   
  49 
Austria Finland Sweden euro area
GDP
MAV 2.30 2.63 3.38 3.07 2.42 2.52 1.99 2.49 2.95 3.65 2.45 2.25 2.25 1.77 2.43 2.56
MAE 1.29 1.36 2.03 1.89 1.08 1.08 0.71 0.95 0.99 1.27 0.80 1.07 1.25 0.69 0.86 0.94
RMSE 1.75 1.89 2.71 2.61 1.36 1.36 0.95 1.19 1.18 1.59 1.06 1.38 1.56 0.86 1.23 1.33
THEIL1 0.66 0.65 0.79 0.77 0.82 0.85 0.74 0.77 0.75 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.73 0.69 0.67 0.67
THEIL2 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.79 0.79 1.23 0.65 0.65 0.99 1.13 0.81 0.81 0.96 0.79 0.78
THEIL2* 0.83 0.82 0.70 0.95 0.53 0.80 0.93 0.73 0.65 0.70
% of positive errors 72 44 50 55 63 45 55 59 71 58
Inflation
MAV 8.38 10.05 4.30 4.87 3.95 4.40 1.64 6.09 8.29 1.54 1.54 6.34 7.95 2.03 5.36 6.37
MAE 1.42 1.69 1.27 1.49 0.68 0.75 0.37 1.04 1.43 0.92 0.64 1.47 1.75 0.29 0.81 0.99
RMSE 2.49 2.80 1.63 1.80 0.90 1.00 0.54 1.71 2.18 1.11 0.77 2.27 2.58 0.35 1.33 1.51
THEIL1 0.88 0.88 0.82 0.83 0.56 0.57 0.73 1.11 1.14 0.95 0.93 0.64 0.63 0.72 0.75 0.76
THEIL2 0.42 0.49 0.58 0.61 0.31 0.32 0.94 0.45 0.59 0.98 1.15 0.42 0.49 1.03 0.40 0.48
THEIL2* 0.36 0.51 0.27 0.65 0.36 0.75 0.97 0.37 0.62 0.35
% of positive errors 31 56 61 55 26 64 82 56 43 50
Investment
MAV 3.44 3.65 5.64 5.44 4.18 4.29 3.49 6.44 7.54 5.99 5.67 4.03 4.07 2.60 3.16 3.24
MAE 2.92 3.14 5.58 5.60 3.16 3.28 2.34 3.93 3.73 3.86 4.00 2.82 3.15 1.97 1.77 1.74
RMSE 3.75 3.97 7.22 6.82 3.86 4.04 2.83 4.90 4.67 5.30 4.49 3.62 3.97 2.72 2.45 2.51
THEIL1 0.60 0.57 0.99 1.13 0.72 0.73 0.69 0.91 0.93 0.98 0.62 0.66 0.65 0.77 0.68 0.66
THEIL2 0.88 0.86 1.01 1.08 0.84 0.84 0.89 0.72 0.80 1.17 0.90 0.77 0.79 1.01 0.81 0.80
THEIL2* 0.80 0.91 0.74 0.74 0.57 0.90 0.66 0.70 0.59 0.71
% of positive errors 64 50 36 64 68 64 55 66 86 61
Unemployment rate
MAV 9.04 8.89 2.08 1.69 6.42 7.26 4.27 5.66 5.83 11.05 7.27 7.57 8.32 8.80 7.95 7.84
MAE 1.03 1.18 0.38 0.36 1.09 1.27 0.49 1.03 1.15 0.52 1.00 0.58 0.71 0.40 0.51 0.52
RMSE 1.56 1.75 0.47 0.44 1.53 1.70 0.75 1.34 1.52 0.71 1.17 0.83 0.94 0.43 0.75 0.80
THEIL1 0.96 1.00 0.74 0.93 0.77 0.77 1.45 0.93 0.95 0.47 0.74 0.61 0.61 0.48 0.74 0.73
THEIL2 0.52 0.53 0.43 0.51 0.41 0.45 1.56 1.08 1.23 0.25 0.64 0.31 0.35 0.78 0.26 0.25
THEIL2* 0.46 0.39 0.36 1.22 0.85 0.17 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.23
% of positive errors 54 50 57 55 63 82 45 63 86 57
Government bal.
MAV 7.60 9.09 2.35 2.10 2.97 3.41 1.93 4.39 5.45 3.25 2.90 3.23 3.56 1.87 3.36 3.83
MAE 1.36 1.51 2.18 2.32 1.24 1.14 0.69 1.21 1.39 1.00 1.38 1.38 1.36 0.66 0.71 0.69
RMSE 1.73 1.90 2.52 2.65 1.50 1.40 0.83 1.60 1.76 1.25 1.56 1.64 1.64 0.81 0.89 0.87
THEIL1 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.80 0.85 0.70 0.87 0.86 0.58 0.47 0.79 0.86 0.66 0.73 0.76
THEIL2 0.46 0.67 1.08 1.25 0.60 0.57 0.51 0.80 1.05 0.37 0.44 0.65 0.78 0.82 0.50 0.56
THEIL2* 0.41 0.97 0.52 0.34 0.65 0.26 0.29 0.58 0.59 0.44
% of positive errors 69 29 33 27 47 27 18 59 57 58
Current account
MAV 1.45 1.65 21.45 21.91 3.35 2.94 1.88 4.57 1.85 5.49 3.51 1.58 1.56 0.49 0.61 0.65
MAE 1.25 1.27 6.88 6.97 1.35 1.26 0.95 1.92 1.34 1.29 1.42 0.97 1.10 0.80 0.51 0.49
RMSE 1.69 1.75 9.27 9.42 1.70 1.57 1.29 2.52 1.57 1.43 1.73 1.50 1.69 0.86 0.68 0.68
THEIL1 0.92 0.91 1.06 1.05 0.90 0.91 0.69 0.76 0.74 0.81 1.09 1.03 1.03 0.82 0.90 0.88
THEIL2 0.95 0.89 0.69 0.69 0.83 0.83 0.71 0.69 1.02 1.19 0.82 0.93 0.95 2.02 0.94 0.86
THEIL2* 0.80 0.58 0.74 0.57 0.59 0.91 0.63 0.77 1.46 0.83
% of positive errors 69 42 49 64 74 45 36 47 71 46
MAV: mean absolute value of the realisation data; MAE: mean absolute forecast error; RMSE: root mean squared forecast error; 
THEIL1 is defined as the ratio between the root mean squared errors of the Commission forecast and "no change forecast" 
THEIL2 is defined as the ratio between the root mean squared errors of the Commission forecast and "average forecast" 
THEIL2* is defined as the ratio between the root mean sqaured errors of the Commission forecast and "recursive mean forecast"
European Union
Table A4: Basic characteristics of the forecast errors - year ahead (continued)
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal United Kingdom
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
   
  50 
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom euro area European Union
real GDP growth
1969-1979 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.5 0.7 1.6 1.6 0.7 1.0 0.7
1980-1989 0.7 0.5 0.7 1.7 0.9 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.9 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.4
1990-1997 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.4
1998-2005 0.6 0.6 0.4 1.8 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.5 0.8 0.4 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.4
Inflation
1969-1979 0.9 1.0 0.5 1.9 0.6 1.0 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.5
1980-1989 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.8 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.8 1.0 0.3
1990-1997 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2
1998-2005 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.1
Investment
1969-1979 2.1 3.3 2.7 3.5 1.7 4.0 3.6 3.1 2.0 1.4
1980-1989 3.0 4.7 2.0 3.4 4.4 3.0 1.2 2.2 1.9 2.5 4.6 1.9 0.8
1990-1997 1.7 3.5 2.0 3.6 2.7 3.4 1.9 2.2 3.7 1.9 1.8 3.2 5.5 4.7 2.3 1.4
1998-2005 2.2 3.5 2.9 3.5 2.4 1.2 1.2 1.7 4.4 2.4 2.4 3.4 1.9 3.0 2.5 1.4 1.5
Unemployment
1969-1979 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2
1980-1989 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.4 1.3 0.2 1.4 1.1 0.3 0.4
1990-1997 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.4 0.1
1998-2005 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2
Government balance
1969-1979 0.4 0.3 0.9 2.7 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.7
1980-1989 0.6 1.3 0.5 1.2 2.2 1.0 0.6 1.1 1.7 0.7 1.6 0.6 0.4
1990-1997 0.3 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.9 1.0 0.4 0.5 1.8 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.5 0.7 0.4
1998-2005 0.4 0.7 0.8 1.5 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.2 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.1 0.5 0.6
Current account
1969-1979 1.3 0.5 0.6 2.6 0.5 1.0 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.3
1980-1989 0.9 0.9 0.6 1.2 1.8 0.9 0.4 0.6 3.3 0.9 1.9 0.9 0.3
1990-1997 0.5 0.8 0.5 1.0 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.7 2.2 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.4 0.5 0.8 0.4
1998-2005 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.8 6.6 1.6 0.9 1.9 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.4
Table A5: MAE by periods - current year
   
  51 
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom euro area European Union
real GDP growth
1969-1979 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.5 0.7 1.6 1.6 0.7 1.0 0.7
1980-1989 0.7 0.5 0.7 1.7 0.9 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.9 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.4
1990-1997 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.4
1998-2005 0.6 0.6 0.4 1.8 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.5 0.8 0.4 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.4
Inflation
1969-1979 0.9 1.0 0.5 1.9 0.6 1.0 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.5
1980-1989 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.8 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.8 1.0 0.3
1990-1997 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2
1998-2005 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.1
Investment
1969-1979 2.1 3.3 2.7 3.5 1.7 4.0 3.6 3.1 2.0 1.4
1980-1989 3.0 4.7 2.0 3.4 4.4 3.0 1.2 2.2 1.9 2.5 4.6 1.9 0.8
1990-1997 1.7 3.5 2.0 3.6 2.7 3.4 1.9 2.2 3.7 1.9 1.8 3.2 5.5 4.7 2.3 1.4
1998-2005 2.2 3.5 2.9 3.5 2.4 1.2 1.2 1.7 4.4 2.4 2.4 3.4 1.9 3.0 2.5 1.4 1.5
Unemployment
1969-1979 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2
1980-1989 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.4 1.3 0.2 1.4 1.1 0.3 0.4
1990-1997 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.4 0.1
1998-2005 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2
Government balance
1969-1979 0.4 0.3 0.9 2.7 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.7
1980-1989 0.6 1.3 0.5 1.2 2.2 1.0 0.6 1.1 1.7 0.7 1.6 0.6 0.4
1990-1997 0.3 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.9 1.0 0.4 0.5 1.8 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.5 0.7 0.4
1998-2005 0.4 0.7 0.8 1.5 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.2 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.1 0.5 0.6
Current account
1969-1979 1.3 0.5 0.6 2.6 0.5 1.0 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.3
1980-1989 0.9 0.9 0.6 1.2 1.8 0.9 0.4 0.6 3.3 0.9 1.9 0.9 0.3
1990-1997 0.5 0.8 0.5 1.0 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.7 2.2 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.4 0.5 0.8 0.4
1998-2005 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.8 6.6 1.6 0.9 1.9 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.4
Table A6: MAE by periods - year ahead  
  52 
GDP
ρ1 0.20 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.31 0.20 -0.06
Signif ρ1=0 0.20 0.12 0.74 0.47 0.94 1.00 0.91 0.25 0.76 0.78 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.15 0.72 0.67
ρ2 0.07 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.05
Signif ρ2=0 0.40 0.24 0.69 0.60 0.57 0.66 0.80 0.40 0.89 0.90 0.33 0.39 0.43 0.36 0.90 0.89
ρ3 -0.18 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.08 -0.10 -0.09
Signif ρ3=0 0.37 0.26 0.86 0.71 0.77 0.82 0.93 0.47 0.97 0.98 0.49 0.57 0.55 0.51 0.90 0.94
Inflation
ρ1 0.10 -0.01 0.06 -0.28 0.09 -0.28 -0.11 0.11
Signif ρ1=0 0.54 0.95 0.97 0.56 0.71 0.46 0.09 0.07 0.63 0.54 0.17 0.07 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.47
ρ2 0.08 -0.07 -0.14 0.01 -0.16 0.02 0.09 0.13
Signif ρ2=0 0.73 0.92 0.92 0.70 0.63 0.61 0.23 0.19 0.62 0.57 0.39 0.19 0.67 0.52 0.54 0.47
ρ3 -0.29 -0.12 -0.29 -0.02 0.10 0.23 -0.06 -0.24
Signif ρ3=0 0.25 0.16 0.86 0.65 0.22 0.14 0.40 0.34 0.74 0.68 0.36 0.13 0.82 0.69 0.30 0.31
Investment
ρ1 0.23 0.16 0.26 0.15 -0.08 0.39 0.04 0.21
Signif ρ1=0 0.15 0.14 0.35 0.35 0.10 0.37 0.36 0.50 0.69 0.80 0.06 0.18 0.81 0.95 0.18 0.59
ρ2 -0.03 0.04 0.08 -0.12 0.01 0.01 -0.18 -0.17
Signif ρ2=0 0.35 0.33 0.62 0.58 0.22 0.66 0.50 0.66 0.92 0.92 0.17 0.38 0.51 0.95 0.22 0.59
ρ3 -0.32 -0.24 -0.12 -0.26 0.20 -0.01 0.00 -0.19
Signif ρ3=0 0.09 0.17 0.37 0.35 0.31 0.37 0.26 0.35 0.72 0.82 0.32 0.59 0.72 0.88 0.20 0.73
Unemployment rate
ρ1 0.20 -0.26 0.27 -0.16 0.10 0.04 -0.19 0.20
Signif ρ1=0 0.20 0.03 0.11 0.19 0.08 0.07 0.35 0.53 0.60 0.57 0.83 0.57 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.90
ρ2 0.17 0.03 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.06 -0.08 0.09
Signif ρ2=0 0.24 0.01 0.28 0.42 0.17 0.16 0.51 0.56 0.70 0.83 0.94 0.29 0.43 0.38 0.38 0.92
ρ3 0.28 -0.09 -0.17 0.04 -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08
Signif ρ3=0 0.10 0.00 0.42 0.47 0.19 0.25 0.70 0.76 0.81 0.79 0.99 0.11 0.62 0.58 0.52 0.08
Government bal.
ρ1 0.21 0.23 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.09
Signif ρ1=0 0.20 0.55 0.20 0.40 0.95 0.63 0.70 0.78 0.84 0.97 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.96 0.56 0.65
ρ2 -0.03 0.13 -0.21 -0.08 0.23 0.29 -0.13 -0.12
Signif ρ2=0 0.43 0.51 0.33 0.44 0.40 0.37 0.83 0.88 0.46 0.57 0.35 0.67 0.66 0.74 0.63 0.69
ρ3 0.08 -0.17 -0.21 -0.14 0.02 -0.03 0.11 -0.16
Signif ρ3=0 0.58 0.72 0.35 0.41 0.29 0.35 0.77 0.83 0.66 0.77 0.55 0.74 0.71 0.71 0.58 0.68
Current account
ρ1 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.11 -0.09 0.34 0.04 -0.12
Signif ρ1=0 0.62 0.36 0.75 0.52 0.97 0.87 0.51 0.56 0.66 0.74 0.11 0.51 0.81 0.98 0.48 0.41
ρ2 -0.10 -0.02 -0.14 -0.02 -0.24 0.19 -0.03 -0.12
Signif ρ2=0 0.74 0.41 0.95 0.77 0.68 0.81 0.79 0.80 0.39 0.08 0.17 0.59 0.95 1.00 0.58 0.68
ρ3 0.08 0.14 -0.13 -0.23 0.11 -0.05 0.11 -0.10
Signif ρ3=0 0.82 0.50 0.84 0.90 0.69 0.67 0.47 0.39 0.51 0.13 0.31 0.76 0.91 0.94 0.68 0.82
Note: The test for serial correlation is based on the Ljung-Box Q statistic, which is asymptotically distributed as χ2. Autocorrelation coefficients up to three lags as well as their significance are reported. 
Numbers above 0.05 indicate no serial correlation at the 5 % significance level. 
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Table A7: Persistence in current-year forecast error
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
   
  53 
Austria Finland Sweden euro area
GDP
ρ1 -0.13 0.27 0.18 0.12 0.42 -0.18 -0.01 -0.21 0.02 -0.06
Signif ρ1=0 0.40 0.48 0.09 0.11 0.26 0.80 0.64 0.04 0.05 0.49 0.96 0.20 0.18 0.95 0.72 0.67
ρ2 -0.08 -0.16 0.10 0.02 0.30 0.04 -0.50 -0.08 -0.09 0.05
Signif ρ2=0 0.62 0.70 0.14 0.25 0.43 0.73 0.90 0.04 0.08 0.78 0.14 0.39 0.36 0.94 0.90 0.89
ρ3 0.21 -0.25 -0.03 -0.37 -0.15 -0.34 -0.33 0.01 -0.58 -0.09
Signif ρ3=0 0.41 0.53 0.09 0.18 0.63 0.89 0.44 0.07 0.12 0.46 0.12 0.60 0.54 0.13 0.90 0.94
Inflation
ρ1 0.17 0.13 -0.12 0.13 0.24 -0.03 -0.12 -0.01 -0.14 0.11
Signif ρ1=0 0.28 0.35 0.41 0.78 0.45 0.41 0.61 0.25 0.27 0.91 0.66 0.96 0.85 0.64 0.48 0.47
ρ2 -0.13 0.06 -0.05 -0.22 0.33 -0.23 0.21 0.24 -0.38 0.13
Signif ρ2=0 0.40 0.46 0.66 0.86 0.72 0.70 0.59 0.14 0.19 0.66 0.64 0.35 0.52 0.35 0.54 0.47
ρ3 -0.22 0.04 -0.07 0.11 0.04 0.09 -0.21 0.08 0.02 -0.24
Signif ρ3=0 0.27 0.35 0.82 0.96 0.83 0.80 0.74 0.26 0.33 0.80 0.64 0.51 0.63 0.55 0.30 0.31
Investment
ρ1 0.00 0.27 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.21 0.33 0.21
Signif ρ1=0 0.99 0.97 0.09 0.36 0.60 0.86 0.62 0.44 0.92 0.50 0.27 0.20 0.28 0.26 0.18 0.59
ρ2 -0.27 -0.11 0.12 -0.18 0.15 -0.07 -0.49 -0.18 -0.43 -0.17
Signif ρ2=0 0.23 0.26 0.19 0.61 0.65 0.64 0.68 0.56 0.96 0.77 0.08 0.25 0.50 0.15 0.22 0.59
ρ3 0.09 -0.17 -0.28 -0.31 -0.12 0.05 -0.50 -0.32 -0.47 -0.19
Signif ρ3=0 0.35 0.36 0.21 0.72 0.25 0.28 0.48 0.66 0.91 0.90 0.02 0.08 0.51 0.07 0.20 0.73
Unemployment rate
ρ1 -0.19 -0.42 -0.19 -0.11 0.34 -0.15 0.39 -0.25 0.57 0.20
Signif ρ1=0 0.24 0.21 0.02 0.13 0.23 0.27 0.68 0.11 0.10 0.57 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.20 0.90
ρ2 -0.06 0.28 -0.05 -0.26 0.23 -0.15 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.09
Signif ρ2=0 0.47 0.40 0.01 0.20 0.46 0.51 0.55 0.14 0.10 0.71 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.15 0.38 0.92
ρ3 0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.15 0.10 -0.42 -0.29 -0.30 -0.14 -0.08
Signif ρ3=0 0.65 0.60 0.03 0.32 0.64 0.69 0.66 0.24 0.18 0.28 0.28 0.13 0.14 0.25 0.52 0.08
Government bal.
ρ1 -0.21 -0.25 0.01 -0.19 0.21 -0.49 0.49 0.26 0.28 0.09
Signif ρ1=0 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.96 0.44 0.48 0.30 0.35 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.65 0.34 0.56 0.65
ρ2 0.02 -0.09 0.03 -0.19 0.22 0.23 -0.20 0.00 -0.30 -0.12
Signif ρ2=0 0.41 0.43 0.30 0.31 0.97 0.57 0.59 0.33 0.23 0.11 0.13 0.30 0.74 0.34 0.63 0.69
ρ3 -0.09 0.02 -0.14 -0.08 0.01 -0.24 -0.39 -0.05 -0.32 -0.16
Signif ρ3=0 0.54 0.55 0.49 0.49 0.83 0.75 0.76 0.53 0.40 0.15 0.08 0.47 0.89 0.29 0.58 0.68
Current account
ρ1 -0.03 -0.36 0.17 0.11 0.00 0.02 -0.19 -0.02 -0.04 -0.12
Signif ρ1=0 0.86 0.61 0.03 0.07 0.29 0.23 0.67 0.99 0.71 0.94 0.47 0.92 0.89 0.88 0.48 0.41
ρ2 -0.18 -0.01 -0.12 0.42 -0.06 0.32 -0.07 -0.13 -0.54 -0.12
Signif ρ2=0 0.54 0.46 0.10 0.14 0.42 0.48 0.23 0.95 0.61 0.44 0.74 0.71 0.78 0.14 0.58 0.68
ρ3 -0.01 0.04 -0.12 -0.05 0.10 0.08 -0.23 -0.10 0.09 -0.10
Signif ρ3=0 0.74 0.64 0.19 0.09 0.51 0.69 0.39 0.95 0.65 0.62 0.68 0.78 0.92 0.26 0.68 0.82
Note: The test for serial correlation is based on the Ljung-Box Q statistic, which is asymptotically distributed as χ2. Autocorrelation coefficients up to three lags as well as their significance are reported. 
Numbers above 0.05 indicate no serial correlation at the 5 % significance level. 
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Table A7: Persistence in current-year forecast error (continued)
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal United Kingdom
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
   
  54 
GDP
ρ1 0.17 0.08 -0.07 0.30 -0.01 0.34 0.01 -0.02
Signif ρ1=0 0.30 0.18 0.62 0.42 0.68 0.79 0.07 0.01 0.95 0.95 0.11 0.18 0.94 0.79 0.91 0.96
ρ2 0.00 -0.13 -0.14 0.18 -0.36 0.01 -0.06 -0.21
Signif ρ2=0 0.58 0.41 0.66 0.50 0.64 0.59 0.11 0.03 0.16 0.25 0.27 0.41 0.93 0.82 0.41 0.38
ρ3 0.05 -0.07 -0.04 0.15 0.22 -0.03 -0.11 -0.04
Signif ρ3=0 0.75 0.57 0.79 0.66 0.81 0.77 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.27 0.45 0.62 0.89 0.91 0.61 0.58
Inflation
ρ1 0.30 -0.31 0.48 0.37 0.35 0.12 0.14 0.37
Signif ρ1=0 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.15 0.57 0.65 0.38 0.75 0.02 0.04
ρ2 -0.02 0.01 0.25 -0.10 0.19 -0.18 0.03 -0.08
Signif ρ2=0 0.17 0.27 0.18 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.29 0.57 0.40 0.66 0.95 0.06 0.10
ρ3 -0.20 0.21 -0.12 -0.27 -0.01 0.01 0.10 -0.19
Signif ρ3=0 0.16 0.24 0.17 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.22 0.47 0.77 0.60 0.74 0.96 0.06 0.09
Investment
ρ1 0.13 0.14 0.31 0.07 0.12 0.29 0.23 0.26
Signif ρ1=0 0.43 0.53 0.39 0.39 0.05 0.22 0.68 0.99 0.52 0.30 0.17 0.30 0.15 0.28 0.10 0.28
ρ2 0.12 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.26 -0.10 -0.19 -0.33
Signif ρ2=0 0.54 0.59 0.69 0.68 0.15 0.40 0.86 0.90 0.31 0.55 0.35 0.58 0.17 0.47 0.03 0.06
ρ3 -0.20 -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 0.00 -0.44 -0.34 -0.33
Signif ρ3=0 0.40 0.53 0.73 0.63 0.23 0.52 0.85 0.95 0.50 0.75 0.07 0.16 0.04 0.43 0.01 0.06
Unemployment rate
ρ1 0.42 0.35 0.54 0.70 0.33 0.53 0.15 0.59
Signif ρ1=0 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.21 0.01 0.02 0.35 0.38 0.00 0.00
ρ2 0.14 0.00 0.26 0.41 -0.21 0.13 0.00 0.22
Signif ρ2=0 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.18 0.04 0.07 0.65 0.68 0.00 0.00
ρ3 0.21 -0.15 0.02 0.23 -0.20 -0.05 -0.11 0.09
Signif ρ3=0 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.72 0.77 0.00 0.01
Government bal.
ρ1 0.15 0.48 -0.04 0.29 0.44 0.31 0.28 0.10
Signif ρ1=0 0.35 0.63 0.01 0.01 0.79 0.69 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.14 0.35 0.08 0.14 0.55 0.98
ρ2 0.03 0.08 -0.32 -0.22 0.13 0.32 0.00 -0.22
Signif ρ2=0 0.63 0.87 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.25 0.11 0.50 0.22 0.33 0.31 0.21
ρ3 0.12 -0.21 -0.01 -0.23 0.25 -0.09 0.05 0.05
Signif ρ3=0 0.69 0.94 0.03 0.02 0.25 0.19 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.28 0.20 0.38 0.38 0.46 0.48 0.25
Current account
ρ1 0.51 0.04 0.17 -0.14 0.20 0.43 0.16 0.27
Signif ρ1=0 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.99 0.30 0.64 0.40 0.36 0.30 0.65 0.04 0.35 0.34 0.62 0.09 0.19
ρ2 0.04 -0.38 -0.17 0.01 -0.02 0.12 -0.07 -0.11
Signif ρ2=0 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.32 0.67 0.70 0.65 0.59 0.61 0.11 0.50 0.58 0.81 0.19 0.42
ρ3 -0.14 0.01 -0.11 0.00 0.09 -0.16 0.11 -0.45
Signif ρ3=0 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.18 0.43 0.85 0.87 0.84 0.73 0.80 0.17 0.71 0.66 0.84 0.01 0.12
Note: The test for serial correlation is based on the Ljung-Box Q statistic, which is asymptotically distributed as χ2. Autocorrelation coefficients up to three lags as well as their significance are reported. 
Numbers above 0.05 indicate no serial correlation at the 5 % significance level. 
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Table A8: Persistence in year-ahead forecast error
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
   
  55 
Austria Finland Sweden euro area
GDP
ρ1 0.10 0.07 0.04 -0.28 0.22 -0.14 -0.27 0.25 -0.44 -0.02
Signif ρ1=0 0.53 0.50 0.65 0.81 0.82 0.92 0.29 0.30 0.19 0.60 0.30 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.91 0.96
ρ2 -0.33 -0.16 0.20 0.10 0.28 0.07 -0.09 -0.04 0.18 -0.21
Signif ρ2=0 0.09 0.10 0.54 0.84 0.45 0.42 0.53 0.23 0.28 0.84 0.55 0.32 0.36 0.30 0.41 0.38
ρ3 0.12 -0.15 -0.15 -0.31 -0.11 -0.33 -0.41 -0.28 -0.44 -0.04
Signif ρ3=0 0.14 0.16 0.53 0.81 0.47 0.54 0.40 0.35 0.42 0.51 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.14 0.61 0.58
Inflation
ρ1 0.18 0.52 0.28 0.02 0.53 0.26 0.27 0.39 -0.19 0.37
Signif ρ1=0 0.26 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.94 0.01 0.05 0.32 0.30 0.02 0.05 0.53 0.02 0.04
ρ2 0.11 0.13 0.15 -0.63 0.00 0.16 0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08
Signif ρ2=0 0.42 0.66 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.20 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.49 0.56 0.06 0.13 0.81 0.06 0.10
ρ3 -0.25 -0.20 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.24 0.03 -0.11 -0.40 -0.19
Signif ρ3=0 0.22 0.31 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.36 0.10 0.10 0.26 0.49 0.76 0.11 0.21 0.40 0.06 0.09
Investment
ρ1 0.12 0.13 0.30 -0.01 0.33 0.05 0.11 0.19 0.28 0.26
Signif ρ1=0 0.45 0.38 0.41 0.04 0.07 0.17 0.97 0.12 0.40 0.86 0.67 0.25 0.35 0.36 0.10 0.28
ρ2 -0.35 0.36 0.07 -0.30 0.09 -0.29 -0.44 -0.30 -0.45 -0.33
Signif ρ2=0 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.17 0.38 0.48 0.26 0.66 0.51 0.20 0.10 0.21 0.19 0.03 0.06
ρ3 -0.01 -0.29 -0.29 0.11 -0.08 -0.08 -0.29 -0.53 -0.49 -0.33
Signif ρ3=0 0.14 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.21 0.65 0.42 0.75 0.69 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.06
Unemployment rate
ρ1 0.50 0.37 0.26 0.04 0.31 0.29 0.44 0.22 0.20 0.59
Signif ρ1=0 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.89 0.14 0.12 0.27 0.10 0.20 0.21 0.51 0.00 0.00
ρ2 0.13 0.07 -0.20 -0.11 0.33 -0.51 0.04 -0.34 -0.24 0.22
Signif ρ2=0 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.33 0.12 0.21 0.90 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.08 0.57 0.00 0.00
ρ3 -0.16 -0.16 -0.10 -0.08 0.06 -0.44 -0.25 -0.36 -0.27 0.09
Signif ρ3=0 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.21 0.20 0.32 0.96 0.19 0.15 0.03 0.27 0.01 0.02 0.52 0.00 0.01
Government bal.
ρ1 0.11 0.16 0.38 -0.14 0.16 -0.10 0.21 0.26 0.14 0.10
Signif ρ1=0 0.49 0.66 0.34 0.40 0.02 0.08 0.60 0.46 0.93 0.70 0.43 0.12 0.34 0.65 0.55 0.98
ρ2 -0.12 -0.16 -0.09 -0.35 -0.07 0.08 -0.29 -0.15 -0.29 -0.22
Signif ρ2=0 0.59 0.66 0.40 0.46 0.05 0.22 0.33 0.72 0.71 0.89 0.37 0.20 0.30 0.53 0.31 0.21
ρ3 -0.09 0.11 -0.23 0.05 -0.20 -0.13 -0.08 -0.16 -0.32 0.05
Signif ρ3=0 0.71 0.67 0.52 0.64 0.04 0.31 0.52 0.65 0.48 0.91 0.56 0.24 0.40 0.41 0.48 0.25
Current account
ρ1 0.15 0.06 0.35 0.49 0.30 0.21 0.19 -0.02 0.32 0.27
Signif ρ1=0 0.34 0.54 0.73 0.74 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.15 0.46 0.42 0.48 0.89 0.84 0.30 0.09 0.19
ρ2 -0.24 -0.45 -0.09 0.13 -0.19 0.19 0.14 0.04 -0.46 -0.11
Signif ρ2=0 0.22 0.41 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.26 0.16 0.24 0.75 0.54 0.67 0.97 0.93 0.15 0.19 0.42
ρ3 -0.18 0.02 -0.25 -0.04 -0.46 -0.02 -0.01 -0.12 -0.51 -0.45
Signif ρ3=0 0.22 0.42 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.29 0.29 0.04 0.08 0.74 0.85 0.90 0.97 0.05 0.01 0.12
Note: The test for serial correlation is based on the Ljung-Box Q statistic, which is asymptotically distributed as χ2. Autocorrelation coefficients up to three lags as well as their significance are reported. 
Numbers above 0.05 indicate no serial correlation at the 5 % significance level. 
European Union
Table A8: Persistence in year-ahead forecast error (continued)
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal United Kingdom
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
   
  56 
GDP
α -0.05 -0.13 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.04 -0.57 -0.48 -0.12 -0.08 -0.20 -0.22 0.03 -0.03 0.11 0.08
Signif α=0 0.72 0.42 0.36 0.49 0.62 0.87 0.10 0.22 0.50 0.77 0.26 0.45 0.83 0.85 0.37 0.61
α1 0.01 0.01 0.52 0.52 0.44 0.44 0.31 0.31 0.19 0.19 0.32 0.32
α2 -0.09 -0.26 -0.02 -0.13 -0.11 -0.33 -0.95 -1.01 -0.25 -0.27 -0.20 -0.22 -0.07 -0.23 -0.02 -0.15
Signif α1=α2 0.60 0.42 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.08 0.16 0.01 0.10
Inflation
α -0.02 0.10 -0.18 -0.29 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.11 -0.11 0.03 -0.28 -0.18 0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.02
Signif α=0 0.89 0.49 0.16 0.07 0.14 0.32 0.96 0.70 0.70 0.94 0.02 0.24 0.74 0.86 0.74 0.80
α1 0.14 0.14 -0.29 -0.29 0.04 0.04 -0.23 -0.23 -0.11 -0.11 0.06 0.06
α2 -0.11 0.06 -0.13 -0.29 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.34 -0.23 -0.13 -0.28 -0.18 0.13 0.06 0.00 -0.01
Signif α1=α2 0.02 0.79 0.17 0.99 0.12 0.64 0.03 0.35 0.02 0.54 0.12 0.68
Investment
α 0.05 0.09 0.33 0.83 1.08 0.60 0.53 0.67 1.42 1.62 -0.10 0.04 0.32 0.47 0.65 0.58
Signif α=0 0.91 0.88 0.70 0.40 0.03 0.27 0.50 0.45 0.10 0.17 0.88 0.97 0.32 0.22 0.02 0.05
α1 0.31 0.31 3.22 3.22 0.64 0.64 1.92 1.92 -0.05 -0.05 0.52 0.59
α2 -0.10 -0.12 -0.93 -0.76 1.34 0.56 -0.07 -0.16 1.03 1.05 -0.10 0.04 0.55 0.95 0.73 0.57
Signif α1=α2 0.53 0.72 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.94 0.03 0.26 0.12 0.18 0.52 0.98
Unemployment rate
α 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.34 0.30 0.00 0.18 0.36 0.22 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.05
Signif α=0 0.89 0.73 0.90 0.90 0.69 0.73 0.03 0.10 0.98 0.47 0.06 0.37 0.76 0.96 0.62 0.54
α1 -0.30 -0.30 -0.22 -0.22 -0.18 -0.18 0.13 0.13 -0.04 -0.04 -0.19 -0.19
α2 0.21 0.36 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.23 0.43 0.42 0.10 0.36 0.36 0.22 0.06 0.04 0.16 0.08
Signif α1=α2 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.42 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.44 0.38 0.68 0.00 0.09
Government bal.
α 0.12 0.23 -0.10 0.05 -0.16 -0.15 -0.33 -0.23 0.54 0.46 0.05 0.28 -0.06 -0.13 -0.08 -0.02
Signif α=0 0.27 0.07 0.67 0.85 0.32 0.39 0.32 0.56 0.23 0.46 0.85 0.48 0.68 0.46 0.44 0.82
α1 0.50 0.51 0.48 0.48 -0.05 -0.06 0.71 0.71 -0.31 -0.31 -0.06 -0.01
α2 -0.08 0.01 -0.25 -0.12 -0.23 -0.25 -0.74 -0.79 0.68 0.68 0.05 0.28 0.09 0.04 -0.09 -0.03
Signif α1=α2 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.34 0.38 0.60 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.32 0.81 0.93
Current account
α 0.03 -0.09 0.01 0.10 -0.20 -0.17 -0.30 -0.46 0.68 0.54 0.37 0.04 0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.80
Signif α=0 0.88 0.68 0.97 0.62 0.13 0.25 0.37 0.29 0.05 0.21 0.13 0.90 0.68 0.54 0.64 0.32
α1 -0.08 -0.09 0.14 0.13 0.03 0.02 -0.93 -0.92 0.05 0.06 -0.02 -0.02
α2 0.09 -0.10 -0.05 0.07 -0.32 -0.31 -0.03 -0.15 0.62 0.43 0.37 0.04 0.04 -0.17 -0.04 -0.13
Signif α1=α2 0.43 0.98 0.41 0.88 0.04 0.25 0.01 0.39 0.96 0.34 0.76 0.51
α: coefficient in regression (1); without subscript: whole period; subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the first (until 1982) and second subperiod (from 1983). Signif. α=0 and Signif. α1=α2 denote the p-values for the α=0 and α1=α2 t-tests respectively. 
Numbers above 0.05 indicate absence of bias, respectively absence of change in bias between the two subperiods at the 5 % significance level.
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Table A9: Bias – current year
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)  
  57 
Austria Finland Sweden euro area
GDP
α 0.43 0.39 -0.63 -0.60 -0.02 -0.14 0.15 0.24 0.00 0.16 -0.09 0.01 -0.01 0.28 0.11 0.08
Signif α=0 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.92 0.40 0.50 0.23 1.00 0.70 0.73 0.95 0.95 0.15 0.37 0.61
α1 0.61 0.61 -0.10 -0.10 0.24 0.24 0.03 0.03 0.32 0.32
α2 0.32 0.19 -0.95 -1.07 -0.17 -0.49 0.15 0.24 0.00 0.16 -0.09 0.00 -0.04 0.28 -0.02 -0.15
Signif α1=α2 0.02 0.38 0.03 0.19 0.04 0.02 0.84 0.87 0.01 0.10
Inflation
α -0.14 -0.09 0.02 0.12 -0.04 -0.01 0.13 -0.41 -0.38 -0.11 -0.01 0.17 0.12 -0.08 0.02 0.02
Signif α=0 0.38 0.64 0.83 0.38 0.70 0.93 0.41 0.01 0.14 0.52 0.94 0.44 0.68 0.35 0.74 0.80
α1 0.07 0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.16 0.16 0.06 0.06
α2 -0.26 -0.25 0.05 0.25 -0.03 0.02 0.13 -0.41 -0.37 -0.11 -0.01 0.17 0.09 -0.08 0.00 -0.01
Signif α1=α2 0.00 0.42 0.51 0.32 0.87 0.78 0.94 0.90 0.12 0.68
Investment
α 1.16 1.13 -0.84 -0.76 0.04 -0.10 0.99 0.55 -0.73 2.14 1.22 0.66 0.53 1.11 0.65 0.58
Signif α=0 0.05 0.12 0.24 0.30 0.94 0.87 0.23 0.58 0.59 0.07 0.31 0.16 0.31 0.11 0.02 0.05
α1 0.98 0.98 -1.11 -1.11 1.06 1.06 0.57 0.57 0.52 0.59
α2 1.27 1.27 -0.67 -0.43 -0.57 -1.19 0.99 0.55 -0.73 2.14 1.22 0.70 0.51 1.11 0.73 0.57
Signif α1=α2 0.53 0.84 0.63 0.65 0.01 0.07 0.83 0.95 0.52 0.98
Unemployment rate
α 0.01 -0.10 0.01 -0.02 0.24 0.23 -0.12 0.31 0.40 0.03 -0.29 0.08 0.04 0.20 0.03 -0.05
Signif α=0 0.97 0.68 0.93 0.76 0.19 0.34 0.36 0.06 0.10 0.87 0.36 0.17 0.58 0.01 0.62 0.54
α1 -0.44 -0.44 0.08 0.08 -0.31 -0.31 0.03 0.03 -0.19 -0.19
α2 0.28 0.23 -0.02 -0.07 0.58 0.73 -0.12 0.31 0.40 0.03 -0.29 0.10 0.05 0.20 0.16 0.08
Signif α1=α2 0.00 0.16 0.30 0.32 0.00 0.02 0.31 0.91 0.00 0.09
Government bal.
α 0.15 0.19 -0.65 -0.58 -0.30 -0.27 -0.09 -0.29 -0.58 -0.47 -1.16 0.03 0.16 -0.11 -0.08 -0.02
Signif α=0 0.51 0.51 0.05 0.16 0.12 0.20 0.67 0.22 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.86 0.42 0.66 0.44 0.82
α1 0.44 0.44 -0.49 -0.49 -0.17 -0.17 0.17 0.17 -0.06 -0.01
α2 -0.02 -0.04 -0.72 -0.64 -0.38 -0.37 -0.09 -0.29 -0.58 -0.47 -1.16 -0.03 0.15 -0.11 -0.09 -0.03
Signif α1=α2 0.00 0.42 0.55 0.86 0.29 0.64 0.41 0.96 0.81 0.93
Current account
α 0.15 0.06 0.43 0.06 -0.05 -0.10 -0.23 0.26 -0.37 -0.05 -0.36 -0.18 -0.16 0.24 -0.03 -0.80
Signif α=0 0.34 0.75 0.66 0.93 0.83 0.61 0.51 0.59 0.38 0.92 0.28 0.29 0.44 0.25 0.64 0.32
α1 0.11 0.10 -0.53 -0.54 0.09 0.10 -0.50 -0.48 -0.02 -0.02
α2 0.18 0.03 0.97 0.55 -0.12 -0.27 -0.23 0.26 -0.37 -0.05 -0.36 -0.05 0.05 0.24 -0.04 -0.13
Signif α1=α2 0.70 0.84 0.33 0.46 0.43 0.38 0.02 0.23 0.76 0.51
α: coefficient in regression (1); without subscript: whole period; subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the first (until 1982) and second subperiod (from 1983). Signif. α=0 and Signif. α1=α2 denote the p-values for the α=0 and α1=α2 t-tests respectively. 
Numbers above 0.05 indicate absence of bias, respectively absence of change in bias between the two subperiods at the 5 % significance level.
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Table A9: Bias – current year (continued)
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal United Kingdom
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
   
  58 
GDP
α 0.25 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.41 0.31 -0.76 -0.64 -0.11 -0.04 -0.13 -0.07 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.32
Signif α=0 0.34 0.49 0.36 0.53 0.13 0.36 0.10 0.29 0.66 0.91 0.62 0.86 0.13 0.25 0.09 0.21
α1 0.75 0.75 0.48 0.48 0.77 0.77 1.16 1.16 0.47 0.47 0.67 0.66
α2 -0.03 -0.25 0.09 -0.01 0.20 -0.09 -1.51 -1.71 -0.21 -0.19 -0.13 -0.07 0.21 0.13 0.16 0.02
Signif α1=α2 0.01 0.10 0.13 0.41 0.02 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.21 0.49 0.01 0.20
Inflation
α 0.01 0.10 -0.39 -0.52 0.01 -0.08 -0.33 -0.32 -0.69 -0.91 -0.41 -0.35 -0.37 -0.48 -0.23 -0.31
Signif α=0 0.96 0.76 0.25 0.25 0.93 0.67 0.50 0.62 0.09 0.13 0.01 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.31 0.28
α1 -0.49 -0.49 -1.01 -1.01 -0.61 -0.61 -2.47 -2.47 -1.15 -1.18 -0.86 -0.87
α2 0.30 0.62 -0.15 -0.22 0.37 0.38 0.50 0.97 -0.76 -1.03 -0.41 -0.35 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.17
Signif α1=α2 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.07
Investment
α 0.90 0.80 0.85 1.41 1.15 0.61 0.57 0.85 1.67 1.44 -0.21 -0.04 0.73 0.94 0.79 0.78
Signif α=0 0.26 0.43 0.48 0.35 0.08 0.40 0.65 0.58 0.03 0.14 0.81 0.98 0.08 0.06 0.051 0.10
α1 2.45 2.45 4.84 4.84 1.07 1.07 1.24 1.24 1.11 1.11 1.04 1.22
α2 0.02 -0.62 -0.72 -0.65 1.19 0.22 0.30 0.61 1.64 1.37 -0.21 -0.04 0.52 0.79 0.65 0.39
Signif α1=α2 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.07 0.87 0.56 0.45 0.84 0.24 0.75 0.42 0.37
Unemployment rate
α 0.23 0.31 -0.01 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.58 0.54 -0.38 -0.14 0.30 -0.15 0.02 -0.04 0.10 0.02
Signif α=0 0.23 0.18 0.98 0.85 0.78 0.83 0.02 0.09 0.21 0.74 0.43 0.80 0.86 0.82 0.43 0.90
α1 -0.52 -0.52 -0.86 -0.86 -0.47 -0.47 -0.10 -0.10 -0.25 -0.25 -0.40 -0.40
α2 0.63 0.97 0.33 0.61 0.32 0.46 0.85 0.93 -0.29 0.03 0.30 -0.15 0.17 0.13 0.36 0.35
Signif α1=α2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.25 0.00 0.01
Government bal.
α 0.35 0.51 0.01 0.14 -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 0.97 0.80 0.16 0.54 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.16
Signif α=0 0.17 0.10 0.98 0.78 0.67 0.82 0.87 0.93 0.09 0.31 0.60 0.29 0.69 0.95 0.44 0.32
α1 1.23 1.23 1.30 1.31 0.02 0.03 1.66 1.66 -0.24 -0.24 0.22 0.23
α2 -0.10 -0.07 -0.33 -0.33 -0.16 -0.13 -0.76 -1.07 0.90 0.68 0.16 0.54 0.24 0.23 0.06 0.11
Signif α1=α2 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.41 0.76 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.30 0.71
Current account
α -0.05 -0.25 0.19 0.37 -0.19 -0.13 0.08 -0.04 0.86 0.44 0.42 -0.08 -0.04 -0.21 0.04 -0.01
Signif α=0 0.88 0.47 0.63 0.46 0.38 0.59 0.88 0.95 0.02 0.30 0.27 0.87 0.82 0.26 0.72 0.96
α1 0.21 0.19 0.72 0.72 0.08 0.07 0.54 0.53 -0.08 -0.06 0.23 0.23
α2 -0.18 -0.61 -0.02 0.17 -0.32 -0.28 -0.10 -0.38 0.84 0.38 0.42 -0.08 -0.02 -0.33 -0.05 -0.19
Signif α1=α2 0.21 0.25 0.02 0.60 0.12 0.47 0.16 0.51 0.72 0.48 0.02 0.12
α: coefficient in regression (2); without subscript: whole period; subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the first (until 1982) and second subperiod (from 1983). Signif. α=0 and Signif. α1=α2 denote the p-values for the α=0 and α1=α2 t-tests respectively. 
Numbers above 0.05 indicate absence of bias, respectively absence of change in bias between the two subperiods at the 5 % significance level.
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Table A10: Bias – year ahead
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
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Austria Finland Sweden euro area
GDP
α 0.70 0.66 -0.08 0.11 0.02 -0.10 0.36 0.41 0.10 -0.07 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.46 0.34 0.32
Signif α=0 0.01 0.06 0.86 0.84 0.94 0.71 0.22 0.14 0.79 0.89 0.52 0.31 0.39 0.18 0.09 0.21
α1 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.49 0.49 0.80 0.80 0.67 0.66
α2 0.58 0.44 -0.66 -0.61 -0.25 -0.61 0.36 0.41 0.10 -0.07 0.22 0.04 -0.03 0.46 0.16 0.02
Signif α1=α2 0.10 0.49 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.20
Inflation
α -1.11 -1.32 -0.18 -0.11 0.15 0.21 0.21 -0.83 -1.06 0.32 0.45 -0.23 -0.42 -0.17 -0.23 -0.31
Signif α=0 0.01 0.01 0.51 0.75 0.33 0.27 0.21 0.03 0.11 0.37 0.05 0.58 0.44 0.21 0.31 0.28
α1 -2.32 -2.32 -1.08 -1.08 0.10 0.10 -1.17 -1.17 -0.86 -0.87
α2 -0.43 -0.46 0.32 0.73 0.18 0.31 0.21 -0.83 -1.06 0.32 0.45 0.14 0.03 -0.17 0.13 0.17
Signif α1=α2 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.58 0.59 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.07
Investment
α 1.57 1.48 -1.25 -1.44 -0.50 -0.77 0.94 0.99 -0.64 2.17 1.80 0.67 0.87 1.80 0.79 0.78
Signif α=0 0.01 0.05 0.31 0.27 0.45 0.32 0.29 0.39 0.67 0.19 0.20 0.31 0.29 0.07 0.05 0.10
α1 1.72 1.72 -1.22 -1.22 1.15 1.15 1.73 1.73 1.04 1.22
α2 1.48 1.27 -1.26 -1.62 -1.43 -2.43 0.94 0.99 -0.64 2.17 1.80 0.25 0.35 1.80 0.65 0.39
Signif α1=α2 0.61 0.75 0.98 0.88 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.42 0.42 0.37
Unemployment rate
α 0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 0.24 0.21 0.00 0.32 0.59 0.35 -0.24 0.12 0.14 0.23 0.10 0.02
Signif α=0 0.82 0.83 0.34 0.54 0.37 0.52 1.00 0.31 0.21 0.10 0.53 0.41 0.47 0.17 0.43 0.90
α1 -0.53 -0.53 0.06 0.06 -0.54 -0.54 -0.26 -0.26 -0.40 -0.40
α2 0.37 0.29 -0.13 -0.11 0.64 0.82 0.00 0.32 0.59 0.35 -0.24 0.27 0.38 0.23 0.36 0.35
Signif α1=α2 0.02 0.25 0.09 0.41 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.01
Government bal.
α 0.46 0.55 -1.27 -1.12 -0.19 -0.11 -0.44 -0.04 -0.54 -0.53 -1.16 0.37 0.43 0.03 0.12 0.16
Signif α=0 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.46 0.70 0.08 0.91 0.33 0.17 0.01 0.21 0.20 0.93 0.44 0.32
α1 0.85 0.85 -1.36 -1.36 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.22 0.23
α2 0.24 0.29 -1.23 -0.99 -0.52 -0.53 -0.44 -0.04 -0.54 -0.53 -1.16 0.35 0.45 0.03 0.06 0.11
Signif α1=α2 0.02 0.43 0.78 0.74 0.00 0.09 0.89 0.94 0.30 0.71
Current account
α 0.43 0.30 -0.86 -0.72 -0.07 -0.15 -0.38 1.10 0.43 -0.20 -0.64 -0.01 -0.05 0.37 0.04 -0.01
Signif α=0 0.14 0.39 0.65 0.71 0.82 0.63 0.35 0.06 0.39 0.67 0.24 0.96 0.88 0.29 0.72 0.96
α1 0.72 0.70 -2.55 -2.54 -0.25 -0.25 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.23
α2 0.28 -0.03 0.19 0.50 0.03 -0.07 -0.38 1.10 0.43 -0.20 -0.64 -0.02 -0.09 0.37 -0.05 -0.19
Signif α1=α2 0.12 0.30 0.28 0.45 0.42 0.77 0.86 0.89 0.02 0.12
α: coefficient in regression (2); without subscript: whole period; subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the first (until 1982) and second subperiod (from 1983). Signif. α=0 and Signif. α1=α2 denote the p-values for the α=0 and α1=α2 t-tests respectively. 
Numbers above 0.05 indicate absence of bias, respectively absence of change in bias between the two subperiods at the 5 % significance level.
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Table A10: Bias – year ahead (continued)
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal United Kingdom
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
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GDP
α -0.13 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 -0.08 0.03 -0.23 -0.46 0.16 0.23 -0.08 -0.11 -0.05 0.02 -0.19 -0.15
Signif α=0 0.63 0.78 0.87 1.00 0.81 0.93 0.74 0.56 0.63 0.62 0.86 0.87 0.83 0.95 0.42 0.60
β 1.08 1.09 0.95 0.94 0.99 0.97 1.20 1.28 0.98 0.89 1.10 1.12 1.01 1.00 1.03 1.03
Signif β=1 0.41 0.35 0.65 0.57 0.94 0.83 0.18 0.18 0.89 0.68 0.53 0.60 0.90 0.96 0.69 0.76
Signif α=0, β=1 0.67 0.47 0.60 0.68 0.88 0.96 0.11 0.19 0.80 0.88 0.44 0.66 0.97 0.98 0.62 0.84
⎯R
2 0.77 0.81 0.70 0.74 0.69 0.67 0.68 0.62 0.70 0.38 0.71 0.69 0.85 0.86 0.82 0.82
DW 1.52 1.39 1.81 1.68 1.83 1.84 2.17 1.66 1.66 1.67 1.49 1.44 1.50 1.40 2.05 2.08
Inflation
α 0.12 -0.15 0.07 0.31 -0.10 -0.04 0.23 0.12 0.67 1.04 0.43 -0.19 0.02 0.21 0.21 0.37
Signif α=0 0.57 0.59 0.75 0.31 0.48 0.82 0.52 0.81 0.20 0.41 0.17 0.75 0.93 0.44 0.13 0.07
β 0.98 1.01 1.02 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.96 1.07 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.94
Signif β=1 0.54 0.83 0.54 0.94 0.96 0.81 0.37 0.56 0.21 0.37 0.60 0.52 0.72 0.42 0.05 0.03
Signif α=0, β=1 0.82 0.77 0.32 0.21 0.34 0.59 0.67 0.78 0.41 0.66 0.07 0.41 0.88 0.71 0.13 0.09
⎯R
2 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98
DW 1.74 2.05 2.00 2.13 1.84 1.69 2.33 2.43 1.75 1.72 2.42 2.83 1.93 2.11 1.77 1.78
Investment
α -0.64 -0.68 -1.10 -1.48 -1.24 -0.59 -1.49 -1.78 -1.88 -1.83 -0.98 -1.31 -0.44 -0.64 -0.82 -0.74
Signif α=0 0.31 0.34 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.41 0.17 0.12 0.15 0.24 0.34 0.40 0.31 0.19 0.03 0.07
β 1.22 1.23 1.43 1.43 1.06 1.00 1.21 1.28 1.09 1.06 1.21 1.24 1.04 1.07 1.06 1.05
Signif β=1 0.14 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.66 0.98 0.19 0.12 0.64 0.83 0.17 0.26 0.68 0.57 0.52 0.57
Signif α=0, β=1 0.33 0.35 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.55 0.33 0.23 0.23 0.39 0.38 0.51 0.56 0.40 0.05 0.14
⎯R
2 0.66 0.68 0.75 0.81 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.68 0.55 0.43 0.78 0.78 0.72 0.73 0.78 0.82
DW 1.65 1.65 2.14 2.27 1.58 1.67 1.49 1.60 1.87 1.77 1.16 1.20 1.89 1.92 1.63 1.88
Unemployment rate
α 0.52 0.48 0.76 0.98 0.21 0.24 -0.36 -0.21 1.83 2.35 -0.33 1.18 0.14 0.12 0.25 0.23
Signif α=0 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.20 0.18 0.33 0.72 0.05 0.01 0.67 0.52 0.48 0.59 0.06 0.19
β 0.94 0.94 0.89 0.87 0.96 0.95 1.00 0.99 0.79 0.68 1.00 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.98
Signif β=1 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.94 0.88 0.05 0.01 0.96 0.45 0.38 0.54 0.02 0.25
Signif α=0, β=1 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.09 0.27 0.13 0.02 0.17 0.51 0.64 0.83 0.06 0.42
⎯R
2 0.97 0.98 0.88 0.86 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.71 0.73 0.97 0.91 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
DW 1.69 1.37 2.56 2.51 1.51 1.45 2.32 2.15 1.62 1.92 1.84 1.62 2.39 2.46 1.80 2.01
Government bal.
α 0.12 -0.14 0.03 -0.40 -0.18 -0.28 0.49 0.52 -0.81 -1.13 0.00 -1.51 0.02 0.11 0.22 0.00
Signif α=0 0.51 0.65 0.91 0.22 0.48 0.27 0.31 0.53 0.32 0.60 0.99 0.23 0.93 0.72 0.36 0.99
β 1.05 1.02 0.94 0.85 0.85 0.81 1.03 1.04 0.97 0.94 1.02 0.71 0.98 0.99 1.04 0.99
Signif β=1 0.11 0.73 0.33 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.75 0.88 0.29 0.85 0.92 0.52 0.99
Signif α=0, β=1 0.15 0.18 0.56 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.55 0.78 0.45 0.73 0.97 0.44 0.90 0.76 0.61 0.97
⎯R
2 0.98 0.96 0.88 0.86 0.73 0.77 0.91 0.86 0.86 0.64 0.80 0.37 0.75 0.75 0.88 0.88
DW 1.80 1.75 1.31 1.64 1.88 1.96 2.13 2.10 1.76 1.78 2.06 1.84 1.74 1.86 1.79 2.06
Current account
α 0.16 0.17 0.03 -0.04 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.33 -0.82 -1.90 -0.50 -0.34 -0.04 0.11 0.06 0.09
Signif α=0 0.47 0.45 0.89 0.88 0.08 0.17 0.57 0.46 0.42 0.20 0.11 0.32 0.71 0.34 0.40 0.29
β 0.88 0.90 1.04 1.04 0.93 0.94 0.91 0.92 0.96 0.61 0.92 0.75 0.97 1.17 0.84 0.92
Signif β=1 0.07 0.18 0.60 0.68 0.36 0.42 0.18 0.29 0.88 0.33 0.49 0.08 0.76 0.16 0.16 0.51
Signif α=0, β=1 0.18 0.36 0.87 0.82 0.21 0.38 0.27 0.33 0.14 0.29 0.25 0.21 0.88 0.30 0.34 0.49
⎯R
2 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.37 0.10 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.80 0.61 0.68
DW 1.63 1.45 1.96 1.81 1.83 1.91 1.76 1.76 2.01 1.78 1.02 1.34 1.87 2.25 2.04 2.13
α and β: coefficients in regression (3). Signif. (.): significance level of the t-statistic (single test) or F-statistic (joint test) of the null hypothesis; 
numbers above 0.05 indicate that the null hypothesis can be accepted at the 5% significance level.
European Union
Table A11: Efficiency - current year
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
   
  61 
Austria Finland Sweden euro area
GDP
α -0.16 -0.03 0.45 0.48 0.15 0.30 0.43 -1.33 -1.47 0.13 0.82 0.24 0.21 -0.40 -0.19 -0.15
Signif α=0 0.63 0.94 0.39 0.40 0.59 0.32 0.51 0.00 0.04 0.93 0.37 0.28 0.41 0.48 0.42 0.60
β 0.89 0.87 1.08 1.06 0.94 0.93 0.71 1.42 1.51 0.92 0.69 0.86 0.88 1.06 1.03 1.03
Signif β=1 0.31 0.28 0.66 0.78 0.57 0.51 0.34 0.00 0.03 0.84 0.40 0.12 0.23 0.81 0.69 0.76
Signif α=0, β=1 0.06 0.16 0.13 0.27 0.84 0.57 0.50 0.01 0.08 0.91 0.65 0.30 0.48 0.38 0.62 0.84
⎯R
2 0.66 0.64 0.52 0.48 0.69 0.73 0.34 0.87 0.84 0.32 0.23 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.82 0.82
DW 2.35 2.39 1.40 1.37 1.59 1.85 1.58 1.79 1.87 2.23 1.94 2.21 2.31 1.93 2.05 2.08
Inflation
α 0.59 0.74 0.13 -0.04 0.12 0.10 0.69 0.12 -0.51 0.45 0.31 0.06 0.34 0.44 0.21 0.37
Signif α=0 0.02 0.04 0.50 0.87 0.42 0.62 0.21 0.64 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.86 0.51 0.40 0.13 0.07
β 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.56 1.05 1.11 0.78 0.81 0.96 0.94 0.80 0.96 0.94
Signif β=1 0.02 0.03 0.34 0.75 0.48 0.59 0.13 0.21 0.11 0.48 0.33 0.40 0.29 0.47 0.05 0.03
Signif α=0, β=1 0.04 0.09 0.62 0.65 0.72 0.86 0.22 0.02 0.09 0.63 0.60 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.13 0.09
⎯R
2 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.26 0.98 0.97 0.37 0.63 0.94 0.93 0.55 0.98 0.98
DW 1.80 1.80 1.66 1.85 2.19 2.24 1.47 1.74 2.18 1.39 2.25 1.76 1.63 1.48 1.77 1.78
Investment
α -0.78 -0.75 1.35 1.12 -0.14 -0.07 -0.61 -2.86 -1.05 0.69 -0.82 -0.38 -0.35 -1.50 -0.82 -0.74
Signif α=0 0.24 0.35 0.10 0.18 0.82 0.92 0.72 0.07 0.74 0.56 0.70 0.44 0.51 0.27 0.03 0.07
β 0.86 0.84 0.80 0.86 1.06 1.11 0.88 1.44 1.26 0.57 0.92 0.85 0.84 1.13 1.06 1.05
Signif β=1 0.30 0.32 0.19 0.35 0.73 0.58 0.80 0.07 0.53 0.01 0.82 0.15 0.14 0.72 0.52 0.57
Signif α=0, β=1 0.08 0.18 0.21 0.38 0.94 0.84 0.49 0.16 0.71 0.01 0.60 0.13 0.20 0.28 0.05 0.14
⎯R
2 0.52 0.51 0.42 0.53 0.49 0.52 0.19 0.67 0.44 0.65 0.42 0.68 0.72 0.56 0.78 0.82
DW 2.02 2.03 1.34 1.43 1.81 1.92 1.64 2.22 2.14 1.84 1.43 1.62 1.64 1.41 1.63 1.88
Unemployment rate
α 0.73 0.78 0.11 0.08 0.30 0.46 1.79 0.96 1.35 0.01 0.45 0.01 0.16 0.61 0.25 0.23
Signif α=0 0.15 0.18 0.49 0.62 0.38 0.31 0.28 0.13 0.10 0.99 0.77 0.94 0.45 0.21 0.06 0.19
β 0.92 0.92 0.95 0.97 0.91 0.90 0.60 0.79 0.73 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.91 0.96 0.98
Signif β=1 0.12 0.19 0.40 0.69 0.07 0.08 0.31 0.04 0.04 0.96 0.91 0.54 0.31 0.11 0.02 0.25
Signif α=0, β=1 0.29 0.39 0.70 0.88 0.08 0.14 0.39 0.02 0.03 0.99 0.67 0.33 0.51 0.01 0.06 0.42
⎯R
2 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.86 0.92 0.91 0.13 0.79 0.79 0.96 0.69 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99
DW 2.35 2.41 2.62 2.43 2.36 2.37 1.23 1.01 0.98 2.01 0.66 2.48 2.59 1.39 1.80 2.01
Government bal.
α -0.49 -1.24 0.90 0.90 0.28 0.33 0.29 -0.89 -1.62 0.43 1.14 0.19 -0.24 0.11 0.22 0.00
Signif α=0 0.33 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.41 0.45 0.48 0.04 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.53 0.51 0.88 0.36 0.99
β 0.95 0.88 0.68 0.55 0.99 1.02 1.09 0.76 0.66 1.04 0.96 1.09 0.97 1.00 1.04 0.99
Signif β=1 0.45 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.94 0.88 0.57 0.00 0.02 0.71 0.61 0.34 0.78 1.00 0.52 0.99
Signif α=0, β=1 0.60 0.36 0.01 0.01 0.31 0.44 0.77 0.01 0.01 0.36 0.00 0.63 0.70 0.91 0.61 0.97
⎯R
2 0.87 0.75 0.46 0.35 0.76 0.75 0.83 0.86 0.73 0.91 0.95 0.82 0.77 0.51 0.88 0.88
DW 2.38 2.39 2.07 2.10 1.76 2.06 1.90 1.63 1.61 2.94 0.94 1.61 1.69 1.42 1.79 2.06
Current account
α -0.15 -0.06 0.76 0.50 0.42 0.34 0.37 -0.20 0.13 2.04 0.68 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.06 0.09
Signif α=0 0.36 0.75 0.64 0.69 0.31 0.34 0.44 0.76 0.78 0.12 0.29 0.42 0.47 0.44 0.40 0.29
β 0.89 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.88 0.90 1.12 1.02 0.75 0.61 0.90 1.00 1.03 0.46 0.84 0.92
Signif β=1 0.29 0.82 0.36 0.58 0.29 0.41 0.64 0.90 0.35 0.11 0.55 0.98 0.88 0.10 0.16 0.51
Signif α=0, β=1 0.36 0.93 0.60 0.85 0.55 0.63 0.73 0.86 0.44 0.25 0.47 0.57 0.74 0.12 0.34 0.49
⎯R
2 0.70 0.72 0.85 0.94 0.63 0.70 0.65 0.74 0.41 0.41 0.74 0.62 0.62 0.21 0.61 0.68
DW 1.90 2.01 2.61 2.57 1.33 1.40 1.99 1.95 1.60 1.65 1.89 1.95 1.94 2.02 2.04 2.13
α and β: coefficients in regression (3). Signif. (.): significance level of the t-statistic (single test) or F-statistic (joint test) of the null hypothesis; 
numbers above 0.05 indicate that the null hypothesis can be accepted at the 5% significance level.
European Union
Table A11: Efficiency - current year (continued)
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal United Kingdom
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
   
  62 
GDP
α 0.25 0.25 -0.36 -0.39 -0.24 -0.04 0.44 0.01 0.41 1.39 -0.78 -1.01 -0.27 -0.24 -0.32 -0.32
Signif α=0 0.64 0.68 0.57 0.59 0.72 0.97 0.68 1.00 0.44 0.11 0.41 0.46 0.58 0.68 0.56 0.63
β 0.79 0.81 1.07 1.10 0.93 0.90 1.08 1.19 0.87 0.08 1.31 1.39 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00
Signif β=1 0.29 0.38 0.79 0.75 0.78 0.72 0.73 0.63 0.52 0.09 0.32 0.41 0.93 0.92 0.96 1.00
Signif α=0, β=1 0.36 0.53 0.64 0.78 0.32 0.62 0.25 0.48 0.74 0.22 0.53 0.69 0.33 0.51 0.25 0.46
⎯R
2 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.29 0.25 0.39 0.26 0.42 -0.07 0.50 0.46 0.52 0.52 0.41 0.41
DW 1.63 1.52 1.75 1.59 2.08 2.05 1.28 0.74 1.83 1.81 1.40 1.40 1.81 1.73 2.01 1.94
Inflation
α 0.02 -0.30 0.50 0.87 -0.60 -0.61 -0.60 -0.99 0.40 1.48 0.65 0.66 0.12 0.29 0.13 0.37
Signif α=0 0.96 0.70 0.40 0.32 0.08 0.21 0.46 0.38 0.60 0.48 0.17 0.60 0.77 0.67 0.78 0.59
β 0.99 1.04 0.98 0.94 1.19 1.20 1.14 1.17 1.03 0.96 0.94 0.94 1.05 1.03 1.02 0.99
Signif β=1 0.93 0.78 0.82 0.63 0.05 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.66 0.77 0.58 0.80 0.46 0.74 0.79 0.92
Signif α=0, β=1 0.99 0.92 0.50 0.47 0.15 0.29 0.29 0.34 0.21 0.31 0.05 0.40 0.25 0.36 0.57 0.57
⎯R
2 0.72 0.67 0.74 0.69 0.81 0.76 0.82 0.81 0.92 0.77 0.80 0.58 0.87 0.81 0.84 0.77
DW 1.34 1.44 2.11 2.04 1.19 1.13 1.09 1.05 1.29 1.22 1.63 1.54 1.85 1.94 1.28 1.25
Investment
α -0.99 -0.91 -2.77 -3.30 -1.03 -0.22 -0.15 -0.57 -2.32 -3.80 -0.11 -0.82 -0.47 -0.56 -0.55 -0.61
Signif α=0 0.47 0.58 0.04 0.04 0.31 0.85 0.94 0.81 0.12 0.04 0.95 0.76 0.50 0.47 0.43 0.45
β 1.03 1.04 1.81 1.86 0.96 0.87 0.91 0.93 1.12 1.63 1.06 1.16 0.91 0.87 0.92 0.94
Signif β=1 0.93 0.93 0.02 0.02 0.88 0.65 0.78 0.87 0.60 0.12 0.83 0.70 0.63 0.52 0.68 0.80
Signif α=0, β=1 0.54 0.73 0.04 0.04 0.21 0.63 0.87 0.85 0.09 0.10 0.95 0.92 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.26
⎯R
2 0.16 0.15 0.51 0.56 0.27 0.26 0.19 0.12 0.51 0.54 0.42 0.43 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.40
DW 1.76 1.78 1.98 2.00 1.30 1.39 1.71 1.88 1.75 1.86 1.25 1.35 1.46 1.50 1.44 1.57
Unemployment rate
α 0.99 0.88 2.15 2.70 0.67 0.75 0.08 0.94 5.04 6.03 -1.12 2.90 0.56 0.53 0.79 0.73
Signif α=0 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.89 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.55 0.12 0.19 0.02 0.05
β 0.86 0.87 0.68 0.63 0.89 0.86 0.94 0.89 0.45 0.27 1.05 0.86 0.93 0.94 0.89 0.90
Signif β=1 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.57 0.09 0.18 0.00 0.03
Signif α=0, β=1 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.18 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.82 0.22 0.39 0.01 0.09
⎯R
2 0.90 0.92 0.74 0.68 0.86 0.83 0.93 0.88 0.28 0.21 0.87 0.55 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95
DW 1.28 1.09 1.45 1.45 0.87 0.79 0.58 0.59 0.89 1.23 0.95 0.71 1.70 1.67 0.94 0.87
Government bal.
α -0.37 -1.01 -0.20 -0.80 -0.71 -0.82 -0.02 0.06 -2.04 -3.70 -0.07 -2.42 -0.22 -0.10 -0.37 -0.72
Signif α=0 0.38 0.14 0.60 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.98 0.96 0.04 0.09 0.88 0.09 0.48 0.77 0.25 0.09
β 1.00 0.91 0.83 0.72 0.65 0.61 0.98 1.00 0.86 0.73 1.03 0.54 0.93 0.96 0.92 0.85
Signif β=1 0.95 0.41 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.99 0.17 0.14 0.83 0.16 0.57 0.76 0.36 0.16
Signif α=0, β=1 0.39 0.19 0.26 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.96 1.00 0.09 0.20 0.86 0.20 0.78 0.95 0.49 0.22
⎯R
2 0.84 0.76 0.70 0.61 0.47 0.50 0.82 0.71 0.78 0.53 0.74 0.19 0.63 0.64 0.76 0.71
DW 1.60 1.63 0.84 0.78 1.87 1.89 1.34 1.31 0.98 0.92 1.33 1.13 1.31 1.36 1.67 1.77
Current account
α 0.36 0.37 -0.27 -0.71 0.33 0.25 -0.23 -0.12 -0.51 -1.88 -0.94 -0.67 0.04 0.27 0.05 0.04
Signif α=0 0.24 0.30 0.51 0.21 0.18 0.34 0.67 0.86 0.68 0.28 0.07 0.19 0.80 0.18 0.66 0.76
β 0.79 0.82 0.83 0.70 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.89 1.09 0.60 0.73 0.53 0.95 1.20 0.57 0.71
Signif β=1 0.03 0.16 0.31 0.17 0.23 0.32 0.25 0.40 0.76 0.39 0.14 0.02 0.73 0.37 0.02 0.17
Signif α=0, β=1 0.10 0.29 0.53 0.29 0.33 0.52 0.50 0.70 0.07 0.41 0.18 0.06 0.92 0.35 0.05 0.38
⎯R
2 0.68 0.62 0.45 0.30 0.59 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.33 0.05 0.49 0.46 0.56 0.53 0.24 0.29
DW 0.73 0.67 1.74 1.74 1.46 1.59 1.94 2.02 1.68 1.79 0.66 0.91 1.55 1.93 1.33 1.34
α and β: coefficients in regression (4). Signif. (.): significance level of the t-statistic (single test) or F-statistic (joint test) of the null hypothesis; 
numbers above 0.05 indicate that the null hypothesis can be accepted at the 5% significance level.
European Union
Table A12: Efficiency - year ahead
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
   
  63 
Austria Finland Sweden euro area
GDP
α -0.04 0.14 0.22 -0.24 0.27 0.34 1.39 -1.81 -1.67 1.73 1.96 -0.20 -0.35 -0.09 -0.32 -0.32
Signif α=0 0.94 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.58 0.54 0.22 0.02 0.16 0.46 0.23 0.71 0.60 0.94 0.56 0.63
β 0.75 0.72 0.95 1.06 0.87 0.89 0.25 1.53 1.55 0.54 0.18 0.98 1.04 0.84 0.99 1.00
Signif β=1 0.14 0.15 0.87 0.90 0.50 0.61 0.12 0.04 0.17 0.47 0.18 0.92 0.90 0.76 0.96 1.00
Signif α=0, β=1 0.02 0.06 0.97 0.97 0.79 0.82 0.13 0.04 0.35 0.75 0.31 0.60 0.69 0.42 0.25 0.46
⎯R
2 0.36 0.33 0.16 0.15 0.36 0.37 -0.07 0.69 0.63 -0.02 -0.10 0.34 0.33 0.22 0.41 0.41
DW 1.95 1.99 1.84 1.89 1.77 1.89 1.82 2.23 1.80 2.00 1.95 1.37 1.35 2.61 2.01 1.94
Inflation
α 0.31 0.47 -0.08 -0.59 -0.07 -0.17 0.09 0.26 0.41 -0.61 0.38 -0.30 -0.11 0.47 0.13 0.37
Signif α=0 0.64 0.64 0.89 0.50 0.79 0.64 0.92 0.71 0.81 0.76 0.58 0.66 0.92 0.74 0.78 0.59
β 1.11 1.10 1.06 1.15 0.98 0.99 0.84 1.11 1.09 1.16 0.58 1.09 1.07 0.84 1.02 0.99
Signif β=1 0.15 0.34 0.61 0.39 0.73 0.88 0.73 0.34 0.68 0.88 0.22 0.34 0.58 0.83 0.79 0.92
Signif α=0, β=1 0.01 0.02 0.71 0.65 0.59 0.54 0.45 0.07 0.27 0.67 0.07 0.54 0.64 0.48 0.57 0.57
⎯R
2 0.86 0.81 0.67 0.63 0.90 0.90 0.18 0.85 0.71 0.02 0.19 0.82 0.76 0.05 0.84 0.77
DW 1.95 1.93 0.96 0.98 1.39 1.42 1.84 1.12 1.04 1.20 1.73 0.90 0.89 1.89 1.28 1.25
Investment
α -1.08 -1.02 1.99 2.24 0.33 0.53 -1.78 -4.47 -0.91 1.61 -2.76 -0.91 -1.07 -2.44 -0.55 -0.61
Signif α=0 0.20 0.30 0.15 0.10 0.68 0.55 0.47 0.05 0.81 0.39 0.45 0.30 0.29 0.33 0.43 0.45
β 0.85 0.84 0.52 0.26 1.11 1.18 1.24 1.64 1.23 0.46 1.17 1.10 1.11 1.19 0.92 0.94
Signif β=1 0.42 0.47 0.24 0.07 0.69 0.59 0.71 0.07 0.67 0.02 0.77 0.66 0.71 0.77 0.68 0.80
Signif α=0, β=1 0.03 0.11 0.29 0.11 0.70 0.53 0.55 0.13 0.83 0.02 0.43 0.54 0.54 0.23 0.14 0.26
⎯R
2 0.35 0.35 0.02 -0.02 0.29 0.31 0.23 0.57 0.32 0.33 0.25 0.41 0.38 0.32 0.39 0.40
DW 1.76 1.72 1.78 1.21 1.45 1.58 1.92 1.42 1.12 1.74 1.62 1.58 1.59 1.29 1.44 1.57
Unemployment rate
α 1.90 2.01 0.24 0.29 0.69 1.00 4.05 2.86 3.10 0.08 0.84 0.59 0.83 2.55 0.79 0.73
Signif α=0 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.92 0.65 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.02 0.05
β 0.78 0.78 0.92 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.05 0.47 0.43 0.96 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.69 0.89 0.90
Signif β=1 0.00 0.01 0.32 0.20 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.60 0.73 0.07 0.09 0.19 0.00 0.03
Signif α=0, β=1 0.02 0.04 0.39 0.35 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.24 0.78 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.01 0.09
⎯R
2 0.78 0.77 0.82 0.75 0.85 0.83 -0.11 0.30 0.26 0.95 0.56 0.92 0.89 0.64 0.95 0.95
DW 0.99 1.00 1.13 1.26 1.42 1.43 0.85 0.62 0.49 1.23 0.67 1.48 1.42 1.78 0.94 0.87
Government bal.
α -0.97 -2.36 1.45 1.30 -0.10 -0.27 0.43 -1.57 -2.47 0.39 1.13 -0.69 -1.31 -0.35 -0.37 -0.72
Signif α=0 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.80 0.55 0.36 0.05 0.22 0.34 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.73 0.25 0.09
β 0.93 0.79 0.56 0.39 0.89 0.88 1.00 0.64 0.50 1.14 0.94 0.86 0.71 0.82 0.92 0.85
Signif β=1 0.36 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.33 0.31 0.98 0.03 0.13 0.31 0.57 0.28 0.05 0.73 0.36 0.16
Signif α=0, β=1 0.19 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.54 0.24 0.08 0.19 0.24 0.02 0.26 0.07 0.93 0.49 0.22
⎯R
2 0.80 0.62 0.30 0.15 0.65 0.68 0.79 0.49 0.14 0.89 0.91 0.61 0.50 0.22 0.76 0.71
DW 1.72 1.75 1.28 1.28 1.12 1.24 1.90 1.62 1.53 2.63 1.50 1.25 1.13 1.55 1.67 1.77
Current account
α -0.32 -0.27 5.09 5.04 1.11 1.02 0.36 -1.72 -0.97 3.41 1.05 -0.38 -0.30 0.52 0.05 0.04
Signif α=0 0.23 0.41 0.13 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.54 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.36 0.26 0.46 0.17 0.66 0.76
β 0.59 0.67 0.78 0.79 0.66 0.66 0.99 0.81 0.51 0.39 0.86 0.61 0.58 -0.08 0.57 0.71
Signif β=1 0.01 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.97 0.21 0.03 0.02 0.68 0.07 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.17
Signif α=0, β=1 0.02 0.21 0.28 0.33 0.06 0.08 0.66 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.47 0.19 0.28 0.03 0.05 0.38
⎯R
2 0.28 0.27 0.55 0.54 0.39 0.41 0.49 0.63 0.38 0.20 0.36 0.20 0.15 -0.19 0.24 0.29
DW 1.40 1.43 1.64 1.64 0.99 1.08 0.92 1.11 2.31 1.66 1.18 1.07 1.01 1.79 1.33 1.34
α and β: coefficients in regression (4). Signif. (.): significance level of the t-statistic (single test) or F-statistic (joint test) of the null hypothesis; 
numbers above 0.05 indicate that the null hypothesis can be accepted at the 5% significance level.
European Union
Table A12: Efficiency - year ahead (continued)
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal United Kingdom
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
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Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland SwedenUnited Kingdom euro areaEuropean Union
GDP
α -0.01 0.09 0.17 -0.54 -0.19 -0.14 0.06 0.46 -0.41 0.00 0.06 0.18 0.08 -0.08 0.00 0.31 0.14
Signif. α=0 0.94 0.59 0.37 0.16 0.26 0.45 0.61 0.03 0.21 1.00 0.81 0.35 0.86 0.80 0.99 0.26 0.25
Signif. α=0 (Bootstrap) 0.94 0.57 0.33 0.17 0.26 0.47 0.61 0.04 0.26 0.99 0.78 0.45 0.80 0.82 1.00 0.24 0.19
β 0.21 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.32 0.21 -0.14 0.27 0.18 0.12 0.44 -0.20 -0.01 -0.22 0.02 -0.06
Signif. β=0 0.22 0.74 0.94 0.91 0.76 0.19 0.21 0.43 0.11 0.30 0.72 0.06 0.58 0.97 0.23 0.97 0.74
Signif. β=0 (Bootstrap)  0.13 0.58 0.80 0.75 0.59 0.05 0.12 0.47 0.05 0.18 0.40 0.02 0.66 0.73 0.27 0.59 0.84
Signif. α=0, β=0 0.46 0.78 0.66 0.31 0.48 0.24 0.39 0.10 0.05 0.58 0.88 0.07 0.84 0.96 0.48 0.40 0.51
Inflation
α -0.01 -0.14 0.09 0.09 -0.09 -0.31 0.08 -0.10 0.01 -0.03 0.07 -0.34 -0.19 -0.06 0.25 -0.14 0.04
Signif. α=0 0.93 0.28 0.24 0.67 0.75 0.02 0.50 0.53 0.92 0.78 0.70 0.06 0.32 0.68 0.23 0.10 0.63
Signif. α=0 (Bootstrap) 0.93 0.27 0.23 0.69 0.74 0.01 0.46 0.56 0.91 0.78 0.75 0.06 0.32 0.70 0.18 0.05 0.62
β 0.10 -0.01 0.06 -0.28 0.10 -0.28 -0.13 0.17 0.13 -0.12 0.13 0.24 -0.04 -0.11 -0.01 -0.15 0.11
Signif. β=0 0.57 0.97 0.73 0.09 0.66 0.20 0.48 0.32 0.45 0.48 0.70 0.31 0.90 0.74 0.96 0.64 0.51
Signif. β=0 (Bootstrap)  0.42 0.88 0.57 0.09 0.44 0.21 0.49 0.19 0.29 0.55 0.39 0.14 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.62 0.36
Signif. α=0, β=0 0.85 0.53 0.40 0.22 0.86 0.06 0.61 0.45 0.74 0.75 0.82 0.02 0.59 0.86 0.48 0.22 0.70
Investment
α 0.09 0.28 0.84 0.52 1.04 0.18 0.39 1.09 -0.54 -0.10 0.66 0.56 0.96 0.68 0.48 0.83 0.53
Signif. α=0 0.86 0.75 0.10 0.52 0.17 0.76 0.24 0.08 0.45 0.86 0.49 0.59 0.31 0.64 0.32 0.38 0.08
β 0.24 0.16 0.26 0.18 -0.08 0.40 0.04 0.00 0.28 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.31 0.21 0.34 0.21
Signif. β=0 0.17 0.39 0.12 0.36 0.64 0.06 0.82 0.99 0.10 0.62 0.71 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.24 0.46 0.22
Signif. α=0, β=0 0.37 0.63 0.03 0.46 0.38 0.17 0.46 0.18 0.14 0.87 0.63 0.66 0.22 0.48 0.22 0.25 0.03
Unemployment
α 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.39 0.00 0.33 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.30 -0.13 0.10 0.12 -0.05 0.11 0.07 0.03
Signif. α=0 0.95 0.87 0.76 0.02 0.98 0.13 0.74 0.93 0.66 0.13 0.40 0.52 0.45 0.84 0.07 0.44 0.64
β 0.21 -0.26 0.27 -0.16 0.10 0.05 -0.19 -0.19 -0.47 -0.19 -0.30 0.38 -0.15 0.51 -0.25 0.57 0.20
Signif. β=0 0.23 0.15 0.11 0.39 0.64 0.86 0.27 0.28 0.01 0.27 0.62 0.08 0.61 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.24
Signif. α=0, β=0 0.48 0.34 0.25 0.07 0.89 0.22 0.52 0.55 0.04 0.22 0.63 0.06 0.67 0.26 0.12 0.02 0.42
Government balance
α 0.08 -0.08 -0.13 -0.43 0.66 0.01 -0.01 0.19 -0.90 -0.38 -0.27 -0.07 -0.79 -0.55 0.00 -0.06 -0.04
Signif. α=0 0.47 0.73 0.42 0.21 0.16 0.98 0.97 0.43 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.74 0.04 0.22 0.98 0.85 0.68
Signif. α=0 (Bootstrap) 0.43 0.79 0.40 0.22 0.19 0.95 0.99 0.43 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.80 0.02 0.45 0.98 0.92 0.69
β 0.21 0.27 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.21 -0.25 0.01 -0.18 0.25 -0.50 0.59 0.26 0.28 0.09
Signif. β=0 0.23 0.20 0.95 0.72 0.85 0.81 0.74 0.22 0.17 0.95 0.40 0.24 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.54 0.58
Signif. β=0 (Bootstrap)  0.14 0.08 0.92 0.83 0.65 0.98 0.61 0.24 0.16 0.81 0.46 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.44
Signif. α=0, β=0 0.30 0.41 0.72 0.44 0.30 0.97 0.95 0.38 0.04 0.12 0.17 0.36 0.08 0.00 0.35 0.78 0.76
Current acount
α 0.09 0.00 -0.21 -0.30 0.68 0.17 0.05 0.21 0.56 -0.03 -0.29 0.37 0.08 -0.43 -0.14 0.25 -0.02
Signif. α=0 0.66 0.99 0.14 0.40 0.08 0.46 0.65 0.19 0.58 0.89 0.47 0.46 0.87 0.33 0.43 0.37 0.76
β 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.11 -0.10 0.36 0.04 -0.03 -0.36 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.04 -0.28 -0.02 -0.05 -0.12
Signif. β=0 0.62 0.77 0.97 0.54 0.67 0.11 0.82 0.87 0.05 0.26 0.74 0.99 0.92 0.52 0.92 0.92 0.50
Signif. α=0, β=0 0.80 0.96 0.30 0.52 0.19 0.13 0.88 0.42 0.13 0.52 0.68 0.75 0.98 0.60 0.72 0.63 0.77
Table A13: Unbiasedness and no serial correlation-current year
α and β: coefficients in regression (5). Signif. α=0, Signif. β=0 denote the p-values for the α=0, β=0 t-tests respectively.   
Signif. α=0, β=0 denotes the p-value for the α=0, β=0 F-test.       
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Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland SwedenUnited Kingdom euro areaEuropean Union
GDP
α 0.25 0.13 0.47 -0.72 -0.21 0.02 0.38 0.58 -0.06 0.06 0.37 0.41 -0.17 0.32 0.11 0.71 0.38
Signif. α=0 0.35 0.58 0.10 0.10 0.42 0.94 0.06 0.06 0.90 0.80 0.27 0.16 0.77 0.41 0.64 0.15 0.08
Signif. α=0 (Bootstrap) 0.33 0.60 0.07 0.11 0.45 0.90 0.04 0.05 0.92 0.78 0.19 0.18 0.79 0.36 0.66 0.14 0.05
β 0.17 0.09 -0.06 0.30 -0.01 0.35 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.04 -0.28 0.25 -0.14 -0.27 0.25 -0.44 -0.02
Signif. β=0 0.33 0.64 0.71 0.07 0.95 0.11 0.93 0.56 0.67 0.83 0.40 0.32 0.69 0.44 0.15 0.38 0.92
Signif. β=0 (Bootstrap) 0.21 0.48 0.81 0.03 0.86 0.03 0.79 0.40 0.52 0.70 0.42 0.15 0.85 0.48 0.07 0.35 0.95
Signif. α=0, β=0 0.34 0.72 0.26 0.02 0.71 0.27 0.15 0.07 0.90 0.95 0.47 0.14 0.89 0.57 0.26 0.31 0.20
Inflation
α -0.05 -0.29 0.04 0.09 -0.52 -0.38 -0.34 -0.96 -0.15 0.08 0.21 -0.34 0.09 0.30 0.11 -0.28 -0.16
Signif. α=0 0.86 0.23 0.77 0.81 0.21 0.06 0.19 0.03 0.53 0.61 0.34 0.38 0.78 0.28 0.69 0.11 0.48
Signif. α=0 (Bootstrap) 0.81 0.23 0.79 0.85 0.19 0.04 0.16 0.01 0.55 0.63 0.28 0.47 0.83 0.37 0.68 0.13 0.47
β 0 . 3 1 - 0 . 3 10 . 4 80 . 3 70 . 3 50 . 1 20 . 1 40 . 1 8 0 . 5 3 0 . 2 90 . 0 20 . 5 40 . 2 80 . 2 8 0 . 3 9 - 0 . 1 9 0 . 3 7
Signif. β=0 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.62 0.41 0.30 0.00 0.09 0.95 0.02 0.39 0.43 0.00 0.64 0.03
Signif. β=0 (Bootstrap) 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.39 0.25 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.61 0.00 0.16 0.15 0.00 0.76 0.01
Signif. α=0, β=0 0.19 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.21 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.55 0.01 0.62 0.18 0.01 0.22 0.05
Investment
α 0.73 0.21 0.93 0.22 1.44 0.16 0.66 1.23 -0.88 -0.27 1.00 1.41 1.59 1.88 0.39 1.64 0.62
Signif. α=0 0.39 0.86 0.15 0.86 0.10 0.84 0.12 0.06 0.49 0.67 0.36 0.14 0.43 0.29 0.55 0.26 0.15
β 0.13 0.15 0.31 0.08 0.13 0.30 0.23 0.12 0.13 0.30 -0.01 0.37 0.05 0.12 0.19 0.28 0.26
Signif. β=0 0.47 0.38 0.06 0.69 0.57 0.19 0.17 0.47 0.45 0.08 0.98 0.07 0.88 0.75 0.28 0.55 0.13
Signif. α=0, β=0 0.46 0.64 0.03 0.90 0.11 0.41 0.06 0.05 0.52 0.18 0.62 0.05 0.61 0.37 0.41 0.15 0.05
Unemployment
α 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.19 -0.16 0.14 0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.19 -0.20 -0.06 0.33 -0.04 0.13 0.14 0.05
Signif. α=0 0.48 0.81 0.83 0.33 0.58 0.70 0.86 0.86 0.52 0.47 0.27 0.81 0.18 0.91 0.41 0.54 0.65
β 0.42 0.35 0.54 0.70 0.33 0.55 0.15 0.51 0.38 0.26 0.11 0.40 0.29 0.55 0.22 0.20 0.59
Signif. β=0 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.39 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.69 0.05 0.36 0.11 0.23 0.69 0.00
Signif. α=0, β=0 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.05 0.67 0.01 0.08 0.21 0.51 0.11 0.11 0.24 0.30 0.59 0.00
Government balance
α 0.37 -0.03 -0.08 -0.16 0.48 0.13 0.09 0.42 -1.15 -0.11 -0.64 -0.06 -0.65 -0.88 0.21 0.13 0.13
Signif. α=0 0.16 0.93 0.72 0.72 0.39 0.67 0.57 0.18 0.02 0.66 0.02 0.88 0.18 0.14 0.47 0.77 0.39
Signif. α=0 (Bootstrap) 0.13 0.95 0.72 0.75 0.46 0.66 0.57 0.20 0.02 0.69 0.02 0.89 0.18 0.21 0.54 0.85 0.39
β 0.16 0.54 -0.04 0.30 0.45 0.33 0.28 0.11 0.16 0.40 -0.14 0.18 -0.10 0.24 0.26 0.14 0.10
Signif. β=0 0.36 0.01 0.81 0.10 0.03 0.19 0.10 0.52 0.38 0.02 0.63 0.51 0.78 0.54 0.15 0.78 0.58
Signif. β=0 (Bootstrap) 0.23 0.00 0.93 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.38 0.24 0.01 0.72 0.28 0.98 0.22 0.07 0.38 0.43
Signif. α=0, β=0 0.18 0.02 0.92 0.23 0.03 0.33 0.19 0.24 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.78 0.38 0.04 0.20 0.91 0.55
Current account
α 0.09 0.11 -0.13 -0.08 0.68 0.10 0.01 0.44 -0.49 -0.07 -0.33 0.72 0.07 -0.68 -0.22 0.09 0.08
Signif. α=0 0.71 0.78 0.57 0.88 0.11 0.75 0.97 0.14 0.81 0.81 0.42 0.25 0.89 0.29 0.23 0.81 0.48
β 0.53 0.04 0.17 -0.14 0.20 0.48 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.38 0.51 0.31 0.22 0.20 -0.03 0.32 0.28
Signif. β=0 0.00 0.85 0.33 0.42 0.36 0.03 0.35 0.37 0.77 0.04 0.12 0.21 0.49 0.57 0.84 0.45 0.09
Signif. α=0, β=0 0.00 0.94 0.48 0.71 0.07 0.07 0.64 0.14 0.92 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.77 0.30 0.48 0.63 0.17
Table A14: Unbiasedness and no serial correlation-year ahead
α and β: coefficients in regression (6). Signif. α=0, Signif. β=0 denote the p-values for the α=0, β=0 t-tests respectively.   
Signif. α=0, β=0 denotes the p-value for the α=0, β=0 F-test.       
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Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom euro area European Union
GDP
β -0.15 0.02 -0.06 -0.30 -0.35 -0.19 -0.10 -0.02 -0.18 -0.04 0.19 -0.53 0.21 0.35 0.16
Signif. β=0 0.12 0.87 0.66 0.28 0.05 0.35 0.26 0.86 0.40 0.72 0.60 0.01 0.75 0.40 0.21
β
1 0.22 -0.05 0.08 -0.28 -0.05 0.16 -0.34 -0.03 -0.13 -0.88 -0.53 -1.96 -0.87 0.32 -1.05 0.00
Signif. β
1=0  0.20 0.79 0.84 0.24 0.87 0.16 0.10 0.93 0.51 0.24 0.11 0.18 0.32 0.08 0.07 0.99
β
2 0.03 0.36 0.30 -0.03 0.25 0.38 0.05 0.54 0.43 0.56 0.69 1.46 0.80 -0.05 -0.50 0.17
Signif. β
2=0 0.89 0.07 0.10 0.95 0.33 0.33 0.83 0.21 0.05 0.49 0.09 0.36 0.41 0.81 0.39 0.30
β
3 -0.35 -0.29 -0.24 -0.12 -0.09 -0.38 -0.16 -0.60 -0.19 0.72 -0.40 1.20 0.32 -0.25 1.99 -0.19
Signif. β
3=0 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.71 0.79 0.20 0.18 0.06 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.25 0.60 0.09 0.04 0.14
β
4 -0.15 -0.08 -0.07 -0.26 -0.19 -0.31 -0.12 -0.04 -0.33 -0.12 0.12 -0.34 -0.02 0.61 0.09 -0.07
Signif. β





4=0    0.07 0.17 0.39 0.72 0.15 0.10 0.24 0.048 0.13 0.21 0.51 0.01 0.52 0.52 0.15 0.13 0.50
Inflation
β 0.10 -0.14 0.00 -0.37 -0.25 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.22 -0.15 0.26 -0.25 -0.05 -0.08
Signif. β=0 0.21 0.16 0.99 0.05 0.39 0.53 0.21 0.36 0.74 0.22 0.70 0.19 0.57 0.17 0.15 0.71 0.11
β
1 0.23 -0.07 -0.06 0.34 0.23 -0.09 -0.27 0.33 0.21 -0.17 0.40 0.38 -0.05 -0.08 -0.05 0.04 -0.09
Signif. β
1=0  0.13 0.63 0.44 0.19 0.57 0.74 0.06 0.04 0.14 0.11 0.44 0.21 0.94 0.80 0.85 0.92 0.33
β
2 -0.09 0.16 0.09 -0.58 -0.14 -0.15 0.32 0.08 -0.37 0.14 -0.38 -0.37 -0.33 -0.12 -0.20 -0.36 0.19
Signif. β
2=0 0.59 0.33 0.30 0.05 0.75 0.63 0.05 0.62 0.02 0.22 0.51 0.30 0.63 0.73 0.46 0.53 0.06
β
3 -0.06 -0.23 0.03 -0.19 -0.58 0.24 -0.02 -0.63 0.20 0.06 0.03 -0.49 0.39 0.61 0.26 0.37 -0.11
Signif. β
3=0 0.65 0.06 0.69 0.37 0.31 0.32 0.90 0.00 0.08 0.46 0.94 0.07 0.40 0.03 0.19 0.56 0.14
β
4 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.21 -0.02 0.00 -0.12 0.03 -0.08 -0.41 0.20 0.00 -0.08 -0.25 -0.01 -0.07
Signif. β





4=0    0.51 0.22 0.72 0.07 0.67 0.78 0.34 0.000 0.12 0.19 0.62 0.23 0.88 0.14 0.15 0.94 0.11
Table A15: Predictability of forecast errors in relation to current information variables-current year








4=0: p-value of the F-test that all the coefficients are jointly insignificant.         
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Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom euro area European Union
GDP
β -0.07 0.42 -0.02 0.49 -0.28 -0.47 -0.21 0.29 -0.34 -0.07 0.70 -0.79 0.56 0.73 0.39
Signif. β=0 0.77 0.12 0.93 0.40 0.49 0.24 0.28 0.27 0.45 0.74 0.20 0.05 0.59 0.27 0.21
β
1 -0.53 -0.12 -0.20 0.02 -0.68 0.03 -0.72 -0.26 -0.05 -1.61 -1.12 -3.08 -0.69 -0.03 -1.76 -0.25
Signif. β
1=0  0.20 0.71 0.76 0.97 0.35 0.90 0.07 0.72 0.89 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.61 0.94 0.03 0.46
β
2 1.06 0.40 0.61 -0.05 0.68 1.26 0.54 1.50 0.67 1.29 1.64 1.65 0.17 0.44 -1.58 0.63
Signif. β
2=0 0.03 0.28 0.14 0.94 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.22 0.06 0.45 0.93 0.28 0.09 0.09
β
3 -0.33 0.04 -0.47 1.12 -0.71 -0.53 0.00 -1.14 -0.54 1.51 -0.58 2.99 1.28 -0.09 4.91 -0.28
Signif. β
3=0 0.37 0.90 0.23 0.07 0.25 0.35 0.99 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.25 0.04 0.25 0.77 0.01 0.35
β
4 -0.04 0.03 0.24 -0.89 -0.59 -0.55 -0.11 0.40 -0.36 -0.02 0.28 -0.65 0.42 0.56 0.08 0.12
Signif. β





4=0    0.23 0.59 0.49 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.96 0.113 0.17 0.34 0.05 0.03 0.12 0.54 0.51 0.03 0.55
Inflation
β -0.24 -0.79 -0.25 -0.33 -1.26 0.06 -0.42 -0.49 -0.27 -0.19 -0.04 -0.49 0.04 0.43 -1.43 -0.09 -0.54
Signif. β=0 0.35 0.06 0.08 0.60 0.03 0.82 0.08 0.19 0.33 0.20 0.90 0.40 0.95 0.28 0.00 0.73 0.01
β
1 1.22 0.11 0.35 1.41 -0.43 0.99 0.29 1.06 1.30 0.24 0.12 1.66 0.24 0.79 0.23 0.75 0.40
Signif. β
1=0  0.00 0.79 0.10 0.04 0.49 0.04 0.40 0.01 0.00 0.25 0.79 0.12 0.88 0.33 0.67 0.41 0.17
β
2 -0.82 0.50 -0.22 -1.18 0.88 -0.81 0.06 -0.74 -1.66 -0.03 0.45 -1.01 -0.95 -0.88 -0.46 -1.15 -0.08
Signif. β
2=0 0.05 0.28 0.34 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.87 0.09 0.00 0.91 0.48 0.44 0.68 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.81
β
3 -0.56 -1.44 -0.11 -0.85 -1.81 -0.50 -0.98 -1.65 0.07 -0.17 -0.36 -1.92 0.82 0.49 -0.88 0.42 -0.97
Signif. β
3=0 0.10 0.00 0.54 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.37 0.32 0.02 0.53 0.43 0.08 0.75 0.00
β
4 0.09 0.52 0.21 1.15 0.29 -0.05 0.57 1.14 0.12 -0.06 -0.69 0.16 0.05 -0.42 -0.01 -0.29 0.43
Signif. β





4=0    0.01 0.00 0.38 0.04 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.000 0.00 0.59 0.45 0.11 0.92 0.36 0.02 0.76 0.00
Table A16: Predictability of forecast errors in relation to current information variables-year ahead








4=0: p-value of the F-test that all the coefficients are jointly insignificant.      
  68 
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom euro area European Union
GDP
β 0.04 -0.03 0.08 -0.04 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.32 0.03 0.01 0.31 -0.17 0.27 0.33 -0.04 0.19 0.10
Signif. β=0 0.64 0.78 0.38 0.72 0.53 0.94 0.64 0.00 0.77 0.94 0.24 0.13 0.34 0.28 0.64 0.37 0.16
Inflation
β 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.14 -0.01 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.28 -0.06 -0.09 0.12 0.01 0.38 0.05
Signif. β=0 0.52 0.58 0.82 0.81 0.28 0.02 0.78 0.02 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.07 0.72 0.56 0.75 0.02 0.02
Table A17: Lagged realisation-current year




Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom euro area European Union
GDP
β 0.18 0.10 0.09 -0.12 0.19 0.04 0.14 0.22 0.21 0.04 0.01 -0.13 -0.20 0.42 0.09 0.20 0.19
Signif. β=0 0.22 0.46 0.52 0.33 0.23 0.81 0.22 0.08 0.18 0.77 0.97 0.38 0.59 0.32 0.46 0.62 0.13
Inflation
β 0.10 -0.11 -0.02 0.03 -0.09 0.05 -0.04 -0.06 0.07 0.10 0.52 -0.07 -0.11 0.22 0.05 0.23 0.08
Signif. β=0 0.25 0.02 0.76 0.68 0.15 0.66 0.55 0.35 0.47 0.04 0.08 0.47 0.77 0.50 0.33 0.48 0.27
Table A18: Lagged realisation-year ahead
β: coefficient in regression (12). Signif. β=0: p-value of the β=0 t-test.  
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GDP
Success rate 0.83 0.83 0.88 0.83 0.86 0.89 0.84 0.88 0.88 0.94 0.89 0.82 0.89 0.86 0.83 0.82
Signif indep 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Inflation
Success rate 0.89 0.93 0.91 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.81 0.83 0.79 0.88 0.74 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.82
Signif indep 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Investment
Success rate 0.78 0.82 0.75 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.75 0.79 0.75 0.81 0.84 0.73 0.86 0.82 0.81 0.89
Signif indep 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Unemployment rate
Success rate 0.69 0.71 0.88 0.92 0.75 0.75 0.88 0.92 0.46 0.50 0.95 1.00 0.91 0.89 0.92 0.89
Signif indep 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Government bal.
Success rate 0.88 0.92 0.71 0.70 0.78 0.79 0.55 0.57 0.74 0.73 0.68 0.64 0.69 0.64 0.92 0.93
Signif indep 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.51 0.04 0.09 0.55 NA 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00
Current account
Success rate 0.62 0.65 0.69 0.71 0.76 0.73 0.75 0.79 0.65 0.60 0.63 0.64 0.74 0.77 0.85 0.88
Signif indep 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.52 0.21 0.38 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Table A19: Directional accuracy – current year
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France
hypothesis of independence can be rejected at the 5 % significance level. 
European Union
The success rate is the percentage share of successes. Signif. indep. is the significance level of the χ2-statistic for independence between the direction of change of forecasts and of realisations. With numbers below 0.05 the null 
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Austria Finland Sweden euro area
GDP
Success rate 0.86 0.93 0.83 0.82 0.75 0.75 0.80 0.74 0.73 1.00 0.80 0.88 0.83 0.86 0.83 0.82
Signif indep 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00
Inflation
Success rate 0.89 0.96 0.75 0.86 0.83 0.86 0.70 0.84 0.91 0.70 1.00 0.81 0.88 0.71 0.81 0.82
Signif indep 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00
Investment
Success rate 0.72 0.75 0.81 0.82 0.86 0.93 0.70 0.68 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.78 0.83 0.57 0.81 0.89
Signif indep 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.00
Unemployment rate
Success rate 0.69 0.75 0.63 0.59 0.86 0.82 0.70 0.79 0.82 0.90 0.60 0.84 0.92 0.86 0.92 0.89
Signif indep 0.02 0.04 0.28 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00
Government bal.
Success rate 0.75 0.75 0.68 0.65 0.64 0.61 0.90 0.89 0.82 0.90 0.70 0.78 0.83 1.00 0.92 0.93
Signif indep 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Current account
Success rate 0.76 0.85 0.71 0.73 0.62 0.62 0.70 0.79 0.82 0.60 0.80 0.75 0.75 0.57 0.85 0.88
Signif indep 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.24 0.32 0.49 0.01 0.04 0.60 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.66 0.00 0.00
hypothesis of independence can be rejected at the 5 % significance level. 
Table A19: Directional accuracy – current year (continued)
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal United Kingdom European Union
The success rate is the percentage share of successes. Signif. indep. is the significance level of the χ2-statistic for independence between the direction of change of forecasts and of realisations. With numbers below 0.05 the null 
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GDP
Success rate 0.69 0.85 0.87 0.78 0.71 0.78 0.58 0.74 0.74 0.67 0.67 0.80 0.74 0.78 0.77 0.78
Signif indep 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.16 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Inflation
Success rate 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.78 0.68 0.78 0.70 0.73 0.56 0.70 0.63 0.74 0.71 0.81
Signif indep 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.20 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.21 0.42 0.87 0.49 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.00
Investment
Success rate 0.66 0.52 0.61 0.65 0.54 0.59 0.71 0.61 0.65 0.60 0.83 0.70 0.83 0.70 0.77 0.74
Signif indep 0.06 0.93 0.18 0.11 0.56 0.38 0.03 0.35 0.02 0.26 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01
Unemployment rate
Success rate 0.71 0.73 0.68 0.78 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.91 0.65 0.33 0.78 0.70 0.65 0.62 0.82 0.77
Signif indep 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.18 0.91 0.00 0.01
Government bal.
Success rate 0.65 0.54 0.61 0.70 0.57 0.68 0.48 0.61 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.55 0.69 0.54 0.63 0.71
Signif indep 0.09 0.88 0.23 0.07 0.38 0.05 0.76 0.38 0.18 0.18 0.88 0.34 0.03 0.70 0.18 0.03
Current account
Success rate 0.50 0.65 0.52 0.43 0.68 0.62 0.68 0.61 0.43 0.67 0.50 0.70 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.81
Signif indep 0.90 0.11 0.88 0.31 0.08 0.26 0.05 0.44 0.51 0.05 0.91 0.20 0.09 0.34 0.20 0.00
hypothesis of independence can be rejected at the 5 % significance level. 
Table A20: Directional accuracy – year ahead
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France European Union
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Austria Finland Sweden euro area
GDP
Success rate 0.69 0.74 0.60 0.63 0.57 0.56 0.70 0.67 0.90 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.77 0.78
Signif indep 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.10 0.38 0.60 0.11 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
Inflation
Success rate 0.71 0.63 0.57 0.70 0.77 0.70 0.90 0.83 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.83 0.67 0.71 0.81
Signif indep 0.01 0.15 0.29 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.60 0.26 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.41 0.01 0.00
Investment
Success rate 0.60 0.59 0.83 0.48 0.69 0.63 0.70 0.61 0.60 1.00 0.80 0.68 0.74 0.67 0.77 0.74
Signif indep 0.14 0.30 0.00 0.86 0.02 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.53 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.27 0.00 0.01
Unemployment rate
Success rate 0.50 0.46 0.79 0.67 0.71 0.77 0.60 0.61 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.94 0.83 0.67 0.82 0.77
Signif indep 0.90 0.39 0.00 0.31 0.02 0.01 0.49 0.49 0.20 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.01
Government bal.
Success rate 0.57 0.54 0.50 0.48 0.60 0.57 0.90 0.72 0.55 1.00 0.80 0.52 0.75 0.67 0.63 0.71
Signif indep 0.49 0.90 0.58 0.85 0.23 0.51 0.01 0.07 0.43 0.00 0.04 0.88 0.02 0.27 0.18 0.03
Current account
Success rate 0.56 0.65 0.63 0.50 0.44 0.69 0.50 0.67 0.80 0.50 0.40 0.71 0.74 0.50 0.62 0.81
Signif indep 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.77 0.33 0.14 1.00 0.16 0.04 1.00 0.49 0.02 0.02 1.00 0.20 0.00
hypothesis of independence can be rejected at the 5 % significance level. 
Table A20: Directional accuracy – year ahead (continued)
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal United Kingdom European Union
The success rate is the percentage share of successes. Signif. indep. is the significance level of the χ2-statistic for independence between the direction of change of forecasts and of realisations. With numbers below 0.05 the null 
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 Table A21: Basic characteristics of the sample data (international context)
US Japan World Rest World
Exp. vol. Imp. Vol. Exp.prices Imp.prices
Current year
Sample 74/05 74/97 74/05 74/97 74/05 74/97 74/05 74/97 69/05 69/97 69/05 6997 69/05 69/97 69/05 69/97 99/05 99/05 99/05 99/05
No of obs. 32 24 32 24 32 24 32 24 37 29 37 29 37 29 37 29 7777
MV(F) 2.39 2.22 2.64 3.25 5.23 4.85 5.51 5.15 5.52 5.53 5.56 5.47 3.60 4.40 3.73 4.60 5.41 5.67 0.47 0.43
MV(R) 2.58 2.30 2.74 3.36 5.29 5.01 5.56 5.15 5.52 5.82 5.58 5.74 4.14 5.10 4.29 5.23 4.54 4.66 0.97 1.59
ME -0.19 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.06 -0.16 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.30 -0.02 -0.27 -0.55 -0.70 -0.56 -0.63 0.87 1.01 -0.50 -1.16
STD(R) 2.20 2.39 2.35 2.16 4.17 4.27 4.78 4.80 4.03 4.14 4.92 5.24 5.63 5.94 9.12 9.98 4.00 4.06 2.28 3.86
Year ahead
Sample 75/05 75/97 75/05 75/97 74/05 74/97 74/05 74/97 70/05 70/97 70/05 70/97 70/05 70/97 70/05 70/97 99/05 99/05 99/05 99/05
No of obs. 31 23 31 23 31 24 31 24 36 28 36 28 36 28 36 28 7777
MV(F) 2.44 2.40 3.17 3.81 5.55 5.14 5.85 5.46 5.75 5.72 5.62 5.49 3.72 4.39 3.71 4.41 5.60 5.99 1.31 0.93
MV(R) 2.79 2.63 2.87 3.58 5.75 5.37 6.15 5.72 5.60 5.87 5.38 5.35 4.09 5.03 4.34 5.34 4.63 4.87 1.09 1.54
ME -0.35 -0.23 0.30 0.23 -0.20 -0.22 -0.30 -0.26 0.15 -0.15 0.24 0.14 -0.37 -0.64 -0.64 -0.93 0.97 1.11 0.23 -0.61
STD(R) 2.06 2.26 2.24 1.92 3.82 3.73 4.41 4.18 3.90 4.01 4.24 4.42 5.55 5.89 8.60 9.39 3.90 4.05 2.37 4.02
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
Euro Area
Export prices Import prices
European Union European Union




 Table A22: Basic characteristics of the sample data (international context)
Exp. vol. Imp. Vol. Exp.prices Imp.prices
Current year
MAV 3.04 2.90 3.06 3.51 5.88 5.79 6.33 6.16 5.85 6.24 6.41 6.78 4.86 5.75 5.92 6.83 4.54 4.74 1.89 2.79
MAE 0.74 0.74 1.01 0.86 2.14 2.01 2.48 2.35 1.96 1.86 2.21 2.18 1.44 1.48 2.15 2.20 2.56 2.76 1.44 1.96
RMSE 1.00 1.03 1.29 1.15 2.99 2.85 3.31 3.21 2.53 2.41 2.90 2.76 2.29 2.46 3.79 4.07 3.17 3.79 1.65 2.57
THEIL1 0.38 0.36 0.65 0.60 0.49 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.47 0.42 0.45 0.44 0.36 0.35 0.53 0.71 0.52 0.47
THEIL2 0.46 0.44 0.56 0.54 0.73 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.64 0.59 0.60 0.54 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.86 1.01 0.78 0.72
THEIL2* 0.41 0.51 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.55 0.39 0.39 0.63 0.77 0.56 0.52
% of positive errors 44 47 41 38 43 49 51 59 57 57 29 14
Year ahead
MAV 3.12 3.07 3.05 3.58 6.11 5.76 6.60 6.16 5.91 6.26 5.89 6.01 4.70 5.58 5.75 6.68 4.63 4.87 1.94 2.80
MAE 1.22 1.13 1.24 1.18 2.77 2.57 3.32 2.96 2.72 2.67 3.10 3.19 2.49 2.73 4.14 4.56 3.11 3.26 1.69 2.73
RMSE 1.48 1.39 1.60 1.40 3.84 3.63 4.20 3.80 3.56 3.57 3.97 4.09 4.01 4.44 6.94 7.71 3.82 4.02 1.82 3.24
THEIL1 0.49 0.42 0.80 0.74 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.42 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.67 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.68 0.69 0.63 0.63
THEIL2 0.73 0.63 0.72 0.74 1.02 1.00 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.95 0.94 0.73 0.77 0.82 0.84 1.06 1.07 0.83 0.87
THEIL2* 0.65 0.65 1.03 0.97 0.84 0.85 0.64 0.72 0.93 0.77 0.74 0.81
% of positive errors 35 58 48 45 58 53 53 61 71 57 57 43
Export prices Import prices
Rest World European Union European Union
GDP Import volume Export volume Import volume
Euro Area
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
US Japan World
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 Table A23: Persistence in the forecast error (international context)
Exp. vol. Imp. Vol. Exp.prices Imp.prices
Current year
ρ1 -0.22 -0.21 -0.31 -0.23 -0.28 -0.09 0.14 0.13 -0.37 -0.14 -0.14 -0.03
Signif. ρ1=0 0.19 0.04 0.22 0.34 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.36 0.08 0.12 0.58 0.53 0.38 0.45 0.41 0.44 0.23 0.65 0.64 0.93
ρ2 -0.03 -0.25 -0.03 -0.01 0.09 -0.11 -0.21 -0.16 0.01 -0.30 -0.54 -0.57
Signif. ρ2=0 0.42 0.10 0.15 0.39 0.17 0.24 0.39 0.56 0.17 0.25 0.66 0.60 0.27 0.40 0.41 0.59 0.49 0.51 0.14 0.13
ρ3 -0.04 0.35 0.04 0.04 0.15 0.11 -0.05 -0.05 -0.35 -0.25 0.08 -0.10
Signif. ρ3=0 0.61 0.20 0.04 0.45 0.31 0.42 0.58 0.76 0.21 0.30 0.72 0.52 0.44 0.57 0.59 0.77 0.34 0.51 0.26 0.24
Year ahead
ρ1 -0.15 0.19 -0.25 -0.14 -0.29 -0.04 0.11 0.05 -0.53 -0.23 -0.12 -0.03
Signif. ρ1=0 0.38 0.35 0.27 0.34 0.14 0.24 0.41 0.64 0.07 0.17 0.82 0.91 0.47 0.58 0.76 0.80 0.09 0.45 0.71 0.91
ρ2 -0.18 -0.15 -0.10 -0.24 -0.10 -0.29 -0.01 0.00 0.25 -0.13 -0.30 -0.26
Signif. ρ2=0 0.39 0.32 0.38 0.56 0.27 0.48 0.25 0.65 0.15 0.21 0.19 0.10 0.77 0.85 0.95 0.97 0.15 0.68 0.52 0.64
ρ3 0.05 0.19 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.40 -0.36 -0.31 -0.36
Signif. ρ3=0 0.58 0.48 0.35 0.75 0.45 0.63 0.43 0.82 0.27 0.34 0.34 0.18 0.91 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.10 0.41 0.42 0.40
European Union Euro Area
GDP Import volume
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
US Japan World Rest World European Union
Export volume Import volume Export prices Import prices
 
 
 Table A24: Bias (international context)
Exp. vol. Imp. Vol. Exp.prices Imp.prices
Current year
α -0.19 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.06 -0.16 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.30 -0.02 -0.27 -0.55 -0.70 -0.56 -0.63 0.87 1.01 -0.50 -1.16
Signif. α=0 0.28 0.71 0.67 0.65 0.91 0.79 0.93 0.99 0.99 0.52 0.97 0.61 0.15 0.13 0.38 0.41 0.51 0.52 0.47 0.26
α1 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 1.14 1.14 1.80 1.80 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.24 -1.55 -1.55 -1.81 -1.81
α2 -0.29 -0.15 -0.16 -0.20 -0.53 -0.94 -0.78 -1.09 -0.11 -0.73 -0.18 -0.74 0.07 0.10 0.20 0.47 0.87 1.01 -0.50 -1.16
Signif. α1=α2 0.05 0.66 0.43 0.64 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.60 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.14
Year ahead
α -0.35 -0.23 0.30 0.23 -0.20 -0.22 -0.30 -0.26 0.15 -0.15 0.24 0.14 -0.37 -0.64 -0.64 -0.93 0.97 1.11 0.23 -0.61
Signif. α=0 0.19 0.43 0.30 0.44 0.78 0.77 0.70 0.75 0.81 0.83 0.72 0.86 0.59 0.46 0.59 0.54 0.54 0.51 0.77 0.65
α1 0.45 0.44 0.84 0.83 1.47 1.46 1.66 1.66 0.39 0.39 1.27 1.27 -2.64 -2.63 -4.19 -4.19
α2 -0.63 -0.59 0.11 -0.09 -0.88 -1.23 -1.10 -1.41 0.01 -0.61 -0.33 -0.84 0.92 1.09 1.37 1.91 0.97 1.11 0.23 -0.61
Signif. α1=α2 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.56 0.48 0.03 0.19 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04
Export volume Import volume Export prices Import prices
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
US Japan World Rest World European Union European Union Euro Area
GDP Import volume
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Table A25: Efficiency (international context)
Exp. vol. Imp. Vol. Exp.prices Imp.prices
Current year
α 0.40 0.32 0.02 -0.29 -1.57 -2.14 -2.07 -2.18 -0.24 -0.10 -1.13 -1.24 0.01 0.07 -0.54 -0.76 -0.08 1.43 0.30 0.87
Signif. α=0 0.14 0.28 0.96 0.60 0.26 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.80 0.92 0.24 0.19 0.99 0.91 0.40 0.34 0.98 0.73 0.70 0.38
β 0.91 0.89 1.03 1.12 1.31 1.47 1.39 1.43 1.04 1.07 1.21 1.28 1.15 1.14 1.29 1.30 0.85 0.57 1.42 1.66
Signif. β=1 0.31 0.23 0.81 0.42 0.20 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.76 0.63 0.16 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.53 0.54 0.23
Signif. α=0, β=1 0.33 0.45 0.89 0.65 0.44 0.20 0.26 0.27 0.96 0.72 0.37 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.79 0.67 0.64 0.26
Adj. R
2 0.79 0.81 0.68 0.70 0.48 0.58 0.53 0.57 0.58 0.64 0.65 0.74 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.20 -0.03 0.39 0.64
DW 1.95 2.16 2.13 2.04 2.61 2.60 2.46 2.35 2.53 2.49 2.19 2.14 1.84 1.83 1.72 1.72 2.66 1.98 2.12 1.93
Year ahead
α 0.00 -0.52 -0.06 0.02 3.58 2.60 2.28 1.25 1.21 1.05 1.68 1.70 -0.60 -0.37 -1.56 -1.87 2.27 2.73 -1.10 0.31
Signif. α=0 1.00 0.38 0.92 0.99 0.15 0.34 0.35 0.61 0.51 0.62 0.33 0.37 0.57 0.80 0.37 0.43 0.64 0.67 0.48 0.86
β 1.14 1.31 0.92 0.93 0.39 0.54 0.66 0.52 0.76 0.84 0.66 0.66 1.26 1.23 1.59 1.63 0.42 0.36 1.66 1.33
Signif. β=1 0.50 0.15 0.67 0.77 0.16 0.36 0.39 0.67 0.43 0.65 0.23 0.29 0.25 0.41 0.09 0.14 0.49 0.54 0.51 0.74
Signif. α=0, β=1 0.34 0.26 0.54 0.71 0.35 0.63 0.64 0.86 0.71 0.88 0.45 0.55 0.44 0.53 0.20 0.28 0.65 0.66 0.76 0.86
Adj. R
2 0.49 0.64 0.48 0.44 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.47 0.42 0.37 0.32 -0.13 -0.17 0.26 0.15
DW 2.23 2.16 1.49 1.44 2.07 2.19 1.93 2.08 2.46 2.40 1.96 1.92 1.90 1.90 2.05 2.06 2.57 2.00 2.00 2.00
Export prices Import prices
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
US Japan World Rest World European Union European Union Euro Area
GDP Import volume Export volume Import volume
 
 
Table A26: Unbiasedness and no serial correlation (international context)
US Japan World Rest World
Export volume Import volume Export prices Import prices Export volume Import volume Export prices Import prices
Current year
α -0.33 -0.24 -0.01 0.00 0.07 0.04 -0.46 -0.45 1.39 1.62 -0.80 -1.35
Signif. α=0 0.04 0.24 0.98 1.00 0.87 0.94 0.25 0.49 0.41 0.44 0.37 0.36
β -0.22 -0.21 -0.32 -0.23 -0.28 -0.09 0.14 0.13 -0.37 -0.14 -0.14 -0.02
Signif. β=0  0.16 0.18 0.08 0.21 0.09 0.61 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.79 0.79 0.97
Signif. α=0, β=0  0.07 0.22 0.21 0.44 0.22 0.87 0.29 0.54 0.58 0.72 0.63 0.59
Year ahead
α -0.50 0.15 -0.34 -0.29 0.21 -0.04 -0.23 -0.53 1.45 1.62 0.08 -0.59
Signif. α=0 0.07 0.60 0.65 0.73 0.72 0.95 0.74 0.66 0.44 0.48 0.94 0.75
β -0.15 0.19 -0.32 -0.18 -0.29 -0.04 0.11 0.05 -0.54 -0.23 -0.12 -0.04
Signif. β=0  0.40 0.29 0.13 0.41 0.09 0.82 0.51 0.78 0.28 0.65 0.83 0.95
Signif. α=0, β=0  0.17 0.43 0.31 0.70 0.22 0.97 0.74 0.86 0.45 0.72 0.97 0.94
Euro Area Euro Area
GDP Import volume
European Union European Union
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Table A27: Directional accuracy (international context)
Exp. vol. Imp. Vol. Exp.prices Imp.prices
Current year
Success rate(%) 0.84 0.91 0.84 0.87 0.90 0.91 0.81 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.86 0.92 0.89 0.67 0.83 1.00 1.00
Signif. indep. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.08 0.01 0.01
Year ahead
Success rate(%) 0.70 0.86 0.67 0.73 0.66 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.80 0.70 0.74 0.70 0.83 0.74 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.83 1.00 1.00
Signif. indep. 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.01
GDP Import volume Export volume Import volume Export prices Import prices
(Results from the original study of 1999 displayed in italics below)
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ANNEX B  
  78 
   Table B1: Comparison of Commission, Consensus and IMF forecasts
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
Sample 90/05 90/05 90/05 90/05 94/05 90/05 90/05 90/05 90/05 95/05 90/05 95/05 95/05 90/05
N o  o f  o b s . 1 61 61 61 61 21 61 61 6 1 61 11 61 11 1 1 6
ME(COMM) 0.14 0.11 -0.06 -1.16 -0.30 -0.01 0.16 0.48 0.06 0.15 0.50 0.16 -0.09 0.09
ME(CONS) 0.17 0.04 -0.14 -1.72 -0.49 0.03 0.22 0.43 0.00 0.15 0.63 -0.26 -0.08 0.10
ME(IMF) 0.18 -0.05 0.07 -0.76 -0.41 0.04 0.18 0.45 0.13 0.16 0.59 -0.07 -0.04 0.10
MAE(COMM) 0.64 0.66 0.63 1.66 0.37 0.45 0.54 0.63 0.74 0.50 0.68 0.96 0.58 0.56
M A E ( C O N S ) 0 . 8 00 . 6 40 . 5 92 . 2 20 . 5 10 . 4 90 .59 0.63 0.67 0.60 0.87 1.17 0.63 0.56
MAE(IMF) 0.67 0.79 0.61 1.29 0.41 0.49 0.50 0.73 0.70 0.53 0.73 1.12 0.65 0.53
RMSE(COMM) 0.79 0.80 0.80 1.95 0.41 0.58 0.62 0.73 0.95 0.71 0.87 1.31 0.82 0.69
R M S E ( C O N S ) 0 . 9 50 . 8 80 . 8 62 . 6 10 . 6 10 . 7 00 .68 0.75 0.88 0.74 1.16 1.47 0.82 0.72
RMSE(IMF) 0.84 0.98 0.85 1.56 0.48 0.68 0.62 0.87 0.89 0.64 0.98 1.43 0.84 0.70
THEIL1(COMM) 0.48 0.56 0.46 0.70 0.84 0.46 0.43 0.56 0.76 0.65 0.59 0.60 0.63 0.49
T H E I L 1 ( C O N S ) 0 . 5 70 . 6 10 . 5 00 . 9 41 . 2 30 . 5 6 0.47 0.57 0.71 0.68 0.78 0.67 0.64 0.51
THEIL1(IMF) 0.53 0.60 0.45 0.68 1.16 0.56 0.43 0.64 0.73 0.56 0.73 0.66 0.64 0.49
THEIL2(COMM) 0.63 0.76 0.56 0.64 0.45 0.47 0.58 0.75 0.70 0.83 0.53 0.79 0.87 0.48
T H E I L 2 ( C O N S ) 0 . 7 50 . 8 30 . 6 10 . 8 50 . 6 60 . 5 7 0.64 0.78 0.66 0.86 0.71 0.88 0.88 0.49
THEIL2(IMF) 0.70 0.85 0.64 0.62 0.56 0.56 0.60 0.87 0.67 0.75 0.63 0.88 0.90 0.48
THEIL2*(COMM) 0.53 0.67 0.48 0.57 0.39 0.40 0.51 0.66 0.64 0.71 0.46 0.69 0.72 0.40
THEIL2*(CONS) 0.64 0.74 0.52 0.76 0.56 0.49 0.55 0.69 0.59 0.73 0.62 0.77 0.72 0.42
THEIL2*(IMF) 0.60 0.75 0.53 0.56 0.48 0.49 0.52 0.77 0.60 0.64 0.56 0.76 0.73 0.41
Success rate(COMM) 80 93 80 80 82 93 93 73 73 80 73 100 80 93
S u c c e s s  r a t e ( C O N S ) 8 08 78 77 36 48 79 38 0 6 08 06 7 1 0 08 0 1 0 0
Success rate(IMF) 80 87 80 73 73 93 93 80 73 70 80 100 80 100
% of positive errors(COMM) 50 69 44 25 17 50 63 81 50 64 81 55 45 63
%  o f  p o s i t i v e  e r r o r s ( C O N S ) 5 65 64 42 51 75 66 96 9 4 45 56 93 65 5 5 6
% of positive errors(IMF) 56 38 44 31 0 56 69 75 63 64 75 36 64 75    
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   Table B1: Comparison of Commission, Consensus and IMF forecasts (continued)
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Year ahead
Sample 91/05 91/05 90/05 91/05 94/05 91/05 90/05 90/05 91/05 95/05 91/05 95/05 95/05 90/05
N o  o f  o b s . 1 51 51 61 51 21 51 61 6 1 51 11 51 11 1 1 6
ME(COMM) 0.41 0.16 0.36 -2.00 -0.41 0.12 0.48 0.80 0.07 0.36 0.73 -0.07 0.22 0.40
ME(CONS) 0.59 0.10 0.37 -2.32 -0.47 0.28 0.50 0.82 0.25 0.43 1.07 -0.33 0.23 0.42
ME(IMF) 0.59 -0.06 0.85 -1.74 -0.45 0.35 0.74 1.03 0.40 0.43 1.05 0.13 0.24 0.51
MAE(COMM) 1.04 0.68 0.93 2.40 0.49 0.68 0.86 0.98 0.92 0.71 0.91 1.27 0.80 0.86
M A E ( C O N S ) 1 . 2 50 . 7 81 . 0 02 . 7 20 . 5 50 . 8 30 .96 1.02 1.04 0.86 1.31 1.33 0.77 0.89
MAE(IMF) 1.18 0.94 1.32 2.31 0.48 0.77 1.07 1.18 1.04 1.11 1.37 1.35 0.83 0.99
RMSE(COMM) 1.25 0.91 1.14 2.88 0.54 0.95 1.04 1.14 1.18 0.95 1.19 1.59 1.06 1.17
R M S E ( C O N S ) 1 . 4 91 . 0 21 . 2 63 . 3 00 . 6 61 . 1 61 .20 1.15 1.24 1.03 1.73 1.73 1.04 1.23
RMSE(IMF) 1.50 1.22 1.65 2.69 0.59 1.06 1.41 1.34 1.33 1.22 1.83 1.59 1.04 1.36
THEIL1(COMM) 0.67 0.62 0.59 0.99 0.64 0.60 0.64 0.77 0.67 0.74 0.72 0.78 0.75 0.77
T H E I L 1 ( C O N S ) 0 . 8 90 . 8 70 . 7 50 . 9 40 . 7 10 . 7 3 0.82 0.83 0.80 0.87 1.02 0.81 0.77 0.82
THEIL1(IMF) 0.85 0.90 0.86 0.97 0.72 0.72 0.94 0.93 0.84 0.93 1.06 0.78 0.81 0.88
THEIL2(COMM) 0.96 0.88 0.80 1.04 0.57 0.73 0.97 1.17 0.84 1.23 0.77 0.99 1.13 0.81
T H E I L 2 ( C O N S ) 1 . 1 40 . 9 90 . 8 91 . 1 90 . 7 00 . 8 8 1.12 1.19 0.89 1.34 1.12 1.08 1.11 0.85
THEIL2(IMF) 1.22 1.16 1.27 1.00 0.66 0.84 1.29 1.38 0.98 1.39 1.13 0.92 1.11 0.94
THEIL2*(COMM) 0.82 0.77 0.68 0.92 0.50 0.62 0.83 1.04 0.76 1.07 0.68 0.86 0.93 0.68
THEIL2*(CONS) 0.89 0.79 0.65 0.92 0.50 0.66 0.94 0.98 0.72 1.03 0.87 0.87 0.91 0.67
THEIL2*(IMF) 0.97 0.95 1.09 0.79 0.47 0.63 1.08 1.14 0.80 1.10 0.86 0.73 0.91 0.73
Success rate(COMM) 64 86 67 50 55 57 73 60 50 70 64 80 80 80
S u c c e s s  r a t e ( C O N S ) 5 77 97 35 76 45 76 76 0 5 05 05 07 08 0 7 3
Success rate(IMF) 50 71 53 64 82 57 47 47 50 60 50 80 90 87
% of positive errors(COMM) 67 47 75 13 17 53 63 81 40 55 73 45 55 69
%  o f  p o s i t i v e  e r r o r s ( C O N S ) 6 06 76 92 02 54 06 38 1 5 35 57 34 56 4 6 3
% of positive errors(IMF) 67 47 75 20 17 47 69 81 53 64 67 55 55 69   
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   Table B2: Comparison of Commission and Consensus forecasts: Proportion of positive forecast differentials  
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
% 6 35 66 36 96 75 66 38 1 5 66 45 09 14 5 5 0
GDP - Year ahead
% 4 75 34 46 06 74 75 63 8 4 06 44 08 25 5 5 6  
 
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP-current year
α (COMM) 0.14 0.11 -0.06 -1.16 -0.30 -0.01 0.16 0.48 0.06 0.15 0.50 0.16 -0.09 0.09
Signif. α=0 (COMM) 0.50 0.61 0.79 0.01 0.01 0.93 0.31 0.00 0.80 0.50 0.02 0.70 0.73 0.63
α (CONS) 0.17 0.04 -0.14 -1.72 -0.49 0.03 0.22 0.43 0.00 0.15 0.63 -0.26 -0.08 0.10
Signif. α=0 (CONS) 0.49 0.86 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.21 0.02 1.00 0.54 0.02 0.58 0.78 0.61
GDP-year ahead
α (COMM) 0.41 0.16 0.36 -2.00 -0.41 0.12 0.48 0.80 0.07 0.36 0.73 -0.07 0.22 0.40
Signif. α=0 (COMM) 0.21 0.51 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.06 0.00 0.84 0.22 0.01 0.89 0.52 0.18
α (CONS) 0.59 0.10 0.37 -2.32 -0.47 0.28 0.50 0.82 0.25 0.43 1.07 -0.33 0.23 0.42
Signif. α=0 (CONS) 0.13 0.73 0.26 0.00 0.01 0.38 0.10 0.00 0.45 0.18 0.01 0.56 0.50 0.18
Table B3: Comparison of Commission and Consensus forecasts: Bias
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Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP-current year
α(COMM) 0.21 0.13 0.00 -1.69 -0.24 -0.03 0.18 0.59 0.03 0.06 0.42 0.08 -0.08 0.03
Signif. α=0(COMM) 0.35 0.56 0.99 0.01 0.11 0.85 0.31 0.01 0.90 0.81 0.09 0.86 0.80 0.88
Signif. α=0(COMM)-bootstrap 0.32 0.54 0.98 0.00 0.12 0.89 0.32 0.00 0.89 0.77 0.12 0.80 0.80 0.87
β(COMM) -0.17 -0.27 -0.06 -0.40 0.15 0.30 -0.23 -0.35 0.28 0.12 0.23 -0.20 -0.01 -0.05
Signif. β=0(COMM) 0.56 0.34 0.82 0.15 0.68 0.31 0.41 0.20 0.32 0.72 0.41 0.58 0.97 0.85
Signif. β=0(COMM)-bootstrap 0.66 0.39 0.98 0.13 0.36 0.10 0.45 0.21 0.12 0.39 0.19 0.67 0.76 1.00
Signif. α=0, β=0(COMM) 0.56 0.58 0.97 0.02 0.05 0.58 0.49 0.02 0.58 0.88 0.04 0.84 0.96 0.97
α(CONS) 0.26 0.09 -0.06 -1.48 -0.54 0.00 0.27 0.55 0.02 0.04 0.46 -0.37 -0.02 0.06
Signif. α= 0 ( C O N S ) 0 . 3 20 . 7 10 . 7 90 . 0 80 . 0 10 . 9 90 . 1 60 . 0 1 0 . 9 20 . 8 80 . 1 40 . 5 10 . 9 4 0 . 7 6
Signif. α=0(CONS)-bootstrap 0.30 0.74 0.75 0.09 0.01 0.99 0.14 0.01 0.92 0.85 0.18 0.61 0.92 0.78
β(CONS) -0.24 -0.38 0.07 0.13 0.01 0.10 -0.35 -0.41 0.26 0.09 0.39 -0.04 -0.07 0.05
Signif. β=0(CONS) 0.38 0.17 0.80 0.66 0.97 0.73 0.20 0.14 0.34 0.78 0.14 0.91 0.85 0.85
Signif. β=0(CONS)-bootstrap 0.43 0.13 0.53 0.39 0.75 0.46 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.48 0.04 0.83 0.95 0.62
Signif. α=0, β=0(CONS) 0.45 0.37 0.92 0.03 0.00 0.94 0.24 0.03 0.63 0.94 0.02 0.79 0.98 0.93
GDP-year ahead
α(COMM) 0.52 0.27 0.54 -2.57 -0.30 0.08 0.64 1.06 0.08 0.37 0.70 -0.17 0.32 0.20
Signif. α=0(COMM) 0.16 0.32 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.79 0.04 0.00 0.82 0.27 0.06 0.77 0.41 0.52
Signif. α=0(COMM)-bootstrap 0.14 0.31 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.78 0.03 0.00 0.79 0.19 0.05 0.82 0.36 0.60
β(COMM) -0.30 -0.34 -0.23 -0.21 0.23 0.24 -0.36 -0.37 0.03 -0.28 -0.02 -0.14 -0.27 0.39
Signif. β=0(COMM) 0.32 0.24 0.37 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.20 0.20 0.93 0.40 0.94 0.69 0.44 0.14
Signif. β=0(COMM)-bootstrap 0.34 0.23 0.39 0.53 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.66 0.42 0.85 0.83 0.47 0.03
Signif. α=0, β=0(COMM) 0.30 0.38 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.67 0.10 0.01 0.97 0.47 0.08 0.89 0.57 0.18
α(CONS) 0.55 0.11 0.54 -1.72 -0.36 0.11 0.67 0.98 0.21 0.32 0.62 -0.32 0.33 0.23
Signif. α= 0 ( C O N S ) 0 . 2 30 . 7 10 . 1 20 . 0 70 . 0 60 . 7 40 . 0 60 . 0 1 0 . 5 80 . 4 10 . 2 00 . 6 30 . 4 0 0 . 4 9
Signif. α=0(CONS)-bootstrap 0.23 0.73 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.78 0.03 0.01 0.58 0.40 0.30 0.71 0.38 0.54
β(CONS) 0.03 -0.30 -0.11 0.33 0.40 0.34 -0.32 -0.23 0.15 0.10 0.42 0.05 -0.21 0.36
Signif. β=0(CONS) 0.91 0.31 0.68 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.25 0.43 0.61 0.78 0.14 0.89 0.56 0.18
Signif. β=0(CONS)-bootstrap 0.67 0.29 0.79 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.23 0.50 0.34 0.47 0.03 0.56 0.63 0.04
Signif. α=0, β=0(CONS) 0.40 0.57 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.14 0.01 0.69 0.57 0.02 0.86 0.63 0.21
Table B4: Comparison of Commission and Consensus forecasts: Unbiasedness and no serial correlation
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   Table B5: Comparison of Commission and Consensus forecasts: Regressions of COMM forecast errors on CONS forecasts
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
Constant -0.27 0.09 -0.25 -0.58 -0.78 -0.01 -0.24 0.34 -0.46 -0.59 1.26 -0.63 -0.83 0.14
P-value 0.62 0.90 0.50 0.61 0.02 0.98 0.56 0.36 0.42 0.43 0.02 0.68 0.39 0.70
Consensus forecast 0.21 0.01 0.12 -0.12 0.17 0.00 0.19 0.08 0.26 0.37 -0.31 0.25 0.31 -0.03
P-value 0.42 0.98 0.52 0.58 0.10 1.00 0.29 0.68 0.32 0.30 0.11 0.58 0.43 0.86
GDP - Year ahead
Constant -2.36 -0.74 -0.12 -3.32 -1.15 -0.01 -0.94 0.42 -1.01 -4.62 1.32 -4.87 -1.89 1.44
P-value 0.14 0.57 0.90 0.10 0.02 0.99 0.30 0.65 0.38 0.01 0.30 0.13 0.30 0.21
Consensus forecast 1.22 0.39 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.05 0.61 0.18 0.47 2.06 -0.22 1.45 0.79 -0.45
P-value 0.08 0.48 0.60 0.47 0.08 0.91 0.12 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.63 0.13 0.24 0.34 
 
   Table B6: Comparison of Commission and Consensus forecasts: Squared-error loss differentials (with small sample correction) 
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
Mean differential -0.27 -0.13 -0.10 -3.00 -0.20 -0.16 -0.08 -0.04 0.12 -0.04 -0.58 -0.42 -0.01 -0.04
P-value 0.17 0.69 0.63 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.31 0.58 0.32 0.49 0.12 0.25 0.93 0.77
GDP - Year ahead
Mean differential -0.66 -0.21 -0.30 -2.59 -0.15 -0.43 -0.36 -0.03 -0.14 -0.17 -1.59 -0.46 0.05 -0.14
P-value 0.32 0.49 0.39 0.15 0.40 0.28 0.24 0.85 0.70 0.28 0.05 0.29 0.76 0.61 
 
   Table B7: Comparison of Commission and Consensus forecasts: Test for forecast encompassing (with small sample correction)  
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
Constant -0.04 0.11 0.02 -0.95 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.02 -0.18 -0.07 0.02 0.05
P-value 0.76 0.17 0.41 0.97 0.45 0.78 0.44 0.54 0.04 0.30 0.90 0.67 0.35 0.20
GDP - Year ahead
Constant -0.18 0.02 -0.04 -0.76 0.10 -0.15 -0.14 0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.52 -0.10 0.05 -0.02
P-value 0.75 0.46 0.63 0.82 0.19 0.82 0.87 0.46 0.31 0.47 0.96 0.68 0.25 0.55 
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   Table B8: Comparison of Commission and Consensus forecasts: Regressions of realisations on COMM and CONS forecasts
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
Commission forecast 1.50 0.70 0.93 1.33 0.72 1.53 1.21 2.19 0.13 1.03 1.41 2.67 0.67 0.60
P-value 0.02 0.08 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.89 0.27 0.01 0.08 0.62 0.27
Consensus forecast -0.83 0.28 -0.04 -0.26 0.17 -0.53 -0.45 -1.36 0.86 -0.40 -0.17 -2.10 0.03 0.45
P-value 0.27 0.57 0.96 0.69 0.52 0.38 0.58 0.19 0.50 0.71 0.76 0.21 0.98 0.45
GDP - Year ahead
Commission forecast 1.75 0.97 1.50 1.40 0.73 2.24 2.90 0.73 1.07 1.19 1.63 2.79 0.03 1.08
P-value 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.57 0.21 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.98 0.24
Consensus forecast -2.21 -0.36 -0.90 -0.81 0.13 -1.45 -2.61 0.15 -0.58 -2.30 -0.45 -3.97 0.19 0.37
P-value 0.04 0.64 0.42 0.41 0.65 0.15 0.01 0.93 0.66 0.02 0.44 0.06 0.91 0.72 
 




Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
RMSE(COMM) 0.79 0.80 0.80 1.95 0.41 0.58 0.62 0.73 0.95 0.71 0.87 1.31 0.82 0.69
RMSE(a=-0.5) 0.84 0.79 0.81 2.24 0.47 0.63 0.63 0.74 0.90 0.71 1.00 1.37 0.81 0.68
RMSE(a=-0.25) 0.81 0.78 0.80 2.08 0.43 0.60 0.62 0.73 0.92 0.71 0.93 1.33 0.82 0.68
RMSE(a=0.1) 0.79 0.82 0.80 1.90 0.42 0.57 0.62 0.73 0.96 0.71 0.85 1.31 0.82 0.70
RMSE(a=0.25) 0.78 0.85 0.81 1.84 0.43 0.56 0.62 0.73 0.99 0.72 0.82 1.31 0.83 0.72
RMSE(a=0.5) 0.79 0.92 0.84 1.77 0.48 0.56 0.64 0.73 1.04 0.74 0.79 1.32 0.84 0.75
GDP - Year ahead
RMSE(COMM) 1.25 0.91 1.14 2.88 0.54 0.95 1.04 1.14 1.18 0.95 1.19 1.59 1.06 1.17
RMSE(a=-0.5) 1.35 0.93 1.18 3.05 0.53 1.04 1.11 1.14 1.18 0.97 1.44 1.65 1.04 1.19
RMSE(a=-0.25) 1.29 0.91 1.16 2.96 0.51 1.00 1.07 1.14 1.17 0.95 1.31 1.62 1.05 1.18
RMSE(a=0.1) 1.24 0.91 1.14 2.86 0.56 0.94 1.02 1.14 1.19 0.95 1.15 1.59 1.07 1.17
RMSE(a=0.25) 1.22 0.92 1.14 2.83 0.60 0.92 1.00 1.14 1.20 0.95 1.09 1.58 1.07 1.17
RMSE(a=0.5) 1.21 0.95 1.14 2.79 0.69 0.89 0.98 1.15 1.25 0.97 1.01 1.58 1.09 1.18 
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   Table B10: Comparison of Commission and IMF forecasts: Proportion of positive forecast differentials  
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
% 5 66 95 08 16 76 35 05 6 5 64 55 08 25 5 6 3
GDP - Year ahead
% 3 36 03 84 75 84 01 92 5 3 37 34 03 66 4 4 4  
 
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP-current year
α (COMM) 0.14 0.11 -0.06 -1.16 -0.30 -0.01 0.16 0.48 0.06 0.15 0.50 0.16 -0.09 0.09
Signif. α=0 (COMM) 0.50 0.61 0.79 0.01 0.01 0.93 0.31 0.00 0.80 0.50 0.02 0.70 0.73 0.63
α (IMF) 0.18 -0.05 0.07 -0.76 -0.41 0.04 0.18 0.45 0.13 0.16 0.59 -0.07 -0.04 0.10
Signif. α=0 (IMF) 0.41 0.83 0.74 0.05 0.00 0.80 0.26 0.04 0.57 0.44 0.01 0.88 0.90 0.57
GDP-year ahead
α (COMM) 0.41 0.16 0.36 -2.00 -0.41 0.12 0.48 0.80 0.07 0.36 0.73 -0.07 0.22 0.40
Signif. α=0 (COMM) 0.21 0.51 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.06 0.00 0.84 0.22 0.01 0.89 0.52 0.18
α (IMF) 0.59 -0.06 0.85 -1.74 -0.45 0.35 0.74 1.03 0.40 0.43 1.05 0.13 0.24 0.51
Signif. α=0 (IMF) 0.13 0.86 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.21 0.03 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.02 0.80 0.46 0.14
Table B11: Comparison of Commission and IMF forecasts: Bias
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Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP-current year
α(COMM) 0.21 0.13 0.00 -1.69 -0.24 -0.03 0.18 0.59 0.03 0.06 0.42 0.08 -0.08 0.03
Signif. α=0(COMM) 0.35 0.56 0.99 0.01 0.11 0.85 0.31 0.01 0.90 0.81 0.09 0.86 0.80 0.88
Signif. α=0(COMM)-bootstrap 0.32 0.54 0.98 0.00 0.12 0.89 0.32 0.00 0.89 0.77 0.12 0.80 0.80 0.87
β(COMM) -0.17 -0.27 -0.06 -0.40 0.15 0.30 -0.23 -0.35 0.28 0.12 0.23 -0.20 -0.01 -0.05
Signif. β=0(COMM) 0.56 0.34 0.82 0.15 0.68 0.31 0.41 0.20 0.32 0.72 0.41 0.58 0.97 0.85
Signif. β=0(COMM)-bootstrap 0.66 0.39 0.98 0.13 0.36 0.10 0.45 0.21 0.12 0.39 0.19 0.67 0.76 1.00
Signif. α=0, β=0(COMM) 0.56 0.58 0.97 0.02 0.05 0.58 0.49 0.02 0.58 0.88 0.04 0.84 0.96 0.97
α(IMF) 0.21 -0.03 0.17 -1.12 -0.43 0.01 0.24 0.50 0.10 0.08 0.52 -0.21 0.03 0.08
Signif. α=0(IMF) 0.39 0.91 0.45 0.02 0.00 0.95 0.14 0.05 0.70 0.73 0.07 0.69 0.93 0.69
Signif. α=0(IMF)-bootstrap 0.36 0.85 0.43 0.01 0.00 0.92 0.15 0.05 0.74 0.73 0.09 0.80 0.96 0.76
β(IMF) -0.10 -0.27 -0.30 -0.38 -0.19 0.18 -0.46 -0.23 0.11 0.06 0.20 -0.17 -0.22 -0.14
Signif. β=0(IMF) 0.71 0.34 0.26 0.17 0.44 0.53 0.09 0.40 0.68 0.85 0.48 0.64 0.53 0.62
Signif. β=0(IMF)-bootstrap 0.83 0.37 0.27 0.16 0.32 0.28 0.07 0.48 0.42 0.63 0.23 0.77 0.55 0.71
Signif. α=0, β=0(IMF) 0.66 0.62 0.42 0.06 0.00 0.80 0.13 0.13 0.83 0.90 0.03 0.84 0.80 0.82
GDP-year ahead
α(COMM) 0.52 0.27 0.54 -2.57 -0.30 0.08 0.64 1.06 0.08 0.37 0.70 -0.17 0.32 0.20
Signif. α=0(COMM) 0.16 0.32 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.79 0.04 0.00 0.82 0.27 0.06 0.77 0.41 0.52
Signif. α=0(COMM)-bootstrap 0.14 0.31 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.78 0.03 0.00 0.79 0.19 0.05 0.82 0.36 0.60
β(COMM) -0.30 -0.34 -0.23 -0.21 0.23 0.24 -0.36 -0.37 0.03 -0.28 -0.02 -0.14 -0.27 0.39
Signif. β=0(COMM) 0.32 0.24 0.37 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.20 0.20 0.93 0.40 0.94 0.69 0.44 0.14
Signif. β=0(COMM)-bootstrap 0.34 0.23 0.39 0.53 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.66 0.42 0.85 0.83 0.47 0.03
Signif. α=0, β=0(COMM) 0.30 0.38 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.67 0.10 0.01 0.97 0.47 0.08 0.89 0.57 0.18
α(IMF) 0.64 -0.09 1.43 -1.57 -0.69 0.20 0.98 1.17 0.26 0.34 1.04 0.02 0.34 0.16
Signif. α=0(IMF) 0.17 0.80 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.53 0.02 0.01 0.50 0.46 0.06 0.97 0.40 0.61
Signif. α=0(IMF)-bootstrap 0.16 0.83 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.55 0.01 0.01 0.51 0.48 0.07 0.96 0.39 0.73
β(IMF) -0.12 -0.22 -0.49 0.23 -0.44 0.27 -0.30 -0.13 0.20 0.04 0.13 0.11 -0.12 0.50
Signif. β=0(IMF) 0.69 0.45 0.04 0.39 0.13 0.35 0.28 0.67 0.49 0.91 0.66 0.75 0.73 0.05
Signif. β=0(IMF)-bootstrap 0.88 0.49 0.03 0.20 0.07 0.11 0.27 0.81 0.25 0.69 0.38 0.41 0.90 0.01
Signif. α=0, β=0(IMF) 0.37 0.72 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.37 0.06 0.00 0.52 0.69 0.05 0.95 0.68 0.06
Table B12: Comparison of Commission and IMF forecasts: Unbiasedness and no serial correlation
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   Table B13: Comparison of Commission and IMF forecasts: Regressions of COMM forecast errors on IMF forecasts
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
Constant -0.14 -0.37 -0.24 0.20 -0.72 0.03 -0.28 0.25 -0.40 -0.32 0.97 -0.59 -0.82 0.12
P-value 0.78 0.59 0.52 0.87 0.02 0.94 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.68 0.02 0.69 0.45 0.71
IMF forecast 0.14 0.24 0.11 -0.27 0.14 -0.02 0.21 0.14 0.22 0.23 -0.19 0.23 0.30 -0.02
P-value 0.55 0.46 0.55 0.24 0.12 0.92 0.24 0.49 0.35 0.53 0.17 0.60 0.49 0.90
GDP - Year ahead
Constant -3.12 -1.99 -1.10 -2.79 -1.21 1.00 -2.04 0.33 -1.29 -2.01 1.04 -1.51 -1.88 1.36
P-value 0.04 0.10 0.35 0.23 0.00 0.50 0.06 0.77 0.26 0.07 0.22 0.53 0.37 0.35
IMF forecast 1.50 0.96 0.61 0.16 0.27 -0.30 0.98 0.20 0.57 1.01 -0.11 0.40 0.78 -0.40
P-value 0.02 0.08 0.20 0.72 0.01 0.55 0.02 0.68 0.22 0.03 0.69 0.54 0.32 0.50 
 
   Table B14: Comparison of Commission and IMF forecasts: Squared-error loss differentials (with small sample correction)  
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
Mean differential -0.08 -0.31 -0.08 1.37 -0.06 -0.13 0.00 -0.23 0.10 0.10 -0.20 -0.32 -0.04 -0.01
P-value 0.71 0.32 0.63 0.08 0.44 0.20 0.98 0.12 0.53 0.59 0.44 0.20 0.78 0.95
GDP - Year ahead
Mean differential -0.67 -0.66 -1.42 1.05 -0.06 -0.21 -0.93 -0.50 -0.37 -0.60 -1.94 0.02 0.04 -0.47
P-value 0.42 0.14 0.13 0.40 0.57 0.62 0.15 0.06 0.46 0.09 0.10 0.96 0.84 0.14 
 
   Table B15: Comparison of Commission and IMF forecasts: Test for forecast encompassing (with small sample correction)  
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
Constant 0.06 0.09 0.16 1.44 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.13 0.09 -0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.05
P-value 0.27 0.26 0.09 0.01 0.36 0.65 0.11 0.84 0.10 0.18 0.52 0.78 0.17 0.16
GDP - Year ahead
Constant -0.15 -0.11 -0.13 1.18 0.03 0.01 -0.32 -0.16 0.09 -0.07 -0.45 0.23 0.09 -0.12
P-value 0.69 0.76 0.67 0.03 0.31 0.48 0.92 0.92 0.34 0.70 0.85 0.18 0.18 0.78 
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   Table B16: Comparison of Commission and IMF forecasts: Regressions of realisations on COMM and IMF forecasts
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
Commission forecast 1.14 0.97 0.66 0.57 0.21 1.32 1.54 1.94 0.34 0.39 1.43 1.94 0.64 0.47
P-value 0.04 0.03 0.51 0.23 0.42 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.63 0.59 0.00 0.12 0.44 0.51
IMF forecast -0.29 -0.21 0.27 0.79 0.71 -0.35 -0.83 -1.10 0.55 0.43 -0.14 -1.18 0.07 0.52
P-value 0.62 0.68 0.81 0.21 0.03 0.61 0.28 0.08 0.52 0.62 0.62 0.36 0.94 0.45
GDP - Year ahead
Commission forecast 1.46 1.03 1.38 0.91 1.03 0.99 1.97 0.85 1.14 0.77 1.53 0.31 0.23 1.36
P-value 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.22 0.05 0.17 0.00 0.86 0.79 0.06
IMF forecast -1.98 -0.98 -1.05 -0.03 -0.31 0.32 -1.96 -0.02 -0.75 -0.85 -0.16 0.26 -0.08 0.01
P-value 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.98 0.35 0.78 0.00 0.99 0.38 0.14 0.61 0.89 0.94 0.99 
 




Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
RMSE(COMM) 0.79 0.80 0.80 1.95 0.41 0.58 0.62 0.73 0.95 0.71 0.87 1.31 0.82 0.69
RMSE(a=-0.5) 0.84 0.85 0.79 2.03 0.41 0.62 0.64 0.77 0.90 0.68 0.99 1.37 0.81 0.68
RMSE(a=-0.25) 0.81 0.81 0.79 1.98 0.41 0.59 0.63 0.75 0.92 0.69 0.92 1.34 0.81 0.68
R M S E ( a = 0 . 1 ) 0 . 7 90 . 8 10 . 8 11 . 9 50 . 4 20 . 5 70 . 6 20 . 7 2 0 . 9 60 . 7 20 . 8 61 . 3 10 . 8 3 0 . 7 0
RMSE(a=0.25) 0.79 0.82 0.81 1.95 0.43 0.57 0.62 0.72 0.99 0.74 0.85 1.30 0.84 0.71
R M S E ( a = 0 . 5 ) 0 . 8 00 . 8 60 . 8 31 . 9 90 . 4 60 . 5 70 . 6 30 . 7 1 1 . 0 30 . 7 80 . 8 51 . 3 00 . 8 7 0 . 7 4
GDP - Year ahead
RMSE(COMM) 1.25 0.91 1.14 2.88 0.54 0.95 1.04 1.14 1.18 0.95 1.19 1.59 1.06 1.17
RMSE(a=-0.5) 1.40 1.00 1.32 2.89 0.55 1.01 1.21 1.23 1.23 1.01 1.50 1.58 1.03 1.25
RMSE(a=-0.25) 1.31 0.94 1.22 2.87 0.54 0.98 1.12 1.18 1.19 0.97 1.33 1.59 1.04 1.21
R M S E ( a = 0 . 1 ) 1 . 2 30 . 9 01 . 1 22 . 8 90 . 5 40 . 9 51 . 0 11 . 1 3 1 . 1 80 . 9 41 . 1 41 . 6 01 . 0 7 1 . 1 6
RMSE(a=0.25) 1.21 0.90 1.10 2.92 0.56 0.95 0.97 1.11 1.19 0.94 1.09 1.61 1.09 1.15
R M S E ( a = 0 . 5 ) 1 . 1 80 . 9 21 . 0 92 . 9 80 . 5 90 . 9 60 . 9 11 . 0 9 1 . 2 30 . 9 51 . 0 41 . 6 21 . 1 2 1 . 1 4  
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   Table B18: Comparison of Commission and OECD forecasts
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
Sample 75/05 75/05 71/05 75/05 81/05 86/05 71/05 71/05 81/05 75/05 95/05 86/05 95/05 95/05 73/05
N o  o f  o b s . 3 13 13 53 12 52 03 53 5 2 5 3 11 12 01 11 1 3 3
ME(COMM) 0.07 0.08 0.15 -0.68 -0.12 -0.20 0.09 0.35 -0.94 0.03 0.15 0.24 0.16 -0.09 0.01
ME(OECD) 0.08 -0.22 0.08 -0.48 -0.15 -0.12 0.10 0.06 -0.48 -0.07 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.12
MAE(COMM) 0.71 0.66 0.79 1.60 0.68 0.55 0.54 0.81 1.35 0.76 0.50 0.70 0.96 0.58 0.69
MAE(OECD) 0.71 0.63 0.72 1.30 0.66 0.49 0.58 0.70 1.21 0.74 0.47 0.74 0.76 0.54 0.63
RMSE(COMM) 0.89 0.86 1.07 1.92 0.87 0.77 0.72 1.16 1.90 0.98 0.71 0.87 1.31 0.82 0.89
RMSE(OECD) 0.86 0.75 0.89 1.61 0.82 0.73 0.83 1.02 1.55 0.87 0.60 0.93 1.17 0.73 0.86
THEIL1(COMM) 0.50 0.39 0.44 0.67 0.63 0.62 0.36 0.45 0.91 0.70 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.63 0.46
THEIL1(OECD) 0.54 0.34 0.36 0.64 0.62 0.59 0.40 0.39 0.73 0.56 0.56 0.72 0.55 0.61 0.45
THEIL2(COMM) 0.62 0.55 0.59 0.58 0.54 0.55 0.44 0.62 0.96 0.68 0.83 0.47 0.79 0.87 0.50
THEIL2(OECD) 0.61 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.54 0.63 0.56 0.73 0.50 0.73 0.82 0.46
THEIL2*(COMM) 0.55 0.47 0.54 0.54 0.51 0.49 0.40 0.56 0.87 0.61 0.71 0.43 0.69 0.72 0.44
THEIL2*(OECD) 0.55 0.40 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.62 0.47 0.63 0.67 0.41
Success rate(COMM) 83 90 85 87 88 89 88 85 75 70 80 74 100 80 88
Success rate(OECD) 80 90 79 83 79 95 88 88 75 77 80 79 100 80 88
% of positive errors(COMM) 52 61 51 39 36 40 57 69 32 42 64 65 55 45 61
% of positive errors(OECD) 48 45 51 35 32 55 60 63 48 39 45 60 36 55 64
GDP - Year ahead
Sample 76/05 76/05 71/05 76/05 82/05 87/05 71/05 71/05 82/05 76/05 95/05 87/05 95/05 95/05 74/05
N o  o f  o b s . 3 03 03 53 02 41 93 53 5 2 4 3 01 11 91 11 1 3 2
ME(COMM) 0.12 0.07 0.45 -1.07 -0.11 -0.13 0.38 0.65 -0.60 0.01 0.36 0.41 -0.07 0.22 0.25
ME(OECD) 0.16 -0.15 0.30 -1.09 -0.20 -0.13 0.25 0.29 -0.52 -0.04 0.22 0.51 -0.21 0.04 0.07
MAE(COMM) 0.96 0.85 1.21 2.14 0.87 0.79 0.83 1.25 1.98 1.03 0.71 0.95 1.27 0.80 1.07
MAE(OECD) 0.97 0.86 1.16 2.22 0.78 0.78 0.86 1.37 1.93 1.09 0.69 1.02 1.23 0.87 1.02
RMSE(COMM) 1.22 1.13 1.64 2.50 1.23 1.06 1.15 1.72 2.47 1.25 0.95 1.19 1.59 1.06 1.38
RMSE(OECD) 1.28 1.10 1.60 2.55 1.04 1.03 1.22 1.84 2.52 1.34 0.88 1.30 1.66 1.04 1.43
THEIL1(COMM) 0.68 0.61 0.69 0.92 0.81 0.65 0.58 0.69 0.86 0.76 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.75 0.72
THEIL1(OECD) 0.76 0.56 0.63 0.91 0.67 0.62 0.61 0.75 0.88 0.75 0.69 0.82 0.74 0.76 0.75
THEIL2(COMM) 0.88 0.78 0.89 0.80 0.76 0.72 0.71 0.90 1.00 0.81 1.23 0.65 0.99 1.13 0.81
THEIL2(OECD) 0.92 0.75 0.87 0.78 0.64 0.69 0.75 0.97 1.09 0.86 1.15 0.71 1.04 1.14 0.81
THEIL2*(COMM) 0.80 0.67 0.80 0.71 0.66 0.55 0.62 0.80 0.85 0.68 0.95 0.53 0.80 0.93 0.73
THEIL2*(OECD) 0.83 0.65 0.77 0.70 0.55 0.53 0.66 0.86 0.89 0.72 0.90 0.58 0.83 0.93 0.71
Success rate(COMM) 72 86 71 59 74 67 74 71 48 55 70 67 80 80 81
Success rate(OECD) 69 83 65 59 78 61 74 71 57 66 60 61 90 70 84
% of positive errors(COMM) 57 47 66 30 29 47 63 71 38 47 55 63 45 55 59
% of positive errors(OECD) 57 50 60 37 38 47 69 54 46 50 55 74 36 55 47 
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   Table B19: Comparison of Commission and OECD forecasts: Proportion of positive forecast differentials  
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
% 5 86 17 16 56 04 55 78 9 6 0 7 48 26 08 24 5 5 8
GDP - Year ahead
% 4 76 07 77 06 35 86 97 1 5 4 7 07 33 76 46 4 6 3  
 
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP-current year
α (COMM) 0.07 0.08 0.15 -0.68 -0.12 -0.20 0.09 0.35 -0.94 0.03 0.15 0.24 0.16 -0.09 0.01
Signif. α=0 (COMM) 0.68 0.60 0.43 0.05 0.50 0.26 0.47 0.08 0.01 0.89 0.50 0.23 0.70 0.73 0.95
α (OECD) 0.08 -0.22 0.08 -0.48 -0.15 -0.12 0.10 0.06 -0.48 -0.07 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.12
Signif. α=0 (OECD) 0.63 0.11 0.61 0.10 0.38 0.48 0.50 0.72 0.13 0.66 0.78 0.53 1.00 0.91 0.41
GDP-year ahead
α (COMM) 0.12 0.07 0.45 -1.07 -0.11 -0.13 0.38 0.65 -0.60 0.01 0.36 0.41 -0.07 0.22 0.25
Signif. α=0 (COMM) 0.61 0.75 0.11 0.02 0.66 0.62 0.05 0.02 0.24 0.96 0.22 0.14 0.89 0.52 0.31
α (OECD) 0.16 -0.15 0.30 -1.09 -0.20 -0.13 0.25 0.29 -0.52 -0.04 0.22 0.51 -0.21 0.04 0.07
Signif. α=0 (OECD) 0.51 0.45 0.27 0.02 0.35 0.59 0.22 0.35 0.33 0.87 0.44 0.09 0.70 0.91 0.79
Table B20: Comparison of Commission and OECD forecasts: Bias
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Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP-current year
α(COMM) 0.00 0.00 0.12 -0.88 -0.19 -0.14 0.07 0.38 -0.61 -0.04 0.06 0.18 0.08 -0.08 0.00
Signif. α=0(COMM) 1.00 1.00 0.52 0.02 0.26 0.45 0.61 0.05 0.13 0.84 0.81 0.35 0.86 0.80 0.99
Signif. α=0(COMM)-bootstrap 1.00 0.98 0.50 0.01 0.26 0.46 0.61 0.06 0.16 0.86 0.77 0.44 0.80 0.81 0.99
β(COMM) 0.21 -0.01 0.05 -0.11 0.06 0.32 0.18 -0.31 0.35 0.12 0.12 0.44 -0.20 -0.01 -0.22
Signif. β=0(COMM) 0.24 0.97 0.76 0.53 0.76 0.19 0.30 0.06 0.09 0.51 0.72 0.06 0.58 0.97 0.23
Signif. β=0(COMM)-bootstrap 0.14 0.90 0.60 0.61 0.59 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.35 0.39 0.02 0.66 0.74 0.25
Signif. α=0, β=0(COMM)  0.49 1.00 0.75 0.05 0.48 0.24 0.48 0.06 0.01 0.78 0.88 0.07 0.84 0.96 0.48
α(OECD) 0.00 -0.24 0.07 -0.45 -0.21 -0.09 0.07 0.02 -0.49 -0.08 -0.04 0.15 -0.06 0.08 0.10
Signif. α=0(OECD) 0.99 0.09 0.68 0.16 0.21 0.60 0.65 0.90 0.16 0.64 0.83 0.47 0.89 0.78 0.52
Signif. α=0(OECD)-bootstrap 0.92 0.11 0.69 0.16 0.21 0.61 0.69 0.98 0.15 0.64 0.90 0.57 0.95 0.79 0.57
β(OECD) 0.29 0.05 -0.08 0.02 0.09 0.33 0.22 -0.12 0.01 0.27 0.05 0.38 -0.01 0.13 -0.02
Signif. β=0(OECD) 0.10 0.80 0.64 0.93 0.65 0.17 0.21 0.47 0.97 0.16 0.87 0.09 0.97 0.72 0.91
Signif. β=0(OECD)-bootstrap 0.03 0.61 0.71 0.77 0.52 0.04 0.10 0.55 0.77 0.07 0.60 0.02 0.69 0.37 1.00
Signif. α=0, β=0(OECD)  0.24 0.18 0.84 0.31 0.37 0.30 0.38 0.77 0.32 0.31 0.97 0.16 0.99 0.89 0.81
GDP-year ahead
α(COMM) 0.12 0.09 0.46 -0.78 -0.21 0.02 0.38 0.52 -0.67 0.07 0.37 0.41 -0.17 0.32 0.11
Signif. α=0(COMM) 0.62 0.68 0.13 0.11 0.42 0.94 0.07 0.07 0.23 0.77 0.27 0.16 0.77 0.41 0.64
Signif. α=0(COMM)-bootstrap 0.61 0.70 0.10 0.13 0.43 0.89 0.06 0.05 0.26 0.77 0.19 0.18 0.78 0.37 0.65
β(COMM) 0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.26 -0.01 0.35 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.19 -0.28 0.25 -0.14 -0.27 0.25
Signif. β=0(COMM) 0.83 0.79 0.74 0.17 0.95 0.11 0.95 0.91 0.89 0.30 0.40 0.32 0.69 0.44 0.15
Signif. β=0(COMM)-bootstrap 0.68 0.63 0.84 0.08 0.88 0.03 0.79 0.77 0.93 0.18 0.42 0.15 0.84 0.46 0.08
Signif. α=0, β=0(COMM)  0.86 0.87 0.30 0.03 0.71 0.27 0.16 0.13 0.47 0.56 0.47 0.14 0.89 0.57 0.26
α(OECD) 0.23 -0.11 0.32 -0.67 -0.29 0.01 0.27 0.09 -0.61 0.06 0.14 0.38 -0.32 0.16 -0.05
Signif. α=0(OECD) 0.35 0.62 0.27 0.17 0.19 0.95 0.22 0.75 0.28 0.81 0.66 0.17 0.61 0.64 0.82
Signif. α=0(OECD)-bootstrap 0.37 0.60 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.91 0.20 0.77 0.29 0.84 0.63 0.23 0.66 0.66 0.79
β(OECD) -0.03 0.12 -0.07 0.32 -0.08 0.34 -0.13 0.18 0.03 0.12 -0.08 0.51 -0.15 -0.28 0.30
Signif. β=0(OECD) 0.86 0.52 0.70 0.09 0.71 0.12 0.47 0.23 0.90 0.50 0.82 0.03 0.67 0.40 0.07
Signif. β=0(OECD)-bootstrap 0.96 0.34 0.78 0.03 0.82 0.04 0.54 0.15 0.71 0.36 0.99 0.00 0.81 0.42 0.03
Signif. α=0, β=0(OECD)  0.64 0.68 0.52 0.02 0.41 0.29 0.41 0.42 0.51 0.77 0.90 0.01 0.81 0.61 0.19
Table B21: Comparison of Commission and OECD forecasts: Unbiasedness and no serial correlation
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   Table B22: Comparison of Commission and OECD forecasts: Regressions of COMM forecast errors on OECD forecasts
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
Constant 0.10 0.40 0.23 0.25 -0.06 0.15 -0.10 0.52 -1.68 -0.10 -0.31 1.21 0.34 -0.55 -0.15
P-value 0.76 0.13 0.42 0.65 0.86 0.75 0.66 0.10 0.00 0.74 0.65 0.01 0.80 0.55 0.54
OECD forecast -0.02 -0.18 -0.04 -0.25 -0.03 -0.12 0.08 -0.09 0.33 0.07 0.24 -0.37 -0.05 0.19 0.09
P-value 0.92 0.13 0.69 0.04 0.83 0.43 0.31 0.48 0.07 0.60 0.46 0.01 0.89 0.60 0.38
GDP - Year ahead
Constant -0.33 0.53 0.45 -0.59 0.06 0.87 0.19 0.25 -2.13 -0.31 -1.26 2.54 -1.17 -2.48 0.38
P-value 0.61 0.21 0.49 0.51 0.90 0.31 0.65 0.59 0.04 0.50 0.24 0.01 0.57 0.16 0.38
OECD forecast 0.22 -0.24 0.00 -0.13 -0.08 -0.34 0.07 0.19 0.59 0.17 0.72 -0.76 0.32 1.07 -0.07
P-value 0.46 0.21 1.00 0.53 0.67 0.22 0.61 0.26 0.09 0.42 0.13 0.02 0.59 0.13 0.71 
   Table B23: Comparison of Commission and OECD forecasts: Squared-error loss differentials (with small sample correction)  
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
Mean differential 0.05 0.17 0.37 1.11 0.09 0.06 -0.18 0.29 1.22 0.19 0.14 -0.10 0.36 0.14 0.06
P-value 0.66 0.45 0.37 0.12 0.32 0.36 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.18 0.34 0.54 0.05 0.32 0.62
GDP - Year ahead
Mean differential -0.15 0.07 0.14 -0.26 0.42 0.06 -0.17 -0.42 -0.28 -0.24 0.12 -0.27 -0.22 0.04 -0.13
P-value 0.57 0.80 0.55 0.77 0.29 0.51 0.34 0.54 0.76 0.38 0.44 0.10 0.53 0.91 0.56 
 
   Table B24: Comparison of Commission and OECD forecasts: Test for forecast encompassing (with small sample correction)  
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
Constant 0.18 0.28 0.34 1.70 0.10 0.06 -0.03 0.29 1.69 0.20 0.10 0.01 0.30 0.12 0.29
P-value 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.66 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.46 0.02 0.08 0.02
GDP - Year ahead
Constant 0.09 0.27 0.22 0.41 0.38 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.11 -0.01 0.11 -0.07 0.05 0.13 0.08
P-value 0.21 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.18 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.52 0.09 0.80 0.41 0.23 0.24 
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   Table B25: Comparison of Commission and OECD forecasts: Regressions of realisations on COMM and OECD forecasts
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
Commission forecast -0.12 -0.08 -0.57 0.44 0.29 0.31 0.96 0.22 1.46 -0.18 -0.55 1.91 -0.23 -0.32 0.42
P-value 0.80 0.81 0.09 0.25 0.57 0.71 0.04 0.62 0.07 0.64 0.70 0.00 0.85 0.79 0.11
OECD forecast 1.23 1.17 1.41 0.72 0.75 0.76 -0.04 0.82 -0.77 1.01 1.39 -0.49 1.11 1.02 0.51
P-value 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.35 0.93 0.06 0.32 0.01 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.39 0.07
GDP - Year ahead
Commission forecast 0.78 0.65 0.29 0.91 -0.32 -0.44 1.14 0.98 1.99 0.85 0.51 0.11 0.47 0.87 -0.12
P-value 0.05 0.12 0.61 0.16 0.47 0.77 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.67 0.90 0.69 0.46 0.87
OECD forecast -0.02 0.44 0.63 0.21 1.15 1.61 -0.19 -0.17 -1.59 -0.03 -0.28 1.84 0.08 -0.94 0.90
P-value 0.96 0.15 0.27 0.73 0.01 0.24 0.66 0.69 0.15 0.95 0.82 0.12 0.94 0.50 0.14 
 




Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom
GDP - Current year
RMSE(COMM) 0.89 0.86 1.07 1.92 0.87 0.77 0.72 1.16 1.90 0.98 0.71 0.87 1.31 0.82 0.89
RMSE(a=-0.5) 0.85 0.76 0.94 1.85 0.85 0.74 0.74 1.07 1.98 0.90 0.67 0.92 1.25 0.79 0.82
RMSE(a=-0.25) 0.87 0.81 1.00 1.87 0.85 0.75 0.72 1.10 1.94 0.94 0.69 0.89 1.28 0.80 0.84
RMSE(a=0.1) 0.91 0.88 1.11 1.95 0.88 0.78 0.72 1.18 1.89 1.00 0.72 0.87 1.33 0.83 0.91
RMSE(a=0.25) 0.93 0.92 1.16 2.00 0.90 0.79 0.72 1.22 1.87 1.03 0.74 0.86 1.36 0.84 0.96
RMSE(a=0.5) 0.97 1.00 1.25 2.09 0.93 0.81 0.73 1.30 1.85 1.09 0.76 0.85 1.42 0.87 1.04
GDP - Year ahead
RMSE(COMM) 1.22 1.13 1.64 2.50 1.23 1.06 1.15 1.72 2.47 1.25 0.95 1.19 1.59 1.06 1.38
RMSE(a=-0.5) 1.23 1.08 1.59 2.57 1.11 1.03 1.17 1.73 2.52 1.27 0.94 1.24 1.60 1.05 1.34
RMSE(a=-0.25) 1.21 1.09 1.61 2.53 1.16 1.04 1.15 1.71 2.49 1.25 0.94 1.21 1.59 1.05 1.36
RMSE(a=0.1) 1.22 1.15 1.66 2.49 1.26 1.07 1.15 1.73 2.46 1.25 0.95 1.18 1.60 1.07 1.40
RMSE(a=0.25) 1.24 1.19 1.68 2.49 1.31 1.08 1.15 1.75 2.45 1.26 0.96 1.17 1.61 1.07 1.42
RMSE(a=0.5) 1.28 1.28 1.73 2.49 1.40 1.10 1.17 1.79 2.44 1.28 0.97 1.15 1.63 1.09 1.47 




WHY AND HOW TO IMPLEMENT BOOTSTRAP TESTS TO OBTAIN MORE ACCURATE 
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS OF FORECAST ERRORS? 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
Time samples of forecast errors are typically short, too short to allow for accurate inference 
on the biasness or serial correlation of the forecasts based on usual parametric tests. Standard 
tests are always valid asymptotically (where the number of observations n grows very large) 
whatever the form of the residuals distribution under the assumption identically 
independently distributed residuals (IID). Some other tests ("t-test", "F-test") calibrated for 
smaller sample size crucially rely on the assumption of normally independently distributed 
(NID) residuals for the test size to be correct16. Thus, the use of t-test or F-test with small 
samples where there is no reason that residuals are NID involves a risk of distorted size, low 
power and wrong inference. 
Two different issues may arise in a small sample framework. First, inference on small 
samples is always less precise insofar as the standard error of the estimated coefficient is 
larger with fewer observations (the test power is lower). Bootstrapping the test statistics, i.e. 
to resample the data randomly and compute the distribution of the bootstrapped statistics, is 
unlikely to help with this first issue, since the standard OLS regression framework is still 
used.  
Second, inference can be unreliable in all the cases where residuals are not well behaved, e.g. 
if the model is misspecified or if there are big measurement errors yielding outliers (such 
situations yield residuals that are not white noise). Then, bootstrapping the test statistics can 
be more robust than standard parametric inference in those problematic settings. In particular, 
bootstrapping can potentially lead to tests that are less sensitive to distortion caused by 
heteroskedasticity17 and autocorrelation in the residuals.  
The exact distribution of a test statistics for a given finite sample is never known, but it can be 
accurately approximated with some parametric distributions that take into account the number 
of observations, in order to compute the P-value of the test (marginal significance level) under 
the null hypothesis. A certain degree of approximation is always involved where some 
                                                 
16 See below in the next paragraphs a reminder on test power vs. size. 
17 See for instance Timmermann (2007). The case of heteroskedasticity should be viewed only as a particular 
case among all situations in which it can make sense to use the bootstrap (e.g. true model non linear, outliers 
with a statistics of interest sensitive to outliers, etc.)   
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inference is made on the basis of the tabulated distributions, because the underlying 
assumptions on the shape of the residuals distribution are generally not met in practice with 
economic time series, and it is very difficult to obtain accurate HAC18 statistics with small 
samples, albeit valid asymptotically.  
The basic intuition is that bootstrap methods provide other estimates of the test distribution, 
which might be in some cases at least as reliable as asymptotic approximations, but less 
sensitive to departures from the linear regression assumptions in small samples.  
Asymptotic distribution and sample distribution of a test statistics:  
Suppose we reject H0 (null hypothesis) whenever an estimated test statistics â is 
abnormal, that is in the very upper tail of its asymptotic cumulative distribution function 
F
∞. We reject if the P-value P(â) = 1 – F
∞(â) is smaller than α, α being the significance 
level or size of the test (1- α is the confidence level). We use F
∞ because we only know 
F
∞ while the 'true' F is unknown. 
Obviously, the accuracy of the test will strongly rely on the quality of the approximation 
of the distribution F of â with its asymptotic distribution F
∞. The bootstrap provides other 
estimates F
b of F that is different from F
∞ and, might yield more accurate tests at finite 
distance. The advantage of the bootstrap is that F
b is directly computed with Monte-Carlo 
experiments on the basis of the data sample and potentially does not require any 
distributional assumption.  
(More technical developments are in smaller font size and framed throughout this note). 
To be fair, the bootstrap is obviously most useful in cases where standard errors of the 
statistics of interest cannot be analytically computed, nor approximated, and tests are 
unavailable, e.g. with principal component analysis statistics19 or with many non-linear 
models. In the context of the linear model applied to the estimation of the stochastic process 
of forecast errors, there is no particular reason why a linear model estimated with OLS 
estimators would be irrelevant, especially where a first-order autocorrelation term is 
introduced in the regression. Even if the residuals’ empirical distribution is not perfectly 
normal, parametric test statistics remain quite well behaved at finite distance. A bootstrap 
analysis in such a context should be seen as potentially allowing to shed some light on the 
robustness of standard tests but it is unlikely to provide tests that are both superior in size and 
power in a general context. Monte-Carlo simulations show indeed that tests based on OLS 
estimates often remain valid where the residual are not NID and are generally as accurate as 
the best bootstrap tests. Where standard and bootstrap tests results would disagree, it is often 
not possible to know for sure which one is right, but it casts some doubts on the validity of the 
former tests results. 
Furthermore, there are many ways to bootstrap the statistics of interest and all the methods do 
necessarily lead to accurate tests, because all bootstrap distributions are not necessarily as 
accurate as the approximations valid under asymptotic theory. The literature provides some 
                                                 
18 Standard heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimators usually lead to distorted tests 
with small samples, cf. Kiefer et al. (2000). 
19 See Grenouilleau (2006) for an implementation of the bootstrap in the context of principal component 
analysis.    
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insights on theoretical results for several types of bootstrap methods, but their properties 
might usefully be checked with Monte-Carlo simulations for given test statistics of interest 
and sample size.  
We introduce in this annex a variety of appropriate bootstrap tests that can be applied to both 
the assessment of the bias and correlation of forecast errors. The properties of the statistics are 
systematically checked with Monte-Carlo simulations.  
2.  SOME BOOTSTRAP STATISTICS AND THEIR ASSESSMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF FORECAST 
ERROR REGRESSIONS 
We first introduce the forecast error regression framework that will be used. Second, we 
suggest two standard bootstrap statistics and explain how to assess them.  
2.1.  Test inference based on forecast error regressions 
2.1.1.  The forecast error regression 
A forecast is usually considered as optimal if it is unbiased and serially uncorrelated. The aim 
of the statistical exercise is thus to apply appropriate tests to check whether forecasts are 
biased or correlated over time. A simple regression involving the forecast errors can be used 
as a basis for statistical testing: 
t t t e r b e ε + + = −1 .  where b is the bias (constant term) and r the autocorrelation of the forecast 
errors. The residual term  t ε  is assumed to be a white noise. 
Tests on b and r based on their regression estimate and standard error estimate should help us 
to answer the question whether the forecasts are optimal or not. With the t-test, if b and/or r 
are larger in absolute terms than some thresholds (estimated) we conclude that the forecasts 
exhibit bias and/or correlation and the forecasts are thus not optimal. 
Student t-test: (case of the bias b) 
If 
2 / 1
1 ) ˆ ( ˆ / ˆ α σ
−
− > n t b b , where b ˆ  is the estimate of b, σ ˆ  the estimated variance of b ˆ  and 
α − 1
n t  the tabulated Student t for a sample size n and a confidence level of 1-α, we reject 
the null hypothesis H0 that b is not different from zero (we consider that b is indeed 
different from zero). 
One should notice in this OLS framework that: 
- If the second term with r is omitted although some autocorrelation at order 1 do exist, the 
estimate for the standard error of b is biased downwards and the t-test on b is unreliable20 
                                                 
20 It becomes oversized, i.e. it tends to reject too often H0 where it is true.   
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unless more sophisticated estimators of the standard error are used (e.g. Cochrane-Orcutt 
procedure, HAC estimators).  
In practice, one should use the regression without second term only if there is no sign what so 
ever that the residuals may be autocorrelated. Given that most tests for the autocorrelation of 
residuals lack power, the inference on the basis of the regression on the constant without 
evidence that there is absolutely no correlation in the residuals21 (very unlikely for economic 
time series) has chances to prove sometimes wrong. Moreover, standard HAC estimators are 
not necessarily reliable with small sample. 
- Even if the second term is included, autocorrelations at order higher than 1 may affect test 
results. Actually, the presence of higher-order autocorrelation could be tested. 
- More generally, if the residuals are not normal (for instance heteroskedastic), the t-test 
might be distorted for small samples. 
- In a small sample context, r is underestimated with OLS but this does not affect the test size 
for r (t- and F-tests remain correctly sized with normal residuals). 
2.1.2.  The meaning of statistical testing 
In non-statistical terms, it is crucial to realise that whether forecasts may be biased and 
correlated or not, we will never know for sure. Our aim is to find a test that is reliable enough 
in the sense that: 
- it does not reject the null hypothesis where it is true (correct decision) more frequently than 
the confidence level 1-α or the significance level α would suggest (minimise the test size or 
the significance 'type-I error'), 
- it rejects the null where it is indeed false (correct decision) as often as possible (maximise 
the test power or minimise 'type II error').  
There is a trade-off between both properties: while the test size decreases, the test power also 
declines. That is one of the reasons why one chooses to work with a given size (e.g. 
confidence level of 95 %) and not to raise it above that level in order to maximise the test 
power for that particular size. Using a test size of 5%, one implicitly considers that the most 
important is that the null is not rejected where it is true. In the context of forecasts evaluation, 
choosing a given size means that we prefer to be sure that we will conclude that the forecasts 
are optimal whenever they are truly optimal and do not care too much if we infer from the test 
they are optimal although they are not in reality. 
                                                 
21 Like in Timmermann (2006) or Keereman (1999).   
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2.2.  Standard bootstrapped statistics 
2.2.1.  Bootstrapping pairs or residuals  
In the case of economic time series, there are two different ways of bootstrapping, i.e. 
resampling randomly with replacement, a regression model22: one can bootstrap the pairs 
(xi,yi) where the series of yi is regressed on that of xi, or one can bootstrap the residuals of the 
regression  β ε ˆ . ˆ i i i x y − =  where β is the vector of regression coefficients.  
Bootstrap data sets 
Pairwise bootstrap: the set is of the form (for B bootstrap replicates): 
( ) ( ) ( ) { } iB iB i i i i y x y x y x , ,..., , , , 2 2 1 1         (Method  PW) 
Residual bootstrap, the set is of the form (for B bootstrap replicates): 
( ) ( ) ( ) { } iB B B i i x x x x x x ε β ε β ε β ˆ ˆ . , ,..., ˆ ˆ . , , ˆ ˆ . , 2 2 2 1 1 1 + + +     (Method  RB) 
In the case of a lagged dependent variable (e.g. autocorrelation), it is important to treat the 
latter variable as xi and not as yi-1. Otherwise, the use of method PW would completely 
destroy the correlation that we try to capture with the estimation of the first-order 
autocorrelation23. Otherwise, it is necessary to use a more complex sampling scheme in the 
case of method PW: the moving-blocks bootstrap. The design consists in sampling from 
continuous blocks of observations (of the same size l). The idea is to choose a block size large 
enough so that we retain the correlation present in observations less than l units apart. A 
drawback of this method is that the performance of the test depends on the relevance of the 
chosen blocks length (but it can be monitored with Monte-Carlo experiments). 
Which method is better? The answer depends on how relevant and well-specified the linear 
model is. In general, if the assumption that the residuals are orthogonal to the endogenous 
variables holds (as implied by the linear regression model), the residuals have the same 
distribution no matter what the xi are. Then, bootstrapping the residuals is likely to perform 
very well and, in practice, the assumption does not have to hold perfectly for the residuals 
bootstrap to give good results. On the other hand, even if this strong assumption does not hold 
at all, bootstrapping pairs is likely to perform reasonably well, since it is no much sensitive to 
more restrictive assumptions24.  
In short, it is useful to test both methods for the statistics of interest with Monte-Carlo 
experiments in a small sample context, since it is difficult to infer from the analysis of 
residuals from a small sample a departure from the linear regression model hypothesis.  
                                                 
22 See Efron (1993), p. 113, and more specifically Freedman (1981). 
23 Efron (1993) p. 100. 
24 Goncalves et al. (2004) show that pairwise bootstrap is more robust to conditional heteroskedasticity in the 
residuals than residuals bootstrap.   
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2.2.2.  The bootstrapped coefficient β percentile  
Through the use of the bootstrap, we can avoid having to make distribution assumptions about 
the regression residuals and this might improve test inference particularly in a small-sample 
context, where residuals are far from complying with strong distributional assumptions.  
The basic intuition behind bootstrap methods is that the computation of the statistics of 
interest for many bootstrap samples allows us to obtain a good empirical approximation of the 
(unknown) distribution of the statistics, or at least as good as that inferred from standard 
asymptotical distributions. Tests can thus be performed directly with the empirical bootstrap 
distribution instead of relying on standard tabulated distributions valid under strong 
assumptions. 
The simplest bootstrap estimate is that of the regression coefficients. An 'empirical' 
distribution of the coefficients  [ ] r b = ′ β  can be estimated directly from the data rather than 
relying on asymptotic distributions. The bootstrap least-square estimate * ˆ β  of  [] r b = ′ β  is 
the minimiser of the residual squared error for the bootstrap data. From the set of 
bootstrapped coefficients  * ˆ β , we obtain bootstrapped percentiles which approximate its 
distribution function.  
The 'percentile' confidence interval at a level of 1-2α is then: ( )
α α β β
− 1 * ˆ , * ˆ  where 
α β * ˆ  and 
α β
− 1 * ˆ  are respectively the α and 1-α quantiles of the empirical distribution of  * ˆ β .  
Based on this confidence interval, one can test the null hypothesis that the coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero. The null is rejected where 0 does not fall within the interval. 
Another solution (based on asymptotic approximation provided by the central limit theorem) 
is to use the bootstrap standard error (i.e. standard error of bootstrap 
estimates) ()
2 / 1 2
1
* ) ( * ˆ
1
1























) ( * ˆ 1
* β β  in the usual 
asymptotic confidence interval, preferably centred25 on the bias-corrected 
estimate * ˆ 2 ) ˆ * ( ˆ β β β β β − = − − : ( ) α α β β β β β β − − + − − − 1 1 *). ˆ ( * ˆ 2 , *). ˆ ( * ˆ 2 t s t s . 
These bootstrap statistics are only first-order accurate: the probabilities beyond the tails 
converge to the intended significance level α at a rate of n
-1/2. More accurate intervals can be 
constructed based on more sophisticated algorithm (BCa or ABC algorithms26), which 
converge at a rate of n
-1 to the expected significance level as well as the method described in 
the following section. Dedicated methods for the autoregression model, in particular the wild 
bootstrap, could also be used27. 
                                                 
25 MacKinnon (2002). 
26 Efron (1993), p. 178. An extension of this note could usefully provide an implementation of the BCa 
algorithm. 
27 See Hansen (1999) or Goncalves et al. (2004).   
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2.2.3.  The bootstrap percentile-t for regression coefficients28 
This solution consists in the approximate tabulation of the distribution of our statistics of 
interest with the data sample (instead of using the standard t-statistics table). 
For each of the bootstrap samples {e
b}1≤b≤B obtained with method 1 (with moving blocks) or 
2, we obtain  ) ( * ˆ b β  and its estimated standard error  ) ( * ˆ b σ . We 
compute
) ( * ˆ







= . The empirical distribution of Z* obtained with the bootstrap 
has the property to produce for very large B a test table which fits the data at hand unlike the 
t-table used in the case of the original t-test statistics for the OLS coefficients 




= Z , 
which applies to all samples of fixed size n under the assumption of NID residuals. 
Then, the bootstrap-t confidence interval is: ( ) ) ˆ ( ˆ . * ˆ ˆ ), ˆ ( ˆ . * ˆ ˆ 1 β σ β β σ β
α α t t − −
−  where the 
quantiles 
α * ˆ t  and 





t b Z /
1






t b Z /
1
* ˆ ) *(
1 29.  
Alternatively, in order to test the null that the coefficients are not significantly different from 
zero, we just need to compare the t-statistics 
α 2 1 ˆ
− z of the original sample coefficients to their 
respective bootstrap quantiles. The null is rejected where 
α 2 1 ˆ
− z  does not fall within the 
interval of the quantiles ( )
α α − 1 * ˆ , * ˆ t t . 
In practice, this method, which became more and more popular in the course of the 90s due to 
its asymptotic behaviour, can give somewhat erratic results and can be heavily influenced by 
a few outlying points30, while intervals based on bootstrapped statistics of interest are less 
erratic and more accurate if they are improved with more sophisticated algorithms to compute 
the critical values. 
2.2.4.  A non parametric bootstrap percentile-F 
Bootstrapping the F-test has rarely been implemented in the literature, except if this pseudo F-
test is performed with the parametric bootstrap31 (i.e. resampling the residuals from a 
Gaussian distribution): the F-test requires the normality of the residuals distribution and might 
give erratic results relaxing this assumption.  
The properties of a non-parametric bootstrap percentile-F computed exactly in the same way 
as the percentile-t (i.e. comparing the F-stat of the original sample to the distribution of the F-
                                                 
28 It is also called t-interval (Efron) or bootstrap with asymptotic refinement. 
29 I is the usual indicative function:  test I =1 if the test result is true or else 0. 
30 Efron (1993), p. 160. 
31 See an example in Davidson (1998).   
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stat of the bootstrapped data32) are quite problematic. The problem could be that the sets of 
residuals drawn randomly with replacement from a set of Gaussian residuals might exhibit 
empirical distributions that do not suit the approximation of the upper tail of the percentile-F. 
The results of Monte-Carlo simulations show indeed that the non-parametric bootstrap 
percentile-F is not well behaved even with valid resampling schemes. The test is seriously 
distorted even with Gaussian residuals under the null: the size of the test is virtually zero.  
3.  COMPARED PERFORMANCES OF BOOTSTRAP STATISTICS WITH MONTE-CARLO 
EXPERIMENTS 
3.1.  Data generating processes 
The empirical distributions of the forecast errors observed for most countries are usually not 
too far from a Gaussian distribution, however many irregularities are visible, especially at the 
tails. If conventional tests cannot be challenged under the assumption of normally-distributed 
first-order autocorrelated residuals where the model allows for such autocorrelation (as in the 
case of the weak efficiency regression), it is interesting to monitor to what extent the 
following relaxation of this hypothesis affects the behaviour of bootstrap tests compared to 
standard tests: 
•  Uniform errors: instead of drawing the residuals from a Gaussian, we draw them from a 
uniform appropriately scaled so that the variance is normalised to one (this can be viewed 
as an extreme case of fat tails), 
•  Gaussian errors with outliers: outliers appear randomly with a frequency of 2.5% (on 
average one per sample of 40 observations) and are generated with a normal distribution of 
standard deviation ten times larger than other residual (generated series are normalised to 
have unit variance). 
•  Heteroskedastic residuals: we allow for GARCH(1,1) residuals in the form of  t t t v h . = ε  
where vt is i.i.d. from a Gaussian standardized distribution and  () 1
2
1 . . − − + + = t t t h h β ε α ω . 
The unconditional variance of the residuals is standardized to one as for the other DGP33. 
The settings of  ) , ( β α  are taken from34 {(0.5,0);(0.3,0.65),(0.2,0.79);(0.05,0.94)}. 
Given the size of available forecast errors country sets, a (small) fixed sample size of 40 has 
been chosen for all experiments. The number of Monte-Carlo replications is set at 10,000, due 
to computational resources limitation. Thus, the test accuracy can be monitored with a hardly 
sufficient precision at the second digit (in particular the standard tests size with Gaussian 
residuals might slightly deviate from 5% at a confidence level of 95% with random 
                                                 
32 See Timmermann (2006, 2007) for such a pseudo F-test on forecast errors. 
33 Thus  ) ( - 1 β α ω + =  since the unconditional variance of a GARCH(1,1) process  is  ) - - 1 /( β α ω . 
34 We follow Goncalves et al. (2004) specification.   
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sampling). The number of bootstrap replications should be set so that α.(B+1) is an integer if 
the test is to be exact35. We choose here 199, bearing in mind that the accuracy of bootstrap 
test is evaluated with a Monte-Carlo of bootstrap.  
3.2.  Some comments on the results 
Detailed results are displayed below.  
Under the assumption of Gaussian residuals, the parametric sample tests are as expected 
almost perfectly sized. The F-test (simultaneous nullity of the bias and first-order 
autocorrelation coefficients) and the t-test for the autocorrelation coefficient exhibit a slight 
distortion (undersized) with a size of 4% (instead of 5% at 95% confidence level), which is 
most likely linked to the bias in the autocorrelation estimation in small samples. The 
bootstrap tests are generally well behaved except the percentile-F that is already severely 
distorted with a size of nil. Some of them are almost as accurate as standard tests, which is a 
good performance given the efficiency and unbiasness of the latter. The residuals bootstrap 
tests are (asymptotic approximation of the b-percentile and the percentile-t) are almost exactly 
sized for the bias coefficient, while they are slightly oversized for the autocorrelation 
coefficient. It is noteworthy that the power of those tests is at least as great as that of standard 
test and notably greater in the case of the autocorrelation coefficient. The corresponding 
pairwise bootstrap tests are about as accurate for the autocorrelation coefficient, but slightly 
oversized in the case of the bias coefficient. The b-percentile bootstrap test seems more 
accurate under its asymptotic approximation.  
Under a uniform distribution, the parametric tests are perfectly sized: apparently the slight 
increase in size due to the relaxation of the Gaussian hypothesis compensates perfectly the 
slight downward bias previously reported. Again, the b-percentile (asymptotic approximation) 
and the percentile-t bootstrap tests are almost as accurate. This time, the pairwise tests are 
more accurately sized, but the residuals tests exhibit a greater power for the autocorrelation 
coefficient.  
Under the assumption of outliers, the parametric tests are no longer as well behaved. They are 
slightly undersized for both coefficients and their power is substantially lowered for the 
autocorrelation coefficient. The b-percentile (asymptotic approximation) and the percentile-t 
residuals bootstrap tests are, on the other hand, correctly sized except the percentile-t that is 
oversized for the bias coefficient (8%). The pairwise b-percentile test behaviour is almost 
identical to that of standard tests. The pairwise percentile-t test is slightly more oversized for 
the bias coefficient (9%).  
Under a heteroskedastic distributions with no (β=0) or medium volatility persistence 
(β=0.65), all pairwise bootstrap tests give similar results and clearly outperform standard tests 
as well as residuals bootstrap tests. They exhibit the best size performance for the correlation 
coefficient (8%), albeit at the cost of a lower power than other tests. Their size for the bias 
coefficient is only slightly distorted compared to other tests (6-7% vs. 4% for standard tests 
                                                 
35 Davidson and MacKinnon (2000). In our case it is however not strictly necessary given that the tests will not 
be exact since the underlying statistics is only asymptotically pivotal.   
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and 5% for the residuals percentile-t test). The F-test is also very distorted (size of 10% for 
the joint hypothesis of nullity of both coefficients). 
Where the volatility persistence grows very large (β=0.79, 0.94), the pairwise bootstrap tests 
are better behaved than other tests only for the autocorrelation coefficient. Differences in size 
with the standard tests become nevertheless small (for the best pairwise test 7% vs. 8% for 
standard tests). For the bias coefficient, the usual residuals bootstrap tests and the standard 
tests perform better than the pairwise bootstrap tests (size of 5% vs. 6-7%). The superiority of 
pairwise bootstrap tests is thus no longer obvious where the variance autocorrelation grows 
large. Indeed, standard parametric tests are reasonably accurate under very persistent 
heteroskedastic processes36.  
In summary, where residuals exhibit both a Gaussian distribution or homoskedastic 
distributions with fat or irregular tails, the b-percentile (asymptotic approximation) and the 
percentile-t residuals bootstrap tests perform well and should allow for reliable inference and, 
in some cases, slightly more reliable than standard sample test. It is noteworthy that their 
power is often greater to reject the null for the autocorrelation coefficient. Under 
heteroskedastic distributions for the residuals, the pairwise bootstrap tests work well for low 
or moderate volatility persistence, whereas standard tests together with the residuals 
percentile-t test work better under persistent volatility. 
All in all, the residuals percentile-t test produces fairly reliable results under many DGP and 
provides an interesting alternative to standard parametric tests in the context of assessing the 
bias and the autocorrelation of forecast errors based on a relatively small number of 
observations. 
                                                 
36 These results are valid for relatively small n (n = 40 in our experiments). Goncalves et al. (2004) report a 
deterioration in the accuracy for large n.   
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3.3.  Detailed Monte-Carlo simulations results 
3.3.1.  Gaussian residuals 
0% 10% 20% 30% 0% 10% 20% 30%
0% t-stat 5% 8% 21% 41% 4% 4% 4% 4%
10% 5% 9% 21% 40% 6% 6% 6% 6%
20% 5% 9% 21% 40% 16% 16% 16% 16%
30% 5% 9% 21% 40% 35% 36% 36% 35%
0% b-percentile 5% 8% 20% 39% 7% 7% 7% 7%
10% (asymptotic 5% 9% 19% 36% 12% 12% 12% 11%
20%  approximation) 5% 8% 18% 34% 26% 26% 26% 26%
30% 4% 7% 17% 32% 49% 48% 49% 48%
0% b-percentile 8% 12% 27% 49% 5% 5% 4% 5%
10% (non asymptotic) 9% 13% 27% 49% 4% 4% 3% 4%
20% 9% 13% 28% 49% 9% 9% 9% 9%
30% 9% 14% 29% 50% 22% 23% 23% 23%
0% percentile-t 5% 9% 23% 43% 6% 7% 7% 7%
10% 6% 10% 22% 41% 12% 13% 12% 12%
20% 6% 10% 22% 40% 27% 27% 27% 27%
30% 5% 10% 21% 39% 50% 50% 51% 49%
0% Test: Bias = 0  4% 7% 17% 34% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10% & Autocorr. = 0 8% 12% 23% 43% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20% 17% 22% 37% 57% 0% 0% 0% 0%
30% 35% 42% 57% 74% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Residuals bootstrap
Bias (% of std) ►
  ▼ Autocorr. (% of std)
F-stat percentile-F
Test: Bias = 0 Test: Autocorrelation = 0
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 0% 10% 20% 30%
0% t-stat 5% 9% 21% 41% 4% 4% 5% 4%
10% 6% 9% 21% 41% 6% 6% 6% 6%
20% 5% 9% 21% 41% 16% 16% 16% 16%
30% 5% 9% 21% 39% 35% 35% 35% 35%
0% b-percentile 6% 10% 22% 42% 6% 6% 6% 6%
10% (asymptotic 6% 9% 22% 42% 7% 8% 8% 7%
20%  approximation) 6% 10% 22% 42% 18% 18% 18% 19%
30% 6% 10% 23% 41% 37% 38% 37% 37%
0% b-percentile 7% 11% 23% 43% 7% 7% 7% 8%
10% (non asymptotic) 7% 11% 23% 43% 9% 9% 9% 9%
20% 7% 11% 24% 42% 20% 19% 20% 20%
30% 7% 11% 24% 41% 39% 39% 38% 39%
0% percentile-t 6% 10% 23% 43% 6% 6% 7% 6%
10% 6% 10% 22% 43% 9% 9% 9% 9%
20% 6% 11% 23% 42% 20% 20% 20% 21%
30% 6% 11% 24% 42% 40% 40% 40% 40%
0% Test: Bias = 0  4% 7% 17% 35% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10% & Autocorr. = 0 7% 11% 23% 43% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20% 17% 22% 37% 58% 0% 0% 0% 0%
30% 35% 41% 56% 74% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Pairwise bootstrap
Bias (% of std) ►
  ▼ Autocorr. (% of std)
F-stat percentile-F
Test: Bias = 0 Test: Autocorrelation = 0
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3.3.2.  Uniform residuals 
0% 10% 20% 30% 0% 10% 20% 30%
0% t-stat 5% 9% 20% 39% 5% 5% 5% 5%
10% 5% 8% 20% 40% 6% 6% 6% 6%
20% 5% 9% 20% 39% 16% 16% 16% 16%
30% 6% 9% 20% 39% 35% 36% 35% 36%
0% b-percentile 5% 9% 19% 37% 7% 7% 7% 7%
10% (asymptotic 5% 8% 19% 37% 11% 11% 11% 11%
20%  approximation) 5% 8% 17% 34% 25% 25% 25% 25%
30% 5% 7% 16% 32% 47% 48% 47% 48%
0% b-percentile 8% 12% 25% 47% 5% 5% 5% 5%
10% (non asymptotic) 8% 12% 26% 48% 4% 3% 3% 4%
20% 9% 13% 27% 49% 9% 8% 8% 8%
30% 9% 13% 28% 50% 22% 22% 21% 22%
0% percentile-t 5% 9% 21% 40% 7% 7% 7% 7%
10% 5% 9% 21% 41% 12% 12% 11% 12%
20% 5% 9% 21% 39% 26% 26% 26% 26%
30% 5% 8% 20% 38% 49% 50% 49% 49%
0% Test: Bias = 0  5% 8% 16% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10% & Autocorr. = 0 8% 11% 23% 43% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20% 17% 22% 36% 57% 0% 0% 0% 0%
30% 36% 42% 55% 75% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Residuals bootstrap
Bias (% of std) ►
  ▼ Autocorr. (% of std)
F-stat percentile-F
Test: Bias = 0 Test: Autocorrelation = 0
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 0% 10% 20% 30%
0% t-stat 5% 9% 21% 40% 5% 5% 5% 5%
10% 6% 9% 20% 40% 6% 6% 7% 7%
20% 5% 9% 20% 39% 16% 16% 16% 16%
30% 5% 9% 21% 39% 35% 36% 35% 35%
0% b-percentile 5% 10% 22% 41% 6% 6% 6% 6%
10% (asymptotic 6% 10% 21% 41% 7% 8% 8% 8%
20%  approximation) 6% 10% 21% 40% 17% 17% 17% 17%
30% 6% 10% 22% 40% 36% 37% 36% 36%
0% b-percentile 6% 10% 22% 42% 7% 7% 7% 7%
10% (non asymptotic) 7% 10% 22% 41% 8% 8% 8% 8%
20% 7% 10% 22% 41% 19% 18% 19% 18%
30% 7% 10% 23% 40% 38% 38% 38% 38%
0% percentile-t 4% 9% 22% 41% 6% 6% 5% 6%
10% 5% 9% 21% 42% 7% 8% 8% 8%
20% 5% 9% 21% 41% 18% 18% 18% 18%
30% 5% 10% 22% 41% 38% 38% 38% 37%
0% Test: Bias = 0  5% 7% 17% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10% & Autocorr. = 0 8% 11% 23% 43% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20% 17% 22% 36% 57% 0% 0% 0% 0%
30% 35% 41% 56% 74% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Pairwise bootstrap
Bias (% of std) ►
  ▼ Autocorr. (% of std)
F-stat percentile-F
Test: Bias = 0 Test: Autocorrelation = 0
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3.3.3.  Residuals with outliers 
0% 10% 20% 30% 0% 10% 20% 30%
0% t-stat 4% 13% 39% 64% 3% 4% 3% 3%
10% 4% 12% 38% 63% 4% 5% 5% 5%
20% 4% 13% 38% 64% 12% 13% 13% 13%
30% 4% 13% 37% 61% 33% 34% 33% 34%
0% b-percentile 4% 13% 38% 62% 6% 6% 5% 5%
10% (asymptotic 4% 11% 35% 60% 10% 10% 10% 10%
20%  approximation) 3% 11% 33% 58% 27% 27% 28% 27%
30% 3% 10% 31% 54% 56% 56% 55% 56%
0% b-percentile 9% 22% 51% 71% 4% 4% 4% 4%
10% (non asymptotic) 10% 22% 51% 71% 3% 3% 4% 4%
20% 10% 22% 51% 72% 10% 10% 10% 10%
30% 11% 23% 52% 72% 28% 28% 27% 27%
0% percentile-t 8% 20% 47% 68% 5% 6% 5% 5%
10% 8% 19% 46% 67% 10% 10% 10% 10%
20% 8% 19% 45% 67% 26% 26% 26% 26%
30% 8% 18% 43% 64% 54% 54% 53% 54%
0% Test: Bias = 0  3% 10% 31% 58% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10% & Autocorr. = 0 6% 13% 39% 65% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20% 14% 25% 53% 74% 0% 0% 0% 0%
30% 33% 46% 69% 83% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Residuals bootstrap
Bias (% of std) ►
  ▼ Autocorr. (% of std)
F-stat percentile-F
Test: Bias = 0 Test: Autocorrelation = 0
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 0% 10% 20% 30%
0% t-stat 4% 13% 39% 64% 3% 3% 3% 3%
10% 4% 13% 39% 63% 4% 4% 4% 4%
20% 4% 14% 39% 63% 13% 13% 13% 13%
30% 4% 12% 38% 61% 32% 32% 32% 33%
0% b-percentile 4% 14% 39% 64% 3% 3% 4% 4%
10% (asymptotic 4% 14% 40% 63% 5% 5% 5% 5%
20%  approximation) 5% 14% 40% 62% 15% 15% 15% 15%
30% 4% 13% 39% 60% 36% 36% 35% 36%
0% b-percentile 8% 19% 46% 68% 7% 8% 8% 8%
10% (non asymptotic) 7% 19% 46% 67% 10% 11% 11% 10%
20% 8% 19% 47% 67% 23% 22% 23% 22%
30% 8% 19% 45% 66% 41% 42% 41% 42%
0% percentile-t 9% 21% 47% 68% 5% 6% 5% 5%
10% 8% 20% 47% 67% 8% 8% 8% 8%
20% 9% 21% 47% 67% 22% 22% 22% 22%
30% 9% 20% 47% 66% 43% 43% 42% 43%
0% Test: Bias = 0  3% 9% 31% 58% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10% & Autocorr. = 0 5% 14% 39% 64% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20% 14% 25% 53% 74% 0% 0% 0% 0%
30% 33% 46% 68% 82% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Pairwise bootstrap
Bias (% of std) ►
  ▼ Autocorr. (% of std)
F-stat percentile-F
Test: Bias = 0 Test: Autocorrelation = 0
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3.3.4.  Heteroskedastic residuals 
GARCH(1,1) residuals in the form of  t t t v h . = ε  where vt is i.i.d. from a Gaussian 
standardized distribution and  ( ) 1
2
1 . . − − + + = t t t h h β ε α ω , unconditional variance of the 
residuals set to one. 
(0.5,0)   ) , ( = β α  
0% 10% 20% 30% 0% 10% 20% 30%
0% t-stat 4% 9% 21% 41% 12% 13% 13% 13%
10% 4% 8% 22% 40% 14% 14% 15% 15%
20% 4% 8% 20% 39% 22% 22% 22% 22%
30% 4% 8% 19% 37% 34% 35% 33% 33%
0% b-percentile 4% 8% 21% 39% 17% 17% 17% 17%
10% (asymptotic 4% 8% 19% 36% 20% 20% 21% 21%
20%  approximation) 3% 7% 17% 34% 31% 30% 30% 30%
30% 3% 6% 16% 30% 44% 45% 43% 43%
0% b-percentile 7% 12% 28% 49% 12% 12% 12% 12%
10% (non asymptotic) 7% 13% 28% 49% 11% 11% 11% 12%
20% 7% 12% 29% 49% 16% 16% 15% 16%
30% 8% 13% 28% 48% 25% 25% 25% 25%
0% percentile-t 5% 10% 24% 43% 16% 17% 17% 17%
10% 5% 10% 23% 42% 20% 20% 21% 21%
20% 4% 9% 22% 40% 31% 31% 31% 31%
30% 4% 9% 20% 37% 45% 45% 44% 44%
0% Test: Bias = 0  10% 14% 25% 41% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10% & Autocorr. = 0 13% 17% 29% 47% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20% 21% 26% 40% 57% 0% 0% 0% 0%
30% 34% 39% 51% 67% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Residuals bootstrap
Bias (% of std) ►
  ▼ Autocorr. (% of std)
F-stat percentile-F
Test: Bias = 0 Test: Autocorrelation = 0
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 0% 10% 20% 30%
0% t-stat 4% 9% 21% 41% 13% 13% 13% 13%
10% 4% 9% 21% 41% 15% 14% 14% 14%
20% 4% 8% 20% 39% 22% 22% 22% 21%
30% 4% 7% 19% 37% 34% 34% 33% 33%
0% b-percentile 6% 12% 26% 47% 8% 7% 8% 8%
10% (asymptotic 6% 12% 27% 48% 9% 9% 8% 8%
20%  approximation) 6% 12% 26% 47% 13% 14% 13% 13%
30% 7% 12% 27% 47% 23% 22% 22% 22%
0% b-percentile 6% 11% 26% 48% 8% 8% 8% 8%
10% (non asymptotic) 6% 12% 27% 49% 9% 9% 9% 8%
20% 7% 12% 27% 48% 14% 15% 14% 14%
30% 7% 11% 27% 47% 26% 25% 24% 24%
0% percentile-t 6% 12% 27% 47% 8% 8% 9% 8%
10% 6% 12% 27% 48% 10% 10% 9% 9%
20% 6% 12% 27% 47% 14% 15% 15% 14%
30% 6% 12% 28% 47% 24% 23% 24% 23%
0% Test: Bias = 0  11% 14% 24% 41% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10% & Autocorr. = 0 14% 18% 30% 47% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20% 21% 26% 39% 56% 0% 0% 0% 0%
30% 34% 38% 51% 67% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Pairwise bootstrap
Bias (% of std) ►
  ▼ Autocorr. (% of std)
F-stat percentile-F
Test: Bias = 0 Test: Autocorrelation = 0
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(0.3,0.65)   ) , ( = β α   
0% 10% 20% 30% 0% 10% 20% 30%
0% t-stat 4% 12% 32% 53% 9% 9% 10% 10%
10% 5% 12% 31% 50% 10% 10% 12% 11%
20% 5% 12% 29% 45% 19% 18% 19% 18%
30% 4% 11% 27% 42% 31% 30% 30% 30%
0% b-percentile 4% 12% 30% 50% 13% 13% 13% 14%
10% (asymptotic 4% 11% 28% 47% 17% 16% 17% 17%
20%  approximation) 4% 10% 25% 41% 27% 27% 27% 27%
30% 3% 9% 22% 36% 42% 41% 41% 40%
0% b-percentile 7% 17% 38% 60% 9% 9% 10% 10%
10% (non asymptotic) 8% 17% 38% 58% 8% 8% 9% 8%
20% 8% 17% 37% 55% 13% 12% 13% 13%
30% 8% 16% 35% 52% 21% 21% 21% 21%
0% percentile-t 5% 14% 34% 54% 13% 12% 13% 13%
10% 5% 13% 33% 51% 17% 16% 17% 17%
20% 5% 13% 30% 46% 28% 28% 28% 27%
30% 4% 12% 27% 41% 43% 42% 42% 42%
0% Test: Bias = 0  8% 14% 30% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10% & Autocorr. = 0 10% 17% 36% 54% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20% 19% 26% 45% 62% 0% 0% 0% 0%
30% 30% 39% 56% 70% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Residuals bootstrap
Bias (% of std) ►
  ▼ Autocorr. (% of std)
F-stat percentile-F
Test: Bias = 0 Test: Autocorrelation = 0
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 0% 10% 20% 30%
0% t-stat 4% 12% 32% 52% 9% 10% 10% 10%
10% 5% 12% 30% 50% 11% 11% 11% 10%
20% 5% 11% 29% 47% 18% 18% 18% 18%
30% 5% 11% 26% 42% 31% 31% 30% 30%
0% b-percentile 6% 14% 35% 55% 7% 7% 7% 7%
10% (asymptotic 6% 14% 34% 53% 8% 8% 8% 7%
20%  approximation) 6% 14% 33% 51% 13% 14% 13% 13%
30% 6% 14% 31% 47% 24% 23% 23% 22%
0% b-percentile 6% 15% 36% 56% 7% 8% 8% 8%
10% (non asymptotic) 7% 15% 34% 54% 9% 9% 9% 8%
20% 7% 15% 34% 52% 14% 15% 14% 14%
30% 7% 15% 31% 47% 26% 25% 25% 24%
0% percentile-t 6% 15% 35% 55% 7% 8% 8% 8%
10% 6% 15% 34% 53% 9% 9% 9% 8%
20% 7% 14% 34% 52% 15% 15% 14% 14%
30% 6% 15% 31% 47% 25% 24% 24% 23%
0% Test: Bias = 0  8% 14% 30% 49% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10% & Autocorr. = 0 11% 17% 35% 53% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20% 18% 26% 44% 62% 0% 0% 0% 0%
30% 31% 39% 55% 70% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Pairwise bootstrap
Bias (% of std) ►
  ▼ Autocorr. (% of std)
F-stat percentile-F
Test: Bias = 0 Test: Autocorrelation = 0
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(0.2,0.79)   ) , ( = β α   
0% 10% 20% 30% 0% 10% 20% 30%
0% t-stat 5% 21% 48% 65% 8% 9% 9% 8%
10% 5% 20% 45% 61% 10% 9% 9% 10%
20% 5% 19% 42% 56% 19% 18% 17% 17%
30% 5% 18% 38% 50% 32% 32% 31% 30%
0% b-percentile 5% 20% 47% 62% 12% 12% 12% 12%
10% (asymptotic 5% 19% 42% 58% 16% 15% 15% 16%
20%  approximation) 4% 16% 38% 50% 27% 27% 26% 26%
30% 4% 15% 32% 43% 44% 43% 42% 42%
0% b-percentile 8% 26% 55% 70% 9% 9% 9% 9%
10% (non asymptotic) 8% 26% 52% 68% 8% 7% 7% 7%
20% 8% 25% 50% 64% 13% 12% 11% 12%
30% 9% 25% 47% 59% 23% 22% 22% 21%
0% percentile-t 6% 23% 49% 65% 11% 12% 11% 11%
10% 5% 22% 46% 62% 16% 15% 15% 16%
20% 5% 20% 43% 56% 28% 27% 27% 27%
30% 5% 19% 38% 49% 45% 44% 43% 43%
0% Test: Bias = 0  7% 20% 45% 61% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10% & Autocorr. = 0 10% 24% 49% 66% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20% 19% 33% 57% 71% 0% 0% 0% 0%
30% 32% 47% 67% 78% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Residuals bootstrap
Bias (% of std) ►
  ▼ Autocorr. (% of std)
F-stat percentile-F
Test: Bias = 0 Test: Autocorrelation = 0
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 0% 10% 20% 30%
0% t-stat 4% 21% 48% 65% 9% 8% 8% 8%
10% 4% 21% 45% 61% 10% 10% 10% 9%
20% 5% 19% 41% 56% 18% 18% 17% 17%
30% 5% 18% 37% 49% 32% 32% 31% 30%
0% b-percentile 6% 23% 49% 66% 7% 6% 6% 7%
10% (asymptotic 6% 23% 47% 62% 9% 8% 8% 8%
20%  approximation) 6% 21% 44% 58% 15% 15% 14% 14%
30% 7% 20% 40% 52% 27% 27% 26% 24%
0% b-percentile 7% 24% 50% 67% 8% 8% 8% 8%
10% (non asymptotic) 6% 23% 48% 64% 10% 9% 8% 8%
20% 7% 22% 45% 58% 17% 16% 16% 15%
30% 7% 21% 41% 53% 30% 30% 28% 27%
0% percentile-t 6% 23% 49% 66% 8% 7% 7% 8%
10% 6% 23% 47% 62% 10% 10% 9% 8%
20% 6% 22% 44% 58% 17% 17% 16% 15%
30% 7% 21% 40% 52% 29% 29% 27% 26%
0% Test: Bias = 0  7% 20% 44% 63% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10% & Autocorr. = 0 11% 26% 50% 65% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20% 19% 34% 57% 71% 0% 0% 0% 0%
30% 32% 48% 67% 77% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Pairwise bootstrap
Bias (% of std) ►
  ▼ Autocorr. (% of std)
F-stat percentile-F
Test: Bias = 0 Test: Autocorrelation = 0
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) (0.05,0.94   ) , ( = β α  
0% 10% 20% 30% 0% 10% 20% 30%
0% t-stat 5% 20% 52% 72% 8% 8% 8% 7%
10% 5% 21% 50% 70% 11% 10% 10% 10%
20% 5% 20% 49% 67% 20% 20% 19% 18%
30% 5% 19% 45% 65% 38% 37% 37% 35%
0% b-percentile 5% 20% 49% 70% 12% 12% 12% 11%
10% (asymptotic 4% 19% 47% 67% 16% 16% 16% 16%
20%  approximation) 4% 18% 44% 62% 29% 30% 29% 27%
30% 4% 16% 39% 57% 49% 49% 49% 47%
0% b-percentile 8% 26% 57% 76% 9% 9% 9% 8%
10% (non asymptotic) 8% 26% 57% 76% 8% 8% 8% 7%
20% 9% 27% 56% 74% 13% 14% 13% 12%
30% 9% 26% 54% 73% 27% 27% 26% 25%
0% percentile-t 6% 23% 53% 72% 12% 11% 11% 10%
10% 5% 22% 51% 70% 17% 16% 16% 16%
20% 6% 22% 49% 66% 30% 30% 30% 28%
30% 5% 20% 45% 63% 50% 49% 50% 48%
0% Test: Bias = 0  8% 20% 48% 69% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10% & Autocorr. = 0 11% 26% 55% 74% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20% 20% 37% 65% 80% 0% 0% 0% 0%
30% 37% 53% 76% 88% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Residuals bootstrap
Bias (% of std) ►
  ▼ Autocorr. (% of std)
F-stat percentile-F
Test: Bias = 0 Test: Autocorrelation = 0
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 0% 10% 20% 30%
0% t-stat 5% 21% 52% 73% 8% 9% 8% 7%
10% 5% 21% 51% 71% 10% 10% 9% 9%
20% 5% 19% 48% 69% 20% 20% 20% 19%
30% 5% 19% 46% 66% 37% 37% 36% 35%
0% b-percentile 6% 22% 51% 72% 7% 7% 7% 6%
10% (asymptotic 6% 22% 50% 70% 8% 8% 8% 8%
20%  approximation) 6% 21% 48% 68% 17% 17% 17% 17%
30% 6% 21% 46% 65% 33% 33% 32% 32%
0% b-percentile 7% 23% 52% 72% 8% 8% 8% 8%
10% (non asymptotic) 7% 23% 51% 70% 9% 9% 9% 9%
20% 7% 22% 49% 68% 19% 19% 19% 18%
30% 7% 21% 47% 64% 35% 35% 34% 34%
0% percentile-t 7% 23% 51% 71% 8% 8% 8% 7%
10% 6% 24% 50% 69% 10% 10% 10% 10%
20% 6% 22% 48% 68% 19% 20% 19% 19%
30% 7% 22% 47% 65% 36% 36% 34% 35%
0% Test: Bias = 0  7% 20% 48% 70% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10% & Autocorr. = 0 10% 25% 55% 74% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20% 20% 36% 65% 82% 0% 0% 0% 0%
30% 37% 53% 76% 88% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Pairwise bootstrap
Bias (% of std) ►
  ▼ Autocorr. (% of std)
F-stat percentile-F
Test: Bias = 0 Test: Autocorrelation = 0
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4.  CONCLUSION 
Inference on the bias or serial correlation of the forecast errors based on usual parametric tests 
may not be accurate, particularly where time samples of forecasts are typically short. A 
solution in order to obtain more accurate standard tests can be to bootstrap the latter statistics, 
i.e. to resample the data randomly and compute the test with the distribution of the 
bootstrapped statistics. In this annex, we introduce classical bootstrap tests that can be used 
for the evaluation of both the bias and the correlation of the Commission biyearly economic 
forecasts. The tests are screened with Monte-Carlo simulations. In particular, the percentile-t 
residuals bootstrap test exhibit correct size and reasonable power under a variety of data 
generating processes.  
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